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Résumé
 
Depuis  le  quinzième  siècle,  l'Empire  ottoman  représente  pour  l'Europe  une  source 
constante d'incompétence politique, de retard culturel et de mal. Elle a sans cesse causé friction 
et concurrence au sein de la communauté internationale européenne tout le long de son existence, 
particulièrement au dix-neuvième siècle, pourtant une période comparativement solidariste dans 
l'histoire  du  continent.  Étant donné  tout  cela,  la  Turquie  est  seule  à  avoir  un  gouvernement 
totalement séculaire parmi les  états  islamiques nés de  la  chute de la dynastie d'Osman, et elle 
demeure  aujourd'hui  le  pays  le  plus  proche  de  l'Europe  malgré  le  fait  qu'elle  fût  rejetée  à 
nombreuses  reprises  par  l'Union  européenne.  Comment la Turquie  a-t-elle  trouvé  cette place 
précaire dans le système international, prise entre deux mondes? C'est la question à laquelle que 
mémoire tente de répondre ce à travers une analyse socio-historique selon les principes de l'École 
anglaise des  relations internationales.  Après avoir présenté les principes fondateurs  de l'École 
anglaise  tels  que  'la  société  internationale'  et  le  rôle  joué  par  les  principales  institutions 
internationales  comme  la  diplomatie,  l'équilibre  des  puissances  et  le  droit  international,  le 
mémoire  propose un  historique des  relations  entre  Ottomans et  Européens  axé  sur les  enjeux 
émergents en  vue de  faire  ressortir  les  motifs,  en  attachant  une  attention particulière au  dix­
neuvième  siècle,  où  'la  question de l'Orient'  représentait  un  enjeu  crucial  pour  la  diplomatie 
occidentale.  Ensuite,  il  examine  l'émergence de  nouvelles normes de  la  société  internationale 
aussi  bien  que  de  la  société Turque Enfin,  il  explore  la  chute  final  de  la  Sublime  Porte,  la 
transformation de son noyau anatolien en république séculaire et l'acceptante a contre- cœur de 
cette république dans la société internationale européenne. IV 
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Summary
 
Ever since  the  Ottoman  Empire  captured  Constantinople  in  the  fifteenth  century,  the 
House of Osman has  represented political incompetence, cultural backwardness and evil.  From 
then  on,  it  fostered  seemingly  endless  friction  and  competition  within  European  international 
society,  particularly during the  nineteenth century, which was by  all  other respects a period  of 
relative continental solîdarity. That being said, Turkey is  the only secular state to  have emerged 
from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, and of all the states that share an Ottoman heritage, it is 
by  far  the  most  European  in  its  style  of governance.  The  European  Union  has  nevertheless 
repeatedly  rejected  Turkey's  membership  applications.  How exactly  did  Turkey come to  find 
itself caught between two worlds in  this precarious international position? That is  the question 
this  dissertation will attempt to answer through a socio-historical analysis based in the principles 
of the English School of international relations. Chapter one will set the theoretical backdrop by 
defining  the  Englîsh  School's  central  concepts  such  as  'International  Society'  as  well  as  by 
exploring the role oforder-maintaining institutions such as diplomacy, the Balance ofPower and 
international  law.  Chapter two  will  provide  historical  context in  Ottoman-European  relations 
with  the  emphasis  being  placed  on  re-emerging  patterns  of conflict,  particularly  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  when  the  'Eastern  Question'  was  most  prominent  in  European  foreign 
relations.  The  third  chapter  shall  describe  the  emergence  of new  ordering  principles  in  the 
international and Turkish societies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The fourth 
chapter explores the Ottoman Empire's last days, the transformation of its  Anatolîan heartland 
into  a  secular  state  and  the  unwilling  acceptance  of this  new  republîc  by  the  European 
international society. Findings shall be summarized in the text's conclusion. VI 
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 Introduction 
On  September 23,  2009  a  man named  Osman Ertugul  Osmanoglu,  age  97,  died  at  an 
Istanbul hospital. His passing made the news around the world. Born in  1912, he was a direct 
descendant Osman l,  the first Ottoman Sultan, and the grandson of Abdul Hamid II, perhaps the 
most  infamous of the Anatolian patriarchs. He was twelve years old when the first President of 
the Republic and father of modern Turkey,  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,  exiled the royal  family,  a 
necessary step in  the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Mr. Osmanoglu was a man who might 
have ruled an empire spanning three continents even at its weakest point. He ended up running a 
mining  company  from  New  York  City,  his  brief obituary  reduced  to  an  item  of historical 
curiosity  in  a  testament  to  how  much  things  have  changed  over  the  past  century.  From  the 
capture  of Constantinople  in  the  fifteenth  century  right  up  to  the  end  of World  War  l,  the 
Turkish-led Ottoman Empire embodied political incompetence, cultural backwardness and pure 
evil  to  Europeans. Today, Turkey is  a member of the United Nations and NATO. Moreover, of 
ail the Islamic states to  emerge from the fall of the Sultanate and abolition of the Caliphate, it is 
the only fully secular nation and the most European in its style of governance. Despite being the 
best- integrated  into  Europe's  international  society,  it  has  faced  repeated  rejections  from 
membership  to  the  EU.  How  is  it  that  Turkey  came  to  occupy  this  particular  place  in 
international society? 
Given  its  emphasis  on  the  historical  and  sociological  dimensions  in  international 
relations, the English School (ES) is weil suited to answering that question. The general thrust of 
the school's theory holds that in  any given historical period, outlying states in  the  international 
system will  tend to  adopt the  norms and  practices of the dominant states,  or of the dominant 
international society in  ES  parlance. Generally, this explanation applies to  the Turkish case, but 
the  devil  is  in  the  details.  The Bosporus separated more than  mere continents.  Culturally,  its 
opposing  shores  might  as  weB  have  been  different  planets  as  both  Christian  and  Islamic 
principles  governing  international  relations  prevented  any  convergence  or  rapprochement. 
Military and economic weakness forced the Sublime Porte to import European savoir-faire from 
the eighteenth century onwards. For the next two hundred years, the 'sick man of Europe' would 
try  fight  fire  with  fire  by resisting European political  and  economic penetration  by adopting 
European social and  physical technologies. In the end, the House of Osman burned down from 10 
the inside. These reforms, carried out at a snail's pace, had after two centuries created a reformist 
goveming class  with Westernized political  ideals,  the most radical  and  secularist elements of 
which,  represented  and  led  by Atatürk,  seized power in  the chaos which followed  WWI.  The 
year 1924 marks an obvious 'point of no  return' in Turkey's convergence with Europe and in  its 
transformation  from  the  political  head  of an  Islamic  theocracy  divinely  tasked  with  the 
destruction or conversion of  Christianity to a parliamentary nation-state. Turkey was the only 
losing  party of the  Great War to  dictate  its  terms  of peace  and  to  receive  reparations.  This 
dissertation hopes to determine whether or not Turkey became a member of international society 
immediately following the First World War. It seeks to describe and understand how the process 
of international  convergence took place in  the Turkish context and  to  delineate the patterns of 
international  relations  between  the  Ottoman  Empire/Turkey  and  the  European  international 
society which led to convergence. 
The first chapter will coyer the major points of  ES theory, focusing particularly on the 
contributions ofHedley Bull and Martin Wight, its two most important authors. Their differing 
conceptions of international society and the roles of what they considered to be the most 
important institutions of that society, namely the balance of power, international power ranking, 
intemationallaw and diplomacy, shall be dealt with in depth. Chapter two establishes the 
Ottoman Empire as the quintessential outsider with respect to European international society and 
traces the evolution of  the major trends and patterns in the relations across the Hellespont right 
up to the twentieth century. Particular attention is paid to the nineteenth century as the Porte and 
the 'Eastern Question' represented major issues in European foreign policy. Chapter three 
discusses the major changes in the ordering principles of international society as weIl as within 
the internaI political arena of the Ottoman Empire from the emergence of the Young Turks and 
the attempted installation of a constitutional government to the preliminary peace negotiations 
held in Paris in 1919. The fourth chapter tackles the Kemalist resistance to a  European-imposed 
peace, the emergence of modem Turkey through war, and the very reluctant acceptance of 
Turkey into the 'family of civilized nations' by European international society. A summary of  the 
main points and findings shall be provided in conclusion. Chapter 1 
Theoretical Considerations: The English School's Approach 
This  chapter  will  introduce  the  key points  of the  English  School  of International  Relations, 
focusing particularly on the definition of 'international society' in the work of the school's two 
main  contributors, Hedley Bull  and  Martin Wight.  Detailed  attention will  also  be paid  to  the 
means by which institutions maintain order in the international system. 
The ABC's of the English School 
By most accounts, the academic discipline of  international relations is an American social 
science, and this is perhaps owing to  the dominance of the neo-realist and neo-liberal paradigms 
starting in the early 1960s and lasting throughout the Cold War. Yet, to  concede this point means 
to  overlook the contributions of many other scholars, in particular those working out of Great 
Britain. As early as  the 1920s, the writings of Arnold 1.  Toynbee dealt with matters of interstate 
relations and tended to see the world in terrns of systems of  states. He was weil aware that during 
the nineteenth century,  these systems were still being united by European economic activities, 
and  ultimately resulted in a single global system dominated by that continent (Toynbee,  1964). 
As a historian, Toynbee entertained the notion that what 'made' these systems were collections of 
shared norrns and principles that were deve10ped over time. E.H. Carr's The  Twenty Year's Crisis 
1919-1939 (Carr, 1946) is considered by many to be the first publication to deal exc1usively and 
deliberately with international relations.  Having been let down by the near-total failure of the 
Versailles  peace process,  a  process  in  which  he  had  participated  on  behalf of His Majesty's 
Diplomatie Service, Carr expressed a view of international politics which opposed the idealism 
of statesmen's beliefs  against the realism of their needs.  Needless  to  say,  Carr was weary of 
utopian goals, preferring more sober motivations with regards to  foreign policy. Both these men 
would have a direct and profound influence, as would the advent of neo-realism, on what wou1d 
later become the English School of International Relations (ES). 
In  1954,  the  Rockefeller  Foundation  began  funding  the  United  States  Committee  on 
International  Relations,  which  inc1uded  Hans  Morgenthau  and  Kenneth  Waltz  among  its 
members.  Sorne four years later, the same foundation agreed to  fund  a sister committee across 
the  pond. The British Committee on International Relations held its first meeting at Cambridge 12 
University in  1958  and  right from  the start, awareness of the American theorists' methods was 
accornpanied by a scholarly disapproval that would become increasingly pronounced as the years 
went  by (Dunne,  1998:  p.  90).  The American use of mathematical  proof and  strict empirical 
procedures,  the  methodo10gical  over-indulgence  in  scientific  approaches,  the  formation  of 
models and the 'fetish for measurement' have basically the same constraining effect on academic 
pursuits  according to  Hedley Bull:  they drastically limit  the  number of questions  one can  ask 
about the practice of international  relations  because these standards of proof are  inappropriate 
and unrealistic (Bull,  1966b; Dunne,  1998:  p.  118).  Five of the eight original attendees of the 
British  meetings  were  historians.  It  is  perhaps  no  wonder  that  the  behaviouralist-positivist 
proposition thatinternational relations have always been and will always be conducted according 
to  the same principles of self-help under anarchy was hard to  accept. Founding member Martin 
Wight  had  even  once commented  during a  lecture  that  international  theory  is  not  at  ail  like 
scientific analysis, but perhaps "more akin to literary criticism" (Epp, 1998: p.  53). On the other 
hand, and  the ES by no  means rejects the idea of international anarchy, but rather suggests that 
its  negative  and  destabilizing effects  are  often mitigated  by customs and  practices  developed 
between states over time. 'Realism', in the narrower sense which refers to the dog-eat-dog nature 
of the  international  system,  is  actually  one of  three  ideological  traditions  in  the  histo~y  of 
European IR identified by Wight. But order exists even in an international system governed by 
such anarchical tenets. Rationalism, the 'middle-way tradition', holds that through repeated and 
iterated interactions, the practices that come to be shared between states evolve into institutions, 
solidifying  the  bonds  between  separate political  units  and  making  them  into  an  international 
society. The rationalist tradition presents quite a broad spectrum of possibilities. Revolutionism, 
the final and most troublesome tradition, does not refer to  a single ideological perspective as do 
the other two, but instead describes revisionist movements within the extra-national, purely inter­
human community ofmankind through which ideological currents flow. 
This  complex and  diverse ontological backdrop  means  that  the  ES  brings  together  an 
extremely heterogeneous group of scholars both in  terms of interests and outlooks. But if there 
are three elements that are common to  ail, they would be those alluded to  above: the rejection of 
positivism in favour of a more classical liberal arts methodology guided by philosophical rigar, 
the acceptance of  socially constructed super-national and extra-national units, and the bridging of 
ideological  (Constructivist)  and  materialist (Realist)  theories.  Since the  late  1990s,  the  often 13 
overlooked ES  has been making a resurgence with a new generation of scholars interested in the 
study  of sociaIly  constructed  order  in  interstate  politics,  perhaps  partiaIly  motivated  by  the 
advent of Constructivist trends  in  the study of international  relations (Dufault, 2007: pp.  159­
160).  It is  no  coincidence that members of the thini  and  contemporary generation of English 
School  theorists  such  as  Barry  Buzan  have  begun  to  reconsider  these  propositions  after  a 
growing dissatisfaction with the a-historicism of the Realist paradigm (See Buzan, 2004:  p.  Il; 
Dunne,  1998:  pp.  5-8;  Linklater and  Suganami, 2006:  p.  82).  In  this  chapter, the fundamental 
principles of the ES  will  be discussed  in  greater depth,  beginning with its  creation by Martin 
Wight and its later development by Hedley Bull, whose more streamlined version ES theory wiIl 
serve as the analytical framework for this dissertation. 
Carr and the 3 'R's: Fundaments of the English School 
Though founders Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield had discussed the possibility of 
inviting E.H.  Carr to  the initial committee meetings, they finally decided not to.  Embittered by 
what he saw as  the two-faced nature of international relations and the needless demonization of 
the communist experiment, he had  secluded himself from  academe to  work on a  monumental 
sixteen  volume  history  of the  Soviet Union.  Wight  feared  that  Carr  would  divert  too  much 
attention towards his own agenda (Dunne, 1998: ch. 2 and p.  93). C.arr had given up his teaching 
positions and hadn't been involved in IR since 1946, yet his partial inclusion amongst the ranks 
of English-Schoolers  is  attributed  to  his  particular  insight  into  international  politics  and  the 
immense influence it had on the ES. Carr belonged to  a generation understandably disenchanted 
by the failures of laissez-faire liberalism, which were numerous. Black Friday ushered in global 
economic collapse of course,  and  at  the  national  political  level,  Carr feared  a  tyranny of the 
masses  over  the parliamentary system  which  also  led  him  to  believe  that  the  application  of 
democratic principles to interstate relations was a mistake. 
In  The  Twenty  Years  Crisis  1919-1939  (Carr,  1946),  the  spectrum  of international 
relations  is  dichotomized  into  utopian  and  realist  categories.  The  fonner  is  represented  by 
intellectuals  and  their  theories  of free  will  and  the  hannony of interests,  and  the  latter  by 
bureaucrats and  their practices predetennined by the need for power. Somewhat paradoxically, 
the  crux of his argument, and of his realist critique of utopian theories and policies in IR, was 
that utopian politics were based on morality and that 14 
[t]heories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies 
itself with  the  community  as  a  whole,  and  which  possesses  the  facilities  denied  to 
subordinate groups [...  ].  Theories of international morality are, for the same reason and 
in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations or groups of nations. For 
the past hundred  years,  and  more specifically since  1918,  the English-speaking people 
have fOl111ed  the dominant group  in  the world;  and the current theories of international 
morality have been designed to  perpetuate their supremacy and  expressed in the idiom 
particular to them (Carr, 1946: p. 74). 
Though  genuine  morality  existed  to  Carr,  it  had  become  completely  bankrupt.  The 
Twenty  Years  Crisis  is  specifie  to  one  particularly troubled  time in  international  history  and 
though it serves the very important purpose of uncovering the power-based motivations behind 
overly moralized issues, it is  good  for  little else.  The work itself is  inherently judgmental and 
pessimistic, which further detracts from its  analytical usefulness. Still, what Carr had done was 
point out the huge rift between theory and  practice, and it is in  the attempt to  fill  this gap that 
Wight found  his  niche in the  field  of IR.  Interpreting European history from  diplomats'  and 
scholars' perspectives, Wight sought to  delineate clear traditions in Western political thought, in 
a word 'paradigms', pertaining to  international relations. He found three: Realism, Revolutionism 
and  Rationalism. Despite his personal beliefs, Wight's categorization is  intended to  be "free of 
the impulses ofpersonal commitment" (Wight,  1966b: p.  89; see also  Dunne,  1998:  p.  14).  He 
thus absolved the political scientist from having to deal directly with issues of right and wrong. 
His  version  of Realism  was  not  a  critique of utopianism,  and  Revolutionism  itself was  not 
necessarily  concerned  with  the  achievement  of utopia  either,  but  more  with  the  attempt  to 
transfol111 or overcome the international political status quo. 
To  begin with what is most familiar, Wight's brand of Realism is really no  different from 
the classical, non-positivist version of  the paradigm as represented by Hans Morgenthau. 
"Anarchy  is  the  characteristic  that  distinguishes  international  politics  from  ordinary 
politics.  The  study  of international  politics  presupposes  the  absence  of a  system  of 
govemment  as  the  study  of  domestic  politics  presupposes  the  existence  of  one. 
Qualifications  are  necessary:  there  is  a  system  of international  law  and  there  are 
international institutions to complicate or modify the workings of  power politics. But it is 
roughly the case that [...] in international polifics, law and institutions are governed and 
circumscribed by the struggle for power" (Wight, 1978: p.  102). 
According to  Bull, Realism is the tradition associated with the Hobbesian state of nature 
in which morality is no consideration at ail in the extreme case, but where at the very least, it is 15 
subordinate  to  raison  d'état.  "Either it  is  held  (as  by Machiavelli)  that  the  state  conducts  its 
foreign policy in a kind of moral and legal vacuum, or it is held (as by Hegel and his successors) 
that moral behaviour for the state in foreign policy lies in its own self-assertion" (Bull, 1977: p. 
25).  As  Bull would  point out  however,  despite its  crudeness,  the assertion that  'might makes 
right' is a socially accepted norm (Bull, 1966a: p. 44). 
The tradition Wight dubbed  'Revolutionism'  has  an  extra-national  quality to  it  and  1S 
defined  as  "recurrent  waves  of international  revolution,  that  is  to  say  organized  attempts  to 
transform  international  society [...  J.  Instead of a  loose company of sovereign states, it seems 
more  of an  organic  unity;  individuals  feel  international  loyalties  which  override  national 
allegiances"  (Wight,  1978:  pp  86-87).  Though  the  state  often  takes  primacy  at  the  level  of 
international society,  individuals can be considered the fundamental unit of analysis  in  the ES 
given  the  importance  attributed  to  the  thoughts  of notable  and  powerful  persons  in  the 
construction  of  international  political  understanding,  institutions  and  communities.  In 
Revolutionist streams of thought, the individual is  not only the primary, but also the dominant 
unit  of analysis;  the  ultimate  goal  is  emancipation  from  the  states-system  resulting  in  the 
achievement  of a  world-state  based  on  an  ideal-type  pan-global,  pacifie  and  homogeneous 
ideology of the  sort most often  associated with  Immanuel  Kant,  though an  imposed  imperial 
doctrine such  as  Stalinism can  play the  same role (Dufault,  2007:  pp.  161-162).  Despite the 
centrality of the individual  in  Revolutionism, the state still  plays a major role.  Wight reminds 
that  international revolutions such as  the French Revolution and the Bolshevik uprising are born 
of specifie  national  conditions and  furthermore,  that  "the  international  repercussions of these 
national revolutions has not been accidentaI. They illustrate first that there is a degree of unity in 
international  society  making the  internaI  events  of one  power of concern  to  other powers" 
(Wight; 1978: p. 80). 
This  is  the  starting-point of rationalist  thought.  It is  based  in  an  assumption  directly 
opposed  to  that of Hobbes:  that in  the state of nature, man is  a social animal (Dufault, 2007: 
p.162).  From there,  one may draw the  conclusion that international  politics  can  be  less of an 
arena and more of a forum.  Wight identified this middle road between realist and revolutionist 
streams with seventeenth century Dutch diplomat, jurist and  author of De Jure Belli ac  Pacis 
(1625), Hugo van der Groot, better known as  Grotius. The 'via media', which seeks to  achieve 
balance between national interests and the demands of the international system, is considered a 16 
defining aspect of the European international system within ES history, and the basis of modem 
international  society itself (Dunne,  1998:  p.  59;  Bull,  1966c:  p.  51).  Grotius  had  extended the 
principle of natural rights of individuals to  coyer relations between states as well, proposing that 
states, as  collectives of individuals, hold the same responsibilities to  one another as  people do. 
Despite  both  Wight  and  Bull's  adamant  denial  of the  usefulness  of domestic  analogies  In 
international politics, Grotius nevertheless became the flag-bearer for international society. 
International Society: The English School's Keystone 
In their study of ES theory, Suganami and  Linklater quote Alexander Wendt, noting that 
when students of IR use the  ward  'structure',  they are almost always refelTing  to  the  Realist­
Materialist definition, which is based on the distribution of military capabilities. "This is not so 
in  the British study of international  relations where rationalism,  in  Wight's  sense, has  been  a 
dominant  interpretation of world  politics.  In  spite of the  formally  anarchical  structure of the 
world  of states,  international  relations  are  governed  by rules,  and  therefore,  substantively,  the 
interactions  of states  exhibit  a  degree  of order  that  could  not,  under  anarchy,  normally  be 
expected"  (Linklater  and  Suganami,  2006:  p.  44).  Unlike  the  Realists,  the  ES  contends  that 
anarchy  and  self-help  are  mitigated  by  other  factors.  Through  their  repetitive  and  iterated 
interactions,  states  develop,  maintain  and  evolve  norms,  customs  and  rules  which  eventually 
become entrenched institutions. Despite this point being common to all members of the ES, there 
are sorne very impoltant nuances between them.  The basic premise, as  expressed by Wight,  is 
that  "if anarchy means complete disorder,  it  is  not a true description of international relations. 
There is cooperation in international affairs as weil as conflict; there are a diplomatie system and 
international  law  and  international  institutions  which  cornplicate  or modify  the  workings  of 
power politics" (Wight, 1978: p.  105). 
These are the bases of international  societies,  which are by their very nature different 
from states because their members themselves are, as states, more robust than individuals, much 
fewer  in  number  and  yet  more  heterogeneous  (ibid  106-107;  Bull,  1966a:  pp.  45-48).  The 
prerequisites for  the existence of states-societies are,  obviously,  a number of sovereign states, 
mutual recognition of sovereignty, means of grading powers for hierarchical purposes, means of 
regular communications, a system of international law and finally, common goals and the ability 
to  defend  them.  In  the  European case,  the  third  and  fourth  roles  are  fulfilled  mainly  by  the 
balance of power and  ambassadorial  diplomacy  (Wight,  1977:  ch.  5).  Wight  used  the  terms 17 
'society  of  states',  'states-system',  'community  of  states'  and  even  'family  of  states' 
interchangeably.  His historical knowledge was beyond reproach and  he was well  aware of the 
existence of non-European states and systems, but his preoccupation was Europe.  It would be 
hard to  successfully accuse the English School of eurocentrism (though it  has been tlied), given 
Wight's  understanding  that  from  the  rest  of the  world's  perspective,  the  West  has  been  the 
foremost aggressor since the days of the Crusades (Epp, 1998: p.  56). Wight preferred to use the 
three  traditions  rather  than  Christianity  as  evidence  of ideological  and  cultural  homogeneity 
between Europeans. 
Wight's  star  pupil,  Hedley  Bull,  had  a  theoretical  orientation  that  was  a  little  more 
specifie  while  his  outlook  was  somewhat broader than  purely  inter-European  relations.  Bull 
explored the question of how order is  maintained in international societies, and it is precisely his 
wider scope that confronted him with the issue of different states-societies such as  the Islamic, 
the Chinese and  the  Indian systems making contact with Europe at  various epochs in  history. 
Thus, one very important point of departure between Wight and  Bull is  the latter's distinction 
between  international  systems  and  international  societies.  Whereas  as  Wight  used  the  terms 
interchangeably, for Bull, "a system of states is  formed when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and  have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to  cause them to 
behave -at least in some measure- as  parts of a whole"  (Bull,  1977:  pp.  9-10).  In  contrast,  an 
international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
cornmon values,  forrn  a society in  the  sense that they conceive themselves  to  be bound by a 
cornmon set of rules in  their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common 
institutions" (ibid: p.  13). 
Bull  also  adds  a  third  ontological  category,  the  Cosmopolitan  or World  Society,  to 
represent the international community of mankind proposed by the Revolutionist tradition. These 
additions  have  several  effects.  First,  they  facilitate  the  problem  of dealing  with  several 
international  societies  at  once  by  creating  the  all-encompassing  system  level  which  can 
encompass  a  multitude of societies,  each  with  particular rules  and  institutions  whether,  they 
have direct contact with each other such as the case of Europe and  the Ottomans,  and  even if 
they  don't  as  in  the  case of Hellas  and  China  in  antiquity  (Buzan  and  Little,  2000:  ch.  8). 
Second,  it  grants  the  international  analyst the  possibility of focusing  on  systemic,  societal  or 
cosmopolitan issues on ontologically separate levels. The Realist stream thus finds its home in 18 
the international system which is  characterized by little else than calculated self-interest where 
interstate relations are concerned, and  likewise, Revolutionist thoughts and  actions are large1y 
relegated to the realm of Cosmopolitan society, allowing Bull and like-minded scholars to focus 
on how order is maintained in the Rationalist domain of international society. 
Wight  had  distinguished  between  societies  with  "thin  morality"  and  the  more  "thick 
mora1ity"  of the  Grotian  dochine  which  called  for  concerted  action  against  violators  of 
international law (Wight, 1966a). Bull made this issue the heart of his theory. Interstate society 
occupies a centrist position between raison d'état and  revolution; it can be 'tugged on' at either 
end  by the  more leftist  influences of Cosmopolitanism or Realist conservatism on the  right, 
resulting  in  differing  degrees  of  cohesion  within  international  societies.  The  more  an 
international  society acts  on systemic self-help or Realist concerns,  the more it  is  said  to  be 
pluralist and  inversely, the more Revolutionist or humanist its  motivations and behaviour, the 
more it  said  to  be a  solidarist society.  Order and justice are  central  concems in  the pluralist­
solidarist divide. A pluralist society will be more concerned with mere coexistence and so norrns, 
customs  and  institutions  may be minimal  in  number or  in  responsibility  and  will  be almost 
exclusively geared towards recognition and protection of  sovereignty; justice takes a back-seat to 
order. Solidarist norms and institutional frameworks will be more elaborate, including means for 
pursuit and defence of  common goals and cooperation on international projects of a wide variety. 
Another fundamental difference between the two lies in the understanding of what justifies the 
resoli  to  war.  "Les  solidaristes  considèrent que l'usage de la  force  doit  être  subordonné à  la 
volonté collective de la société internationale en formant un régime de sécurité collective au sein 
duquel  les  états  qui  en  violeraient  les  règles  seraient  punis"  (Dufault,  2007:  pp.  163-164). 
Pluralists, lacking common values or universal standards, may be able to  create procedural and 
contractual understandings and  even laws  concerning the practice of war, though they will  be 
unable regulate the use of force as  an  instrument of policy.  Solidalist societies will likely have 
more numerous and complicated criteria for membership (Buzan, 2004:  p.  193), while pluralist 
systems are more suited to culturally heterogeneous states' societies. 
The question of common culture has always been central to  the ES,  and  it is  generally 
accepted  that  the  more  states  have  in  common  culturally,  the  more  there  is  potential  for  a 
solidarist society, though there are always exceptions. Japanese entrance into European interstate 
society makes  one wonder,  at  the very  least,  which elements  of culture  are more important 19 
towards socio-political convergence. Wight also  expressed the thought that international society 
can be 'patchy' since "political pressures do  not operate uniforrnly throughout the states-system, 
and  in  certain  regions  which  are  culturally  united  but  politically  divided,  a  subordinate 
international society cornes into being, with a states-system reproducing in miniature the feature 
of the general states-system"l  (Wight,  1978:  p.  63).  One of the criticisms brought by the latest 
generation of ES  theorists, namely Barry Buzan, is  that the line between international systems 
and international societies, as  well  as  between pluralist and  solidarist societies,  is  very blurry. 
His solution was  to  first  collapse the system and  society levels,  and  then  to  create a spectrum 
ranging from the purely asocial system to  the highest possible degree of interstate solidarism, the 
world-state.  In Bull's work, the international system and  international society are ontologically 
separate  and  as  such,  combining  them  can  create  complications  down  the  road  in  historical 
periods  where  the  system  has  several  component  societies.  That  being  said,  the  idea  of a 
spectrum  covering the  array of possibilities between pluralism and  solidarism  makes  a  lot  of 
sense and  is in no way contradictory to  Bull's ontology. Competition, coexistence, cooperation 
and convergence all cefer to different degrees of solidarity and plurality, making a more accurate 
investigation possible (Buzan, 2004: ch. 5; pp. 158-160). 
The Roles and Characteristics of Institutions 
For  Buzan,  institutions  have  a  triple  function  In  ES  theory.  They give  international 
society its substantive content, they support the concept of international order, and theyhelp set 
the English School apart from neoliberal institutionalists (ibid:  pp.  161-162). Traditionally, the 
five  most-studied institutions in the ES  are the balance of power, international hierarchy (power 
ranking),  diplomacy,  international  law,  and  war.  Though  there  are  others,  discussion  will  be 
focused  on  these  five  first  because,  international  trade  notwithstanding,  they  are  the  most 
commonplace; they are the 'bare bones' of  international society. 
The Balance of Power (BOP)  is  a  rather loaded  terrn.  Wight distinguishes between no 
less  than nine usages of it (Wight,  1966c). For the purposes of this dissertation, the phrase will 
only  be  used  to  denote  the  repartition  of capabilities  within  the  international  system  or 
international  society,  and  more commonly, to  refer to  the multilateral  institutional  practice of 
avoiding hegemony. As Wight once called it, "that elaborate artifice," is not necessarily a natural 
1 Please note that Wight uses 'society' and 'system' interchangeably 20 
outcome of the combination of man's irmate belligerence, systemic uncertainty and international 
anarchy.  Historically speaking, the BOP as  an  institution, a most European social  teclmology, 
signifies both the ideology and practice of  not allowing any one state or bloc to become powerful 
enough  to  rule  oyer  the  others,  be  it on  a  system-wide  or  regional  level.  As  per  Vattel's 
definition, it is a stalemate. In general, the ES distinguishes simple balances between two states 
from  complex balances held  between three or more powers. There is  also  a distinction drawn 
between single and  multiple balances. Multiplicity entails a plurality of issues within an  ever­
shifting international society, balancing and re-balancing around them to  maintain order.  Single 
balances describe a dyadic configuration of international society on either side of a single set of 
issues.  The latter are often the result of irresolvable conflicts of interests arising from within a 
complex balance. In Wight's playful words, in such cases of single-issue balancing, the BOP "is 
no longer a merry-go-round but a see-saw" (Wight, 1978: p.  170). 
There  are  several  varieties  of balance  in  Bull's  work  as  weIl.  First,  he  distinguishes 
between fortuitous and contrived balances. The former are spontaneous while the latter denote a 
BOP  arising out  of conscious  efforts.  Contrived  balances  tend  to  be more  complex  and  that 
complexity increases with the number of member parties. The more the balance extends over the 
system  as  a  whole,  the more it  requires  active measures  and  calculation for  its  preservation, 
which actually entails a 'thickening' of international  society (Bull,  1977:  pp.  104-106). This is 
rather interesting because BOP policies  are usually a good  indicator of pluralism.  Since war, 
peace and  alliances are completely subordinate to  maintaining order through balance, justice is 
almost not a question of morality at ail. The 'right thing to do' is to maintain the balance. It wouId 
seem however, that BOP can evolve into more solidarist forms of  multilateralism. More complex 
balances carmot exist without a network of embassies which generate information and allow for a 
measure of order through  regular  communication.  Basic international  laws providing rules  of 
sovereignty,  diplomatic  immunity,  compensation  and  war  are also  a  prerequisite  towards  the 
existence of complex balances. Reciprocally, the existence of a functioning balance of power is 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  operation  of  international  law  yet  paradoxically,  the  smooth 
functioning of the BOP often necessitates the violation of international regulations to  'hold the 
balance', regardless of whether or not encroaching powers have legitimately broken the law or 
not.  Similarly, the interests of weaker states also  take a back seat to  the maintenance of order 
(ibid: p.  108-109). 21 
In  broad strokes, ba1ancing against hegemony did occur in  antiquity and  thereafter, but 
active1y pursuing balance as  a policy originated in fifteenth-century Ita1y (Wight, 1977: p.  137). 
It  was  only during  the  seventeenth  century that  the  concept was  more  clearly  expressed  and 
became wide-spread, the War of Spanish Succession being a perfect example of BOP policies 
(Butterfield,  1966a:  pp.  132-139).  By the 1ate  eighteenth century,  the BOP became associated 
with Newtonian principles and taken as their high-political equivalent. Achieving balance, that is 
avoiding  hegemony,  was  the  utmost  diplomatie  imperative.  Though  self-interest  was  still 
perfectly  legitimate  grounds  for  action,  states  were  expected  to  contribute  towards  the 
maintenance of  order in interstate society. "The eighteenth century did not set its heart on either a 
Catholic order in  Europe or a Protestant order, but on an international system which was to  be 
defended for its own sake; a new kind of order because it was comprised of both Catholics and 
Protestants, just as  it comprised both monarchies and republics" (ibid:  pp.  141-142). During the 
nineteenth century, the comp1exity and the scope of the balance of power increased, and it came 
to  be understood as  "the equal aggrandizement of the great powers at  the expense of the weak", 
and certain1y at the expense of  the Asian and the African (Wight, 1966c: p.  156). 
The Concert of Europe was the most e1aborate, complex and geographically vast balance 
that  ever was, and joint European interventions in Africa and Asia demonstrate that the Concert 
registered  on the solidarist end  of the  spectrum.  Despite that,  its  generality increased  and  the 
limi ts of its institutions were pushed until European international society t1ew apart at the seams. 
BOP  had  clearly  fai1ed  in  the  ever  increasingly  globa1ized  and  interdependent  international 
system  leading  up  to  the  world  wars,  and  if the  Versailles  negotiations  were  its  funeral 
procession,  then  the  treaty of Locarno (1925)  was  the final  nai1  in  its  coffin  since it  failed  to 
create  even  a  simple  equilibrium  between  Germany  and  France.  The  inherent  and  obvious 
problem with the BOP  is  its  "demonic vitality and  changeab1eness",  rendering it  a  system  of 
"scales perpetually oscillating without ever coming to  rest"  (Wight,  1978: p.  175  and p.  179). 
There are three easily distinguishable types of alliances:  BOP-maintaining, BOP-changing and 
doctrinal!ideo10gical  (which  are  almost  a1ways  BOP-changing,  but  with  motives  being 
revolutionary and not material!strategic; Wight, 1978: ch.  12). 
The institution associated with power ranking can be understood as  an integra1 aspect of 
the BOP. Mutually-accepted hierarchy is yet another clue to the existence of  international society 
(Wight, 1977: p.  129  and pp.  136-141) Grading powers is perhaps the initial step in the process 22 
of achieving a balance, whilst in later phases, "great powers have the tendency to  club together 
as akind of  ~irectorate and impose their will on the rest of the system. They usual1y justify their 
action as  enforcing peace and security" but really "they wish to  monopolize the right to  create 
international  conflict"  (Wight,  1978:  pp.  42-43).  Bull  has  three  criteria  in  identifying  the 
institution of 'great-powerhood' within a states-society: first, there has to  be at least two powers 
of comparable strength and forming between them "a club with a rule of membership." Second, 
the rnembers of this club must be at  the rnilitary  forefront of the international system.  Third, 
these great powers must accept their functions as leaders and have that leadership recognized by 
other states within the interstate society. The concept of an  accepted hierarchy signais another 
ordering principle. "The idea of a great power, in other words, presupposes and implies the idea 
of an international society as opposed to an international system, a body of independent political 
communities  linked  by common rules  and  institutions  as  weil  as  by contact  and  interaction" 
(Bull,  1977:  pp.  200-202).  The  duties  that  come  with  great-powerhood  are  focused  around 
preservation of the balance, including crisis control and the limitation of war (especially between 
great  powers  themselves),  and  encouraging  or  enforcing  stability  within  their  spheres  of 
influence, be it unilaterally or in concert (ibid: pp. 208-227). 
Diplomacy is the master-institution of international relations, and to  Bul1,  it entails both 
the  formulation  and  execution of foreign  policy  by official  state representatives.  Formulation 
requires information-gathering while conversely, execution often demands expression. Means of 
regular communications between governments are thus the sine qua non of international society 
and  mutual  privileges  granted  emissaries  are  amongst  its  oldest  customs  and  rules.  Besides 
communication, diplomacy achieves severalother goals. In and of itself, diplomacy presupposes 
a certain level constancy of interactions amongst states and the importance of this institution can 
also  be attributed to  its  regularity. Day-in day-out interactions of an almost banal nature allow 
states  to  find  common  ground  and  develop  and  elaborate  shared  norms  and  customs.  The 
diplomat him  or herself is  an  avatar of international society, whose very existence symbolizes 
states' respect for international norms and rules (Bul1,  1977:  pp.  170,  172 and  179-180, Wight, 
1978:  p.  113). Negotiation is an integral part of international relations, and whether it is carried 
out through diplomats or directly by ministers and heads of states, information-gathering is, once 
more,  centrai.  European  diplomatic methods were forcibly. imposed upon the governments  of 
Asian states in  certain cases, as  the former's state-society gained dominion over the rest of the 23 
system. Of such situations, Bull writes that "[d]iplomacy can play no role where foreign policy is 
conceived  as  the enforcement of a claim to  universal authority, the promotion of the true faith 
against heretics, or as  the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no  account of the interests 
ofothers" (Bull, 1977: p.  170-171). 
Even when not imposed, diplomacy can actively help enforce or entrench power-relations 
between  center  and  periphery,  as  the  dominant side can  keep  tabs  on  or  give  orders  to  the 
subservient state through  the  network.  Identification of common goals  and  the application of 
reason to finding 'give and take' solutions are therefore defining aspects of the master-institution. 
Avoidance and management of crises are domains under diplomacy's purview as  weIl,  and can 
accurately be described as specialized ateas of  negotiation. The ES distinguishes between several 
different  forms  of modem diplomatie  activity.  The first  category,  the diplomatie  network  of 
resident  ambassadors,  mostly  fulfil1s,  though  is  not  limited  to,  the  communicative  and 
informational functions.  A second category, summit meetings, is  more common when standard 
diplomatie channels are too slow or too far removed from the seat or power. Final1y, congresses 
are more official and regular versions of summit meetings. Diplomatie endeavours can be ad hoc 
just as  they can be institutionalized. International organizations such as  the International Labour 
Organization  or  the  World  Health  Organization  can  be  classified  as  permanent  conferences 
(Wight, 1977: 141-143; Bull 1977: p.  165-166). 
Diplomatie endeavours can be bilateral or multilateral. There is  also a distinction drawn 
between diplomatie and consular relations, the latter denoting relations between private citizens 
and  a foreign govemment viatheir own govemment's diplomatie network. The lines between the 
two  can be blurred when consular issues take on a large scale or are highly publicized. Far from 
being  a  uniquely  peaceful  institution,  there  are  sorne  precisions  that  must  be  made  about 
diplomacy's darker side. As we aIl know, knowledge is  power, and so the most obvious blemish 
is  the institution's penchant for a different kind of information-gathering: espionage.  Ironically, 
espionage  only  increases  in  times  of war  or  instability,  when  honesty  is  most  important. 
Revo1utionary powers often initial1y withdraw from diplomacy as the Boisheviks had, and later 
use it as a propaganda tool and weapon as Stalinists did (Wight, 1978; pp.  113-120). Historically, 
the  master-institution  has  been known,  under one form  or  another,  to  aIl  states-societies.  But 
ambassadorial diplomacy, as opposed to emissarial diplomacy, is an invention peculiar to Europe 
whose origins can also  be found  in  Renaissance Italy, though sorne aspects of it  can be traced 24 
further  back  to  medieval  ecclesiastical  congregations.  European  diplomatie  practices  started 
being adopted by Asian and  Islamic states in the eighteenth century. The Sublime Porte opened 
its first permanent embassies in the1790s in Paris, London, Vienna, Saint Petersburg and Berlin, 
but it  wasn't until the Treaty of Paris in  1856 that it was allowed to  participate in multilateral 
negotiations in a manner befitting an empire of its status. 
International laws are not always respected by virtue of the system's anarchical aspects, 
not the least of which being a lack of monopoly on the legitimate use of force or a corresponding 
enforcement agency as per Hegel. Nevertheless, Bull avers that these shortcomings should not be 
mistaken  for  a  lack  of efficacy.  The  important  question  is  whether  or  not  the  rules  of 
intemationallaw are observed to a sujJicient degree to justify treating them as a substantial factor 
in the maintenance of international order. The institution of international law is  responsible for 
codifying the  general1y  accepted  norms  and  habitually practiced  customs  of the  international 
society,  and  so  whether or not  they  are  fully  respected  or  enforced,  they add  an  element of 
predictability  to  states'  behaviour  (Dufault,  2007:  p.  165).  International  law  has  three  main 
functions. Its first and primary role is to identify the universal principles of political organization 
within  an  international  society.  The  second  and  third  functions  lie  in  the  expression  and 
transmission of  international society's norms (Bull, 1977: p.  141). 
What is a clearer sign of the inefficacy of a set of rules is  the case where there is 
not merely a lack of conformity as between actual and prescribed behaviour, but a failure 
to  accept the validity or binding quality of the obligations themselves  as  indicated by a 
reasoned appeal to a different and conflicting set of  rules, or by an unreasoning disregard 
for the rules (ibid: p.  138). 
Violations  of international  law can often be made without prejudice or from  a legally 
justifiable position, just as  obedience can be coerced  (ibid:  p.  136-140).  International law will 
vary with the  degree of international  solidarity. Adherence to  notions  of morality and justice 
being  central  to  the  difference between the two  archetypes,  international  law  in  pluralism  is 
delived  from  states'  already-establishedpractices  whereas  substantive  natural  law,  involving 
elements  of  what  states  'ought  to  do',  are  much  more  commonly  accepted  sources  of 
jurisprudence under solidarism. Pluralist laws are based on consent, solidarist ones in consensus 
(ibid:  pp.  148-156).  Grotius,  a  solidarist  himself,  was  called  'le père  des  droits  des  gens' 
precisely because he believed  that European citizens should  receive equal  treatment under the 25 
law in ail  Christian kingdoms regardless of their political allegiances. The more a society leans 
towards  solidarism, the more war as  an  instrument of policy takes  a back seat  to  non-violent 
means,  and  so  the  more  international  law  becomes  substantive.  It  follows  that  international 
societies displaying pluralist characteristics will  establish much more basic sets of rules,  more 
concerned  with  simple coexistence than  any real  cooperation.  When it  cornes to  war,  the  ES 
revives  von  Clausewitz' famous  statement;  war is  nothing but the  continuation of politics  by 
more violent and compelling means, and does not necessarily represent the breakdown of order, 
but in fact,  can reflect its  functioning on another level. In pluralism, war is  seen as  business as 
usual (Howard,  1966; Bull,  1977:  ch.  8). The reduced prominence of war only means that there 
are more rules and increased stringency surrounding its use. Solidarist societies still resort to war 
in necessary cases of enforcement or punishment, but action is  subordinate to  the consent of the 
states-society as  a whole, which though occurring more rarely, leads to much more wide-spread 
engagements  (Bull,  1977:  p.l55).  International  society has  nevertheless  sought to  reduce  the 
onset of wars through restrictions, but 'legitimate' reasons to fight have not yet ceased to present 
themselves. 
Comparative History of the English School 
Since the English School's study of international relations revolves around system-wide 
concepts of order throughout European history, it is  a given that a comparative approach is  the 
best way to understand the origins and evolution of the ideas that govern international political 
thought.  Comparative  history  is  in  fact  in-built  into  the  ES  method,  but  early  proponents, 
particularly Wight and Butterfield, wove somewhat seamlessly between theory and history. Later 
works by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson as weil as by Barry Buzan and Richard Little, sought to 
apply  the  logic  supporting  ES  arguments  to  comparative  historical  analyses.  Between  The 
Expansion of International Society  (Bull  and  Watson,  1982),  The  Evolution  of International 
Society (Watson, 1994) and International Systems in  World History (Buzan and Little, 2000), the 
ES  has managed to  flesh-out the grand narrative of  European international relations and  their 
spread to  the rest of the globe.  The details of this expansion and the Ottoman Empire's special 
role vis-à-vis European international society are the subjects of the following chapter, but at this 
point, the theoretical concepts yielded by their historical observations must be introduced. 
First  of ail,  conception  of an  international  society unavoidably  means  that  there  are 
outsiders. This feature is not unique to  European international society, but is a recurring theme in 26 
history.  China,  Rome  and  Persia  all  distinguished  between  civilized  cultures  and  those 
'barbarous' hordes that surrounded them. The schism between East and West with the Bosporus 
as  the median dates all the way back to  the Hellas-Persia system. The standard of civilization, or 
in  other words 'what makes an outsider' evolves with changes in international society or in  its 
dominant members. The idea of the 'West and  the rest',  that there is  a nugget or core group  of 
states in Europe and that the rest form a periphery, is intrinsic to  rationalist thought going all the 
way back to Grotius himself, who "had a dual conception of international society: an outer circ1e 
of aU  humankind bound by natural  law;  and  an  inner circ1e of Christians, bound by the law of 
Chri st. Drawing on culture, he went as far as to calI for a general league of  Christian states and a 
crusade on 'the Turk'"  (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: p. 339; see also Wight, 1977: pp.  125-128). 
For Herbert  Butterfield,  Europe  was  unified  by  Christianity,  which  was  and  remains 
among its defining characteristics. After the fall  of Rome, it was  the  frictions between church 
and  state for  dominion  over  the  souls  of men  which  led  to  unique  and  extremely  dynamic 
conceptions of European society (Butterfield,  1952:  p  28).  Furthermore,  for  him,  concepts of 
natural rights in internationallaw are descended from the medieval church so directly that 
modern internationalism is the system of medieval Christendom with the religion 
evaporated  out of it.  The eighteenth  century developed  the  conception of a  Europe,  a 
states-system bound together by a common culture and common standards and separated 
from the outer world of  Turks and Chinamen (ibid: p.  39). 
In  the  1880s,  Scottish  natural  lawyer  James  Lorimer  devised  a  triple  categorization 
scheme by which peoples could be c1assified as 'civilized', 'barbarous', or 'savage' (Bull, 1977: p. 
38).  Rooted  in  anthropology,  this  categorization  was  in  fact  quite  popular  from  the  late 
nineteenth century on. Even Friedrich Engels used it (Engels, 1884) and three and a half decades 
later  at  Versailles,  it  was  applied  in  justification  of  international  mandates.  Civilization, 
nevertheless,  does  not  equate  directly  with  membership  in  international  society.  The  most 
important observation made by Bull and Watson is  that within international systems, states tend 
to converge around the norms and practices of the most powerful society of states, adopting their 
institutions and learning their culture. (Bull &  Watson, 1984) The theory of convergence is  very 
general  as  every  case  is  different  owing to  domestic  peculiarities.  Though it  is  an  often  ill­
defined  concept  in  the  foreign  relations  between  core  and  peripheral  states,  the  standard  of 
civilization is not as intangible as one would initially suspect. Nevertheless, it is never uniformly 27 
applied  and  eaèh  candidate  nation  must  meet  it  III  the  fashion  demanded  by  the  dominant 
international society. 
If international society can be likened to  a club, the standard of civilization merely refers to the 
criteria for membership required by the directorate. From the beginning of  the nineteenth century 
at  the  very  latest,  Europe  has  been  the  undisputed  leader  whose  practices  have  since  been 
mimicked by others. While the gap between Western and other states widened from the sixteenth 
century onward, Europe itself inversely shifted from a highly pluralist society in the seventeenth 
century to the solidarist Concert of Europe of the nineteenth. As European society solidified, the 
standard  of civilization changed  and  the bar was  set much higher,  though  it  underwent sorne 
metamorphoses after the Balkan crises, and certainly after the troubled year that was 1919. 
According to  the  ES,. there  have been several  international  systems  in  the  past.  From 
roughly the sixteenth century on, European trade began to  unite them loosely.  As the Vatican's 
hold  over European politics began to  wane in  the  1600s,  and  as  the principles of natural  law 
began to emerge and gain momentum, relations with advanced non-European govemments came 
to  be guided  to  a large  extent by the  principals of mutually respected  sovereignty during the 
1700s. Several important things happened during the nineteenth century. First, the technological 
(also read military) cleavage between Europe and the rest of the world increased dramatically to 
the former's  advantage.  This  in  turn  led  to  a shift  in  European policy with respect  to  foreign 
relations. It seems that the very real technical upper hand led to  a perceived moral and  cultural 
sense of superiority, which in tum drove European society's attempted absorption of the rest of 
the  world  forward.  In  many  if  not  most  cases,  convergence  was  imposed  rather  than 
implemented.  First  the  European  economic  model  was  internationalized,  and  political 
convergence soon foUowed,  starting with Russia in the early seventeenth century and reaching a 
climax with the spate of  post WWII decolonizations. 
It is worth discussing the drastic break from past practices which took place at the end of 
WWI because that period marked a major evolution of international society because of the great 
shift  in  the  ordering  principles  and  practices  in  international  relations  that  it  espoused. 
Obviously, aU  primary institutions are interrelated, both with each other and with the principles 
upon which  they are  founded,  and  so  it  can be tricky to  unravel  the ties  that hold  interstate 
society together when they are so tangled. During the nineteenth century, the BOP was not only 
an  institution,  but  the  be-aU  end-ail  of international  relations.  Other institutions  were  geared 28 
toward its maintenance and operation. In a system with five world powers and a number of other 
major powers, this feat necessitated constant diplomatic adjustments,  and  its continued success 
was contingent first on less powerful states' acceptance of the Big Five as the legitimate leaders 
of international society, and in second place, on a very low level of competition on the continent 
itselfthanks to rampant and unimpeded colonial expansion. Both those factors would dissipate at 
the turn of  the 20th century for a variety of reasons. Even before the Versailles talks, nationalism 
would  increase  the  number  of states  on  the  continent.  On  its  own,  that  is  enough  to  make 
balancing more difficult, but nationalism had built into it the notion of  self-determination, which 
struck  a  further  blow  to  the  doctrine  of great-power  management.  This  was  exacerbated  by 
another increase in the number of states immediately after the Great War. Despite their totallack 
of experience in  international relations,  these newcomers often resisted  even altruistic outside 
influences. What is more, great powers were disappearing. 
Germany was totally ostracized from international society and Austro-Hungary ceased to 
exist. The onset of Bolshevism also  created more instability as  it erected an ideological barrier 
between the former Russian Empire and  a very large portion of international society.  England 
and  France  were broke and  the traditionaUy  isolationist United  States  did  not  really want  to 
assume  the  burden  of international  directorship.  InternaI  changes  had  affected  international 
relations as  weIl. The combination of democracy, improvements in communications technology 
and  an  international  press  had  somewhat  unpredictable,  and  often  detrimental  effects  on 
diplomatic  relaÜons,  and  the  professional  diplomat's  importance  was  reduced  (Butterfield; 
1966b).  Ironically, international law saw a revival of Grotian principles with the advent of the 
League of Nations despite the fact  that international society had become highly pluralist at that 
time.  This  latter  development  was  in  part  due  to  the  number  of new  states  both  from  the 
expansion international  society and  the breakup of old  empires.  Despite a renewed  interest  in 
subordinating war to  international law, the almost exclusively self-interested way in which most 
European  states  conducted  their  foreign  relations  during  the  early  interwar  period  made  this 
impossible, causing the type oftwo-faced international relations that Carr found so distressing. 
Research Orientation and Methodology 
The question  asked  by  this  dissertation  is a  very  simple  one.  Did  Turkey  become  a 
member of the  international  society after World  War One?  To  spoil  the  suspense,  the  short 
answer is yeso  AU facetiousness aside, both the question and the answer are much more complex. 29 
To address to the query properly, three steps must be taken:  first,  it must be clearly established 
that the Ottoman Empire was in fact  exterior to  the European international society prior to  the 
twentieth century and to  list the main differences responsible for the sociological divide.  How 
did internaI  differences apply to  the external relations between the two states'-societies? What 
were the patterns of interaction between the two separate states'-societies. Knowing already that 
the Concert of Europe became the undisputed dominant international society in the nineteenth 
century, the second goal is thus reduced to an examination of the mechanics of convergence. The 
process  of international  politico-ideological  convergence  as  described  by  the  ES  is  not  an 
ovemight phenomenon, so how did the patterns of interaction evolve to include, absorb or force 
the Ottomans into the more complex European international institutions over time? The bulk of 
the work lies here.  The third step is  to  explain which straw broke the  camel's back.  Precisely 
what changes, whether domestic, diplomatie or both, finally allowed Turkey make to  meet the 
European standard of civilization? The chosen turning point, or the date at which time Turkey 
'joined the club' is July 24, 1923, the day the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. 
Methodologically speaking, the ES' guidelines can be resumed simply as  the 'liberal arts 
method':  reason  and judgment, clearly elaborated and  applied  with philosophical rigour to  the 
practices  of international  societies  within  a  chronological  narrative.  The principles  and  ideas 
goveming international relations are created and kept in the minds statesmen, scholars, diplomats 
and  other  professionals  and  intellectuals  whose work  pertains  to  international  relations.  The 
sources of empirical data in this study are balanced between texts from the disciplines of general 
history,  diplomatie  history  and  of course,  Turkish/Ottoman  history  with  special  focus  on 
speeches,  statements  and  writings  of the  diplomats  and  heads  of state  involved,  including 
mem01rs. Chapter II 
Historical Context: Four Centuries of  Antagonism 
The goal of this chapter is  to  analyze patterns of relations between the Ottoman Empire 
and Europe in  order to  establish precedence and  a basis for  comparison to  the  early twentieth 
century.  Toward  that  end,  international  interaction  between  the  European  Continent  and  the 
Ottoman Empire can be separated into three periods. The criteria for evolution into a new phase 
of relations  are  twofold  since  they  must  consider  international  as  weil  as  internai  Ottoman 
factors.  The earliest period  (1535-1718)  is  one defined  by the  mutu~l  antagonism of clashing 
civilizations. A relaxation of the standards of civilization on both shores of the Sea of Marmora 
marks the transition into a second period, which allowed the very first convergent changes on the 
part of the Ottomans (1719-1815). The third period (1818-1908) starts as  European international 
society  closes  its  ranks  after  the  fall  of Napoleon,  and  is  characterized  by  its  increasingly 
specific, demanding and  invasive standard of civilization which accelerated and  influenced the 
already confused reform efforts of  the Sublime Porte. 
The  Cross  and  the  Crescent:  Early  relations  between  Europe  and  the  Ottomans  (1535­
1717) 
Communities almost always define themselves against the backdrop of what lies beyond 
their borders, and this is  no  different in the practice of the nineteenth-century European states­
society.  According to  Bull, Wight had noted that states-systems throughout history "have had  a 
sense of cultural differentiation from what lay outside" (Bull, 1977b: p.  18).  The savage and the 
barbarian have always been an  essential  and  inescapable aspect of self-definition to  European 
states-society. Since the capture of Jerusalem in 1076, the 'unspeakable Turk' has represented the 
outsider par excellence to Europe, and its territories marked the limits of European international 
society (Neumann and Welsh: p.  330). As early as  1095, Pope Urban II united Europe against the 
sultanate  in  the  first  crusade.  "Let  the  holy  Sepulchre  of our  Lord  and  Saviour,  which  is 
possessed by the unclean nations,  arouse  you.  [...  ] Wrest that land  from  the  wicked  race  and 
subj ect it yourselves" (Ikin, 1928: pp. 119-120). For an international society united and governed 
by the tenets of its faith and the leaders of its church, "[t]he principal external society with which 31 
Christendom  had  to  do,  in  the centuries when it  was  transformed  into  the states-system, was 
regarded by it as a historical, even an eschatological, embodiment of evil" (Wight, 1977: p.  120). 
This sentiment became more entrenched after failedmilitary actiQns against 'the unclean nations', 
and would perhaps even increase over time, outlasting the unity of the Western church. Martin 
Luther was  born  in  1483, thirty years  after Constantinople was taken,  yet three decades were 
scarcely enough to  dilute the venom in the European's psyche. He had expressed that "[a]  beast 
full  of life must have a body and a soul; the spirit or soul of antichrist is  the pope, his flesh  or 
body the Turk" (Martin Luther quoted in Wight, 1977: p 121). The feeling was mutual; Ottomans 
had  likewise defined themselves against the Western 'other' during the same era and afterwards 
(Bozdaglioglu,  2003:  p.  36).  Sultan Bayezid II,  reigning  from  1481-1512, had  gone so  far  as 
threatening to feed his horse on the altar of Saint Peter's Basilica. 
The nomadic Turkmeni, pushed West by advancing Mongols in  the thirteenth  century, 
replaced the Seldjoukid Turks of  Anatolia thanks to military practices that would remain superior 
to those of Europe until the seventeenth century. During the fifteenth century, as the Reconquista 
ousted Islam from  Iberia, the House of Osman replaced Saracens at  the helm of the  Umma-the 
world-wide  community of ail  people  faithful  to  Allah.  The empire that  Osman's dynasty had 
created can be described as a sort of international system given the great variety of peoples and 
territories annexed. Adopting a style of governance learned from  Persians, the Sultan delegated 
much power to  regional  leaders in exchange for troops and  tribute'  (Watson, 1992:  p.  113).  In 
the Hanafi branch of Islam practiced by Ottoman Turks, the world is  divided into Dar-al Islam 
(the abode of Islam) and Dar-al harb (the abode ofwickedness). The former refers to  ail territory 
under Islamic law while the latter, its dyadic counterpart, refers to those parts of the world under 
non-Islamic rule. The patriarchal head of the empire fulfills a dual function as  Sultan- temporal 
leader of  dar-al Islam, and Caliph, spiritual leader of the Umma. 
Foreign  policy  is  very  succinctly  expressed  in  Hanafism:  there  is  no  differentiation 
between races, cultures or languages amongst members of the abode of Islam; Muslims comprise 
a single unit whose Allah-given dutY is  to  wage eternal jyhad on Dar-al harb. There can be no 
peace under any circumstances. The best non-believers can ever hope for is  trade relations and 
temporary periods of truce as  permitted by the Hanafi interpretation of the Koran and  Hadith 
1 Wight had long averred that suzerain empires were early forms of international society. 32 
(Piscatori, 1984; Watson, 1992: p 113). Ironically, it is the similarities between Cmistianity and 
Islam that kept the Porte and Europe apart:  two faiths, each claiming moral superiority over the 
other and  monopoly of the ultimate spiritual truth, and both striving for the conversion of all 
infidels, cannot be expected to  easily get along. And so during this period where the standard of 
civilization was purely based on faith, "[r]eligion was the creator of an iron curtain which neither 
the necessities of common diplomatie interest nor the lures of commercial profit could remove" 
(Berkes, 1998: p. 29). 
Given  the  degree of enmity,  relations  between  Ottomans  and  Europeans  have  always 
been paradoxically close. Due to  geographical proximity, the Sublime Porte was drawn into the 
European  system  (not  society)  by  the  French  in  1535  with  the  first  great  balancing  act 
implicating non-Europeans. François  l,  who sought to  give France the upper hand  against  the 
Habsburg Empire, justified the alliance with the reasoning that Turks lay within the community 
of humankind.  François  may have  had  the  gift  of foresight,  for  this  would  be  the  common 
understanding in the centuries to come. The move was very unpopular at the time (Wight, 1977: 
p.  122).  As  far  as  Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) was  concerned, this  alliance 
was  a unilateral  act on the part of his  empire to  weaken the infidel  Habsburgs on his western 
flank (Watson, 1992:  177). On a very basic 1evel, one can reasonably argue that the Porte joined 
the  institution of the Balance of Power  as  it  was  being  e1aborated  in  the  sixteenth  century. 
Nevertheless,  that  argument  must  be  qualified.  The  Ottoman  Empire  often  fostered  anti­
hegemonial states in Europe not to avoid hegemony per se, perhaps because the Sultan knew that 
he was the hegemon at the time, but to weaken the Christian continent as a whole (Naff, 1984: p. 
147). In that light, one could easily argue that given the lack of common understanding about the 
purpose of the BOP and its disdain for European society as a whole, the Porte did not meet Bull's 
criterion  of shared  goals  (Bull,  1984:  pp.  117-119).  It engaged  in  the  BOP  purely  from  a 
unilateral  position  and  with  nothing  but  power  calculation  as  a  motive,  without  being  a 
participant in even the most minimally-defined collective institution. 
This  lack  of common  understanding  and  shared  goals  becomes  more  evident  when 
contemplating  the  nature  of capitulations.  The  first  of them  were  granted  to  France  (1536 
informally, 1569 officially), England (1583) and the Netherlands (1613). Capitula were consular, 
juridical and  commercial privileges granted to  foreign sovereigns for their subjects in Ottoman 
lands. European traders were thus under the aegis of a consul, particularly when in need of legal 33 
recourse, and had the added assurance that they would receive a trial "more or less in conformity 
with  their  own  legal  code"  (Toynbee  and  Kirkwood,  1927:  p.  137).  These  concessions  can 
neither be seen as diplomatie overtures nor as attempts to develop mutually binding international 
laws.  In the case of diplomacy, though it  is  a given that consuls would gather information for 
their sovereigns, the establishment of Ottoman embassies in western capitals was still a century 
away. There was no  regular communication across the straits of the Bosporus, so  there was no 
real diplomacy to  speak of. As for internationallaw, while the Europeans considered capitula as 
binding  and  reciprocal  contracts  between  sovereign  states  (as  they  reciprocated  rights  for 
Ottoman subjects  in  the  European  states  concerned),  Ottoman  subjects  were  still  considered 
outside  the  scope  of European  international  law  given  sorne  of their  practices.  Particularly 
offensive to European morality was the bondage ofwar prisoners. The infamous Janissary Corps, 
ranked by the fittest and ablest young boys plucked from conquered Christian families at the age 
of nine on average, converted to  Islam, and trained in war and administration, was at the top of 
the  list  of offences.  Again,  the  Porte  saw  these  capitula  as  unilateral  actions  which  were 
beneficial to  the empire and sanctioned by the Koran; allowing foreigners to  enforce justice by 
their  own custom was  merely an  extension of the  rules  used  to  govern Jews  and  Christians 
already living in the empire.  Furthermore, they were non-permanent: capitula were valid only 
during the lifetime of the Sultan who  had  proclaimed them unless  renewed  by his  successor 
(Watson, 1992: p.  217). 
To  paraphrase historians  in  the  language of the  English  School,  the  situation  can be 
described as two international societies within what was increasingly becoming a single system, 
divided by a single issue; relations revolved around a simple balance and could be likened to  a 
holy cold war.  As would be the case four and  a  half centuries  later,  the stronger of the two 
societies would eventually 'absorb' the other. But while the Porte was powerful enough, it could 
survive in  self-imposed isolation  from  Europe.  A  series  of territorial  losses  to  Persia and  to 
Europe during the mid to  late seventeenth century weakened the previously undefeated empire, 
and  after a second failure at the gates of Vienna in  1683, the absorption of the Ottoman Empire 
by the West was only a matter of time. The Peace of Carlowitz, accompanied by a treaty of the 
same name (1699), was the first in which the Porte ever ceded territory. Parts of the Balkans and 
the  Peloponnesus  were  handed  over  to  Austria,  Poland  and  Venice.  Peter  the  Great  would 
negotiate a separate peace to buy himself enough time to  close his northern front. In 1718, even 34 
more land was signed away after the Tsar provoked the Porte into declaring war. Peter would not 
hold  the  land  he invaded,  but Vierma  would keep  everything  north  of the  line rurming  from 
Sarajevo  to  Bucharest according to  the treaty of Passowaritz (1718).  From then on, the  Porte 
would be on the defensive.  "Il  n'est pas adapté à une interruption de son expansion telTitoriale. 
L'année vit du butin autant que de la solde.  Il  n'y a plus de nouveaux territoires, donc moins de 
butin, donc moins de revenu" (Ternon, 2005: pp. 61-62). Unversed in the economic principles of 
their neighbours, the sultanate had under-estimated the importance of the capitulations. As goods 
flowed out of the Levant and Anatolia and gold and other wealth flowed in from the New World 
at unregulated rates, the empire's currency was debased markedly and persistently from the start 
of the eighteenth century.  Corruption, nepotism and  incompetence further reduced tax  revenue. 
Together,  these  ever-increasing  weaknesses  finally  provided  the  Porte  with  the  impetus  to 
reconsider its cultural isolationism (Toynbee, 1962: pp. 24-27; Aktar, 1985: p. 34). 
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same (1719-1815) 
Across the straits, the Vatican's sway in matters of state had been weakening before the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648),  the most commonly accepted  point of departure for  a European 
international society based on  secular, 'logical' foreign  policies, but it  still retained  a powerful 
influence.  The  graduaI  rift  between  faith  and  politics  initially  led  to  a  new  conception  of 
international society. The days of the crusades were over and gone with them was the horizontal 
organization  between  sovereigns.  This  move  away  from  a  solidarism  rooted  in  Catholicism 
generated  a pluralist international society ordered by natural law, whose universalist principles 
extended the fundament of mutual recognition of sovereignty across the board, at least in theory. 
Voltaire's famous quote  about "la grande république" reveals that despite this pluralist shift and 
the theoretical inclusion of non-European powers into a broader, though looser, society of states, 
shared history made manifest in similar cultures and shared norrns and institutions still supported 
what Grotius had  expressed one century prior:  that Europe was  like the irmer ring of an  ever­
growing spider web. The House of Osman wouId soon become more entwined. 
In  1717,  the  Europhile Sultan Ahmed  III  (1703-1730),  with  the  support of his  Grand 
Vizir, made the decision to open the empire to the West. The importance of this decision should 
be put in perspective. Hanafite Islam is an indivisible whole; there are no clear lines between the 
individual,  the  family,  and  the state.  Laws of appropriate conduct have been handed down by 35 
God  and  misbehaviour in  any  realm  is  a  sin.  For that  reason,  the decision  to  pursue further 
contact with infidels is  very important.  But one must remember that the Porte did  not  at  first 
envision any serious reforrns to  come from  these openings.  It  had experienced first-hand what 
modernization could accomplish at the tips of  Peter the Great's bayonets, and plaImed on making 
technical  and  technological  ameliorations to  its  military,  and  nothing more.  (Ternon,  2005:  p. 
76).  The Ottoman  elite  had  no  doubts  pertaining  to  the  moral  -and  by connection,  political 
superiority of Islam and the empire. Throughout the eighteenth century, the problem was purely 
understood as  a technological deficiency.  In  other words, the first Ottoman reforrners  were not 
real1y  reforrners  at  ail,  but  statesmen  who  were  slightly  more  open-minded  than  their 
predecessors. Necessity had  forced them to  contort Hanafite jurisprudence in order to  dilute the 
concept of jyhad, allowing for a more stable and durable alliances with European powers (Naff, 
1984: p.  150-153). Almost immediately, an Islamic conservative movement surfaced, allying the 
Ulema  with  the  Janissaries.  These  elite  and  once  meritocratic  soldiers  and  bureaucrats  had 
become increasingly corrupt and  nepotistic ,however, selling their stations, accepting bribes for 
favours, andmaking or breaking Sultans at their pleasure. 
The  Tulip  Era  (1717-1730)  would  mark  the  end  of  the  long  and  almost  purely 
antagonistic initial phase of Ottoman-European relations.  In  1720, Louis XV  received the first 
ever Ottoman delegation. Thus commenced a period of data absorption, and by the end of that 
decade, the Porte had amassed an  impressive collection of Western military manuals.  In  1727, 
the Sheik ul-Islam (the empire's spiritual second-in-command) had  produced  a fatwa  allowing 
the translation and  publication of secular books,  and  on January 31,  1729, the first  book ever 
printed in  the Islamic world rolled of the press in  Istanbul (nearly ail  publications consisted of 
military and  medical  maimals;  Berkes,  1998:  pp.  48-49).  When Ahmed  attempted  to  open  an 
engineering school in 1730, the Janissaries forced his abdication with the support of the Islamic 
jurists. The school was shut down. They blamed the Empire's weakness on the Sultan's impiety 
and  could not accept this  latest breach of Koranic law.  In  reality, any change in  the status quo, 
especially in  terrns of military organization, was a threat to  the Janissaries' power.  Likewise, it 
was  the  madrassa school  system  that  produced  the Ulema's jurists, and  foreign  influences  in 
scholarship  were  a  threat  to  the  conservative social  elements, and  to  the  empire's  traditional 
culture  in  general.  Even  guilds,  of paramount  economic  importance  and  setving  as  the  link 
between the productive classes  and  government, preferred the artisan to  the machine and  thus 36 
acted  as  a conservative agent.  Scribes and calligraphers protested the opening of Istanbul's first 
press  In  1729,  for  example.  The press  had  been known  to  Turks  since  the  early  seventeenth 
century.  Chelebi  Mehmed,  Ahmed  III'S  emissary  to  the  Bourbon  Court,  displayed  great 
familiarity  with  the  machines  he  was  shown  in  France.  Chelebi's  son  Said  Mehmed,  who 
accompanied his father to France, would eventually become the first Turk to speak French as far 
as  history recalls. He would return to  Paris in  1741  to  find  friends from  his first visit, frequent 
operas and flirt with courtesans. Voltaire even postponed performances of his play Mahomet out 
of courtesy during Said's visit. (ibid: pp.  34-36). This swing of the Ottoman pendulum between 
progressive and conservative periods persists to this day, though to a much less dramatic scale. 
Russian  ascension  would  mark  the  eighteenth  century  for  the  whole  of Europe  as  it 
would  for  the  Ottomans.  Istanbul  and  Saint  Petersburg's  fates  were  bound  together.  It was 
Ottoman strength that had prompted Peter the Great's reforms with European consent, hoping for 
a  strong  Christian,  albeit  Orthodox  power  on  the  Osmanli's  northem  frontier.  Once  its 
westernization complete with modem professional armies, universities and a Polish Tsarina who 
corresponded regularly with the likes of Voltaire and Diderot, it would be Russia's turn to  push 
the Turks  further  into  the  European  institutions  in  search of allies.  The momentary  reprieve 
granted by Peter's northern campaigns gave the Ottomans an  opportunity to  'Iearn the ropes' of 
European  diplomacy.  After  1683,  and  even  more  so  after  Passowaritz,  concessions  were  no 
longer unilaterally handed down by an omnipotent Sultan, but were in fact negotiated and would 
later  be  imposed  from  the  other  end.  During  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Porte  had  but  one 
unallied victory against a European power in the 1738-39 campaign against Austria, which was 
waged as part of  a conservative backlash after Ahmed's deposal. 
Even amongst conservatives however, an awareness of the necessity of defensive treaties 
with Europeans became painfully obvious. The need for outside help would of course draw the 
sultanate further  into  the European balance of power.  Envoys to  European capitals increased, 
especially to  Versailles,  the Porte's oldest ally and  the cultural  centre of Europe  at  the time. 
France  wouId  gain  further  preferential  trade  concessions  as  weil  as  dominion  over  Latin 
Christians in the Empire in 1740, in exchange for an agreement of mutual defence in the case an 
of  Austrian attack. Foreign missions in the Pera, on Istanbul's western shore commonly reserved 
for non-Ottomans, increased ,both in size and in number. With Russia looking north, and with the 
Austrian Wars of Succession (1740-1763) and American and Central Asian expansion occupying 37 
the continental powers at home and abroad, the Porte was mostly left alone until Catherine the 
Great turned her sights on the Crimea. The 1770's brought one military disaster after another for 
Istanbul, who was forced  to  sign the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja in July,  1774, granting Russia 
dominion over Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, unlimited access to  the Black Sea, 
the Sea of Azov and  to  the Straits,  and  sovereignty over all  land  between the Dniepr and  the 
Boug. The Ottomans resisted, declaring war on Catherine in 1787 with the encouragement of the 
British. But by 1790, the Foreign Office had thrown its lot in with the Tsarina to counter-balance 
against France, who was of course, in no  position to  help its oldest Eastern ally at the time.  In 
1792, Russia imposed the treaty of Jassy, re-establishing the terms of 1774. Jassy would bring to 
light  three  tendencies  that  will  become  irrefutably  clear  by  their  numerous  and  successive 
examples: first, Ottoman reforms would, save for a few isolated instances, never be progressive, 
but  always  reactionary  to  a  loss  of power;  second,  as  already  noted,  reformative  actions 
themselves would always be accompanied by a conservative reaction; and third, convergence of 
the  outward-looking  institutions  of the  Ottoman Empire  with  European  norms  and  practices 
cannot  be disassociated  with  internal  institutional  changes  and  convergence  with  European 
norms and practices. 
Nevertheless, the union of the Ottoman and  European systems was nearing completion. 
The  Ottomans  were,  by  the  end  of the  eighteenth  century,  an  integral  part  of balancing 
calculations  amongst  the  French,  the  Romanoffs,  the  Habsburgs  and  more  recently,  of the 
English,  and  vice versa.  Selim III  (1789-1807),  one of the more enlightened  Sultans  to  have 
ruled,  established  the  Porte's  first  permanent  embassies  in  1792,  in  the  four  of the  most 
important capitals of the day (Paris,  London,  Vienna and  Berlin).  This was  a small  and  very 
tardy step forward considering that during the three quarters of a century that had elapsed since 
Ahmed's envoys, numerous treaties had been negotiated, a high number of foreign officers came 
to serve in Ottoman ranks, and extensive commercial relations had developed between East and 
West.  In  another swing of the pendulum towards the reformist end,  Selim managed to  send a 
contingent of 150 students to European schools. He expanded the engineering school, which had 
been reopened  in  1768, and  staffed  it with French professors.  He even  opened  a Turkish-run 
engineering school eight years later which he attended himself, and sent further special envoys to 
European capitals to  study the internaI organization of European governments. The Sultan had 
also  learned much about the infidels' law of nations. After the Wars of Succession, he had gone 38 
so far as  to  offer his mediation, causing sorne raised eyebrows in European diplomatie circles. 
The offer was declined, but politely. More revealing in  terms of Ottoman understanding was  a 
comment by Selim III's Grand Vizir upon the Russian Black Sea squadron's unannounced entry 
into the Straits in 1799. 
The Reis  Effendi  (meaning Selim)  should  take  this  opportunity to  remind  the Russian 
interpreter in an amicable way of the international rules of conduct and of the clauses of 
the treaty (of Jassy) governing the matter. It is contrary to the canons of international law 
that a war fleet should enter a foreign port without specifying the number of vessels. This 
act of the Russians  causes  agitation among ill-intentioned persons.  They look on such 
acts as insults to our state (taken from Naff, 1984: pp. 159-160; parentheses added). 
The Ottomans were too big and still  too powerful to  be quartered and divvied as Poland 
had  been,  yet  militarily  and  economically,  they  were weak  enough to  be treated  as  a  minor 
power. This was definitively so from 1774 on, even when it was the only non-European power in 
the anti-hegemonial coalition against Bonaparte, and perhaps even the holder of that balance. 
The  proof is  in  the  pudding.  Selim's  downfall  would  be  his  commitment  to  alliances  with 
-Sweden (1790) and Prussia (1791), both against Russia, and both to  be neglected by Stockholm 
and Berlin in 1792 in favour ofstatus quo ante bellum with St. Petersburg (ibid: p.160-161). 
Europe found  itself in a state of perpetuai war from that year on until the end of 1814. 
Battles were not merely fought between states, but between political systems. It is  tempting to 
attribute such double-crossing behaviour on the part of Europeans towards the Osmanli as part of 
the tradition of unequal treaties that would last weil into the 1900's, but in reality, this was not 
drastically different  from  the  way European states  treated  each other  at  the  time.  "La partie 
consiste à contracter des alliances: les reines entres elles, avec ou contre le roi noir, avec ou sans 
les pions. Elle se joue par coups successifs et s'étend sur un siècle. Aucune alliance n'est donc 
définitive. Chaque partenaire est donc menacé par les autres. D'européene, la partie devient vite 
mondiale"  (Ternon,  2005:  p.  120).  As  Selim was  sucked  into  the Napoleonic Wars,  he  was 
judged a puppet of the Franks by his subjects, and a traitor by the Janissaries. Having lost Egypt 
to Bonaparte, his end would come in the shape of a military reform policy called Nizam-e Jadid, 
a Farsi phrase meaning 'new military', and once again, with the support of the Ulema, he and his 
heir  apparent  were  assassinated,  leaving  Mahmud  II  (1807-1839)  the  only  living  male 
descendant of Osman on the Ottoman throne. 39 
Two  St~ps  Forward (1818-1856) 
The Porte  was  neither summoned  to  Vienna nor  to  Aachen,  but  big changes  were  to 
European intemational society were around the corner.  Mahmud  II  is  most renowned for  two 
achievements:  he built the Sublime Porte in  1834,  but before that,  he destroyed the last of the 
Janissaries with cannon fire in June, 1826. It took him sorne 17 years to do so because as soon as 
he had come to power, an attempt to continue Selim's military innovations resulted in yet another 
rebellion in 1809, perpetrated by the usual suspects. Istanbul was losing Mediterranean territories 
to  France,  then  to  England.  Russia  had  pushed  southwards  along  the  Black  Sea  coast  and 
continued to  gain influence in the Balkans. Mahmud was wise enough to  wait until his Prussian­
trained  armies  won  victories  against  Mehmet  Ali's  forces  to  demonstrate  the  efficacy  of 
European militarism to  the Ulema and  other conservative institutions (Ternon, 2005:  pp.  140­
141).  He was  the  first  Sultan  to  see  his  empire  as  an  Ottoman  state  containing  a  variety  of 
ethnicities and faiths rather than as  the home of the Umma. At the very least, he did not see the 
empire exclusively as  the latter. He embodied many other innovations. Mahmud II  was the first 
Sultan to  base his understanding of sovereignty on the citizenry, first Sultan to learn French, and 
most importantly, first  to  realize that the traditional  institutions of the Ottoman Empire had  to 
change before any worthwhile degree of  modemity could be achieved (Berkes, 1964: p 90-92). 
In  1824, he had initiated compulsory primary education, though it was not secular. The 
ability of the state to maintain this policy to an effective degree is debatable however, for as late 
as the 1870's, the illiteracy rate was as high as 90% in what was then left of  the Ottoman Empire, 
with  statistics varying greatly between urban and  rural  areas in  favour of the former (Garnier, 
1973: p.  45). Primary education in the madrassa system did not concern itself with literacy; arts 
and  trades  are the product of science, serving man in this world, while Islam is  concerned with 
salvation in  the world  to  come.  Furtherrnore, madrassas utilized  Arabie script,  which was  ill­
suited to  Turkish phonetics.  After having gained  the support of the religious  castes,  Istanbul's 
naval  and  military academies, staffed by foreigners,  opened in  1827 and  in  1834 respectively, 
followed by a teaching hospital for war surgery attached to  the naval arsenal at Galata Saray in 
1838.  Necessities  being what  they were,  the  hospital's  main  function  soon  turned  out  to  be 
obstetric.  "That  Muslim  women  should  have  been  willing  as  early  as  1839  to  have  their 
accouchements superintended by infidel Frankish physicians shows how rapidly the anti-Western 
prejudice was already breaking down" (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927: p. 47). 40 
By the  1840's,  the  reformist  momentum  was  picking  up  with  the  Tanzimat  -literally 
'reorderings' era (rough1y  1839-1875), during which few of the changes to  government made by 
Mahmud were consolidated by his  spendthrift son, Abdul Medjid. To describe the Tanzimat as 
an epoch of institutiona1 evo1ution is  partially inaccurate. Certain institutions did change, but in 
most  cases,  education  and  the justice  system  being  the  most  obvious,  new  Western  style 
administrations were created and  emp1aced  without the abolition of their Ottoman forerunners. 
Mahmud had decommissioned certain palatial offices and replaced them with an administration 
of ministers each in charge of the quasi-autonomous departments of internaI, external, financial, 
commercial, educational, agricultural and  industrial affairs, led by a bashvekil or chief minister. 
The office of the Seyul Islam, whose political powers Mahmud also sought to reduce through the 
removal  of  temporal  responsibilities,  was  actually  reinforced  by  the  administrative 
transformation since it inherited jurisdiction over the entire court system. Mahmud is often and 
mistakenly credited with the establishment of the first Turkish penal code, when in  reality, the 
codes  he  did  create  addressed  the  responsibilities  of officiaIs  and  included  penalties  for 
incompetence and  corruption, hence the erroneous categorization. Nevertheless, these were the 
first  codified  rules  outside the Sheriat.  SO  alien was  the  concept of government accountability 
and  of public service that the code was unpopular with the very public it  was meant to  protect 
(Berkes, 1998: pp. 98-99). 
Legal  reforms  would  become  central  during  the  Tanzimat  and  the catalyst  would  be 
economic this time. In 1838, the Foreign Office would enforce free trade, and though economic 
liberalism  increased  trade  flows  by  connecting  Ottoman  farms  directly  to  the  European 
agricultural  market,  there  would  nevertheless  be  very  little  sustained  growth  in  the  Porte's 
economy.  Turkey  represents  one  of the  first  instances  of non-colonial  foreign  economic 
development in modern history, and  the problems faced  then are no  different than those of the 
twentieth-first century.  Trade liberalization demanded  a  new  commercial code of laws  which 
facilitatedand guaranteed foreign  investment, and  increased foreign  control as  a consequence. 
There was no capitalist class to speak of among the Turkish Ottomans, and the Greek, Arrnenian 
and  Balkan bourgeoisies  which traditionally formed  the  empire's  merchant classes  were little 
inclined  to  partake  in  burgeoning  sentiments  of economic  nationalism.  Foreign  commercial 
companies, banks and  insurance firms set up shop in the major Ottoman ports. Though military 
improvements had  greatly improved  tax  collection and  security tlu'oughout  the empire by the 41 
1840s, the cost of maintaining a professional conscripted army was overwhelming. RefOlID  is an 
expensive endeavour and the Porte's economy was still caught in a feudal  configuration. Faced 
with  western industrial  capitalism,  it was  helpless to  prevent penetration as  Europeans  gained 
monopolies  in  several  important  areas  of trade.  Infrastructure,  starting with  roads,  ports  and 
lighthouses,  but  later  including  rail  and  telegraph  lines  were  also  developed  by  European 
contractors with foreign capital (Toynbee and Kirkwood: p. 46; Aktar: p. 46). 
The Ottoman Empire furnished raw materials and outlet markets for  a Europe booming 
demographically as well as  economicallY and industrialization provided the latter with more and 
more buying power as well as access to cheaper foodstuffs from abroad, including the Near East 
(Keynes,  1920:  pp.  5-17).  As  Ottoman  agriculture  was  increasingly  'plugged  into'  European 
markets, sectoral specialization arose on ethno-geographic lines  that would later accelerate the 
spread  of various  nationalisms,  and  ultirnately,  the  disappearance  of the  Ottoman  Empire 
(Berkes,  1998:  pp.140-142).  Matters only got worse as  time elapsed.  The extractive nature of 
western  economic penetration coupled with the  increased cost burden of reforms would mean 
that from the Tanzimat on, the vicious cycle of capital flight leading to foreign loans, resulting in 
loss of sovereignty and autonomy, thus creating the need for more refol1ns, costing more money, 
requiring more concessions to  secure loans ad  infinitum, would become endemic. It would  also 
become  a  favoured  means  of manipulation  by  foreign  offices  across  Europe  (Toynbee  and 
Kirkwood, 1927: pp. 244-245). As of 1865, viliually all  new loans were paying old debts and so 
was  60% of Ottoman revenue. The empire's heavy military expenditures and inelastic revenue 
sources meant that large groups of rentiers in the UK and France held a direct stake in Ottoman 
stability  (Anderson,  1966:  p.174).  Furthermore,  by  impoverishing  the  Ottoman  peasantry 
indirectly for a number of  reasons, free trade would further accentuate urban-rural cleavages and 
the unfavourably viewed reforms wou1d  drive the children of classes  left behind  towards  the 
conservative camp  and  into  the madrassa system.  The small  urban middle classes were much 
more  likely  to  have  their  sons  schooled  in  the  institutions  of secondary  education  run  by 
foreigners, of which there were over 250 by 1870  (Ternon, 2005: pp. 152-154). 
If there was a  silver lining to  this  dark  cloud  looming over the POlie,  it was  that the 
inadequacies  of its  legal  system  were  made  undeniably  obvious,  and  beginning  with  the 
commercial  code of 1838,  legal  reforms  took  on  a  new vigour.  The Tanzimat were  actually 
ushered in  by the Rose Chamber charter which bound the patriarch to  the laws of the empire, 42 
though legislation was not carried out by elected officiaIs and  was subject to  final  approval by 
the Sultan himself. The charter also called for the creation of codified laws in areas not covered 
by the Sheriat, thus widening the breach between the secular and the religious. A mixed tribunal 
for commercial suits which used France's  1807 commercial code became the first  court outside 
the jurisdiction of the Seyul Islam starting in  1840. A criminal code mixing Sheriat and secular 
concepts  was  published  that  same  year,  but incompatibility  led  to  another  in  1851,  and  yet 
another based mostly on the Napoleonic Code, in  1858.  During the Tanzimat, more and  more 
areas of Ottoman life came to  fall under secular elements of governance, but bifurcation would 
remain  the  defining element  of Osmali  rule,  and  continued  well  into  the  first  quarter of the 
twentieth century, though it  was most pronounced during the mid-nineteenth. The court system 
had at times a theatrical element about it, as differently costumed lawyers and judges would trade 
places  between  secularlcriminal  and  civil/religious  proceedings  (Berkes,  1964:  162-164).  If 
irreconcilability of the  two  legal  systems was  not yet perceived by Ottoman refOlIDers,  it  was 
nevertheless  a source of concern to  European statesmen.  There is  an  often-cited quote by the 
Tyrolean Metternich, Austrian Chancellor at the time, which reflects this well: 
We recommend the Porte the following policy- Build your government upon the basis of 
adherence to  the religious institutions which are the essentials of your very existence [...] 
because western institutions are based on principles that are different from those forrning 
the  bases  of your  empire.  Restez  turcs  mais  alors  consultez  la  loi  musulmane  (from 
Berkes, op cit : pp. 148-149). 
European political nOlIDS  and  ideals had begun to  trickle into  intellectual circles in  the 
Ottoman Empire as  early as  the  1730's.  Sorne had contact with Europeans and  had  learned on 
their own, such as Said Chelebi, and of course, there were Selim's academic envoys. Others such 
as Ibrahim Müteferrika were more typical ofwhat was to  come. Müteferrika's foremost interests 
were scientific.  He had  written the  first  Turkish treaties  on  Cartesian geometry and  Galilean 
astronomy but had had to  learn several European languages including Latin to  do  so. He was an 
ethnic Hungarian and a convert from Unitarianism, but his linguistic skills had opened up a new 
universe for him. In  1731, he printed a book entitled Rational Bases for the Politics of  Nations in 
which he discusses different Western political concepts such as  monarchy, aristocracy and even 
democracy, and the roles of the military in each of the three configurations. Müteferrika viewed 
Europe as a Christian empire, and said ofhis own that since "neither the statesmen nor the public 
cared to  learn the causes of [European success] and did not consider them important, it has now 43 
become an evident and urgent need to  collect infonnation about the details of European affairs in 
order to repel their hann and to prevent their. malice" (from Berkes, op cil:  pp. 43-44). 
A very small group of intellectual elites thus became acquainted with European culture, 
and  by the  late  1790s,  European  vestments  and  alcohol  had  made  their  way onto  Istanbul's 
Eastern shore. So had the understanding amongst a select few that there was no band-aid solution 
to  refonn.  When  the  Porte  introduced  Western  style  institutions  of higher  learning  during 
Mahmud II's reign, the focus and the foreseen applications were still exclusively military. Even 
the engineering and medical faculties were erected with combative aims in mind. These schools 
found  it  more  practical  to  teach  in  French  than  to  translate  manuals.  Foreign languages  thus 
became an integral part of curricula from day one. By allowing for Western-style academies and 
opening their doors to all who demonstrated capability (and who could afford tuition), Mahmud 
stimulated  the  creation of an  elite class  of intellectuals.  By placing the  graduates  of western 
schools  in  the bureaucratie functions  left  vacant by the  abolished  slave-classes  to  which  the 
Janissaries and  palace staff belonged, Mahmud also ensured that the primary Ottoman and later 
Turkish agent ofrefonn would be the state, and more specifically, the upper ranks of the military 
(Bozdaglioglu,  1993:  pp.  38-39).  Atatürk himself would be a product of this  phenomenon. He 
would  start  his  education  in  a  Western-style  nonnal  school  and  continue  at  a  high  school 
intended for the training of Salonika's bureaucrats. 
By the late Tanzimat, this  intellectual class was beginning to  take on  a life of its  own. 
During  the  1860's,  the  growing  westernized  intellectual  class  began  to  elucidate  the 
particularities of Ottoman identity. Though nationalism had been sweeping through the western 
provinces of the empire quite naturally since the early eighteenth century given the combination 
ofreligious and ethno-linguistic homogeneities and later, economic specializations, the idea was 
slow to  take hold in the central areas of the empire due Islam' s religious definitions of identity 
and  citizenship. Ibrahim Sinasi (1824-1871) was the first Turkish writer to  tackle such issues as 
nationalism and  liberalism,  and  did  so  openly in  his  opinion-based newspaper,  the  first  to  be 
Turkish-owned (1861).  He was  also  a literary pioneer given that he wrote in  a simple, almost 
conversational  Turkish rather than  in  literary Arabie or  Farsi.  Sinasi  was  adept at translation 
from  French, but he was only one of the best among many.  "Translations were made of almost 
all of the French literature which provided the intellectual background for the French Revolution. 
The  works  of Voltaire,  Montesquieu,  Rousseau,  Fénélon,  Fontenelle,  and  Volney  enjoyed 44 
particular  attention"  and  if the  numbers  of copies  published  are  any  indicator,  these  authors 
found  an  audience among Tanzimat intellectuals, as  did Molière and  Racine (Berkes,  1998:  p. 
199). 
One of the most important Ottoman thinkers also emerged during the Tanzimat. Namik 
Kemal  (1840-1888)  was  the  main  inspiration behind  the  birth  of the  Ottoman  constitutional 
movement and  of the Young Ottomans  2 in  1858, and  perhaps the first Osmanli intellectual to 
suggest that an application of  the principles of natural rights to  the legal and philosophical tenets 
of Islam may be possible. He also clarified the idea of popular sovereignty raised by Mahmud, 
but he was more conscious of  the West's invasiveness, and thus painfully aware of the dangers of 
fighting fire with fire,  of becoming more European in  order to  keep Europeans at bay.  Namik 
Kemal  was the bridge between what was  and what was  to  come.  Mustafa Kemal (no  relation) 
wou1d write ofhis second year at the Istanbul military academy in 1900, that 
c'est  à  ce  moment-là  que  la  pensée  politique  commence  à  nous  occuper.  Nous  ne 
parvenons pas  à nous rendre un compte exact de la situation. C'est à l'époque du Sultan 
Abdülhamid. Nous lisons les livres de Namik Kemal. Une nuit, j'appelle Ali Fuat et je lui 
donne un examplaire du Panégyrique de la mère patrie de Namik Kemal; je lui  demande 
de l'apprendre par coeur. Je lui en lis un passage à voix basse: "Que tout les désordres et 
les  fardeaux  du  mondes se rassemblent sur mes  épaules, je ne tournerai pas  le dos  au 
service que je dois à mes compatriots (Atatürk, 2005: p.  9). 
Whether or not he was aware of Metternich's warning,  Namik Kemal's brand of  nationalism was 
based in Islamic faith and included ail  Ottoman subjects regardless of ethnicity. In his thinking, 
rights  should be subject to  the will  of the  majority,  but based  in the conception of 'good'  as 
determined  by Islamic  law  within  a  constitutional  system  framed  by  an  institutional  model 
closely resembling Napoleonic France (ibid: pp. 21 0-213). 
So far,  we have discussed the major changes within Turkish society that represent a fair 
degree of modernization and of convergence with Eu~opean political practices of the nineteenth 
century- the 'two steps forward'. Before discussing the 'step back', the international context must 
be brought  back  into  the  foreground.  International  societies  vacillate  too.  Watson  and  Bull 
(1984),  and  Watson  (1992)  in  particular,  have observed  that  states'-societies  'swing'  between 
pluralism and  solidarism. Napoleon Bonaparte may have failed  to  unite Europe under his  own 
2  It was Namik Kemal who  drafted  the  Young Ottoman manifesto  from  Paris,  demanding  a constitution and  a 
parliamant from the Sultan 45 
banner, but in the end, he caused the major powers to  create a union based on cooperation rather 
than  dominion.  The Treaty of Vienna (1815)  is  a reaffirmation of the  balance of power.  The 
agreement  reached  at  Aachen  three  years  later,  to  which  France  was  also  party,  takes  that 
affirmation one step further. Traditionally, the BOP was a negative affair; it was supposed to be 
the natural result of states pursuing self-interest. For the first time since the remnants of the Holy 
Roman Empire had disintegrated, a positive and  horizontal organization between states' leaders 
re-emerged, but this time rooted more deeply in reason than in faith.  The five major powers of 
the day (France, England, Germany, Austria and  Russia)  agreed to  cooperate, even to  collude, 
not only to  deter hegemonic aspirations, but to  manage the economic and political affairs of a 
rapidly growing  international system.  So  began the Concert of Europe. If a shore-bound ship 
sails  forth too slowly during a rising tide,  it may find  itself further from its destination as  time 
goes  by.  In the nineteenth century, the Porte was at  the helm of such a ship. Reforms came too 
slowly  and  too  ineffectually  during  a  time when  European  international  society was  rapidly 
gaining solidarity, which resulted in a much more rigorous standard of civilization. 
Among ES  authors, Gerritt W.  Gong has paid the most attention to  the European states­
society's standard, dedicating an entire bookto the exploration of this concept. He has noted that 
prior to  the end of the nineteenth century, it was implicit and  vague but that  "[b]y  1905  at the 
very latest, a standard of civilization had  emerged as  an  explicit legal principle and  an integral 
part ofthe doctrines ofinternationallaw prevailing at the tirrie" (Gong, 1984b: p.  14). He goes on 
to say that these laws emerged as  crystallized and elaborated versions of the early customs and 
norms  governing the  treatment of foreign  nationals  in  non-European  countries.  The Ottoman 
capitulations  being  among  the  earliest  of such  treaties,  served  as  the  basis,  or  at  least  the 
inspiration for the first  arrangements with Eastern empires such as  China, Japan and the Indian 
states'-society. To Gong,  the standard of civilisation has  five  main requirements.  First,  certain 
basic rights such as  security of the person and of property and freedom of worship, travel and 
commerce  had  to  be guaranteed.  Second,  states  considered  'civilized'  had  to  have  a  political 
. organization capable of  delivering and protecting freedoms, order and domestic institutions so as 
to  maintain  internai  security  and  sovereignty.  In  addition,  domestic  institutions  created  or 
reforrned along western models were favoured by Europe, and as Toynbee points out, none more 
so than parliament (Tonybee,  1925). Third, states had to  observe the principles of international 
law.  Fourth, states had to  maintain permanent diplomatie channels. Gong goes on to  state that 46 
despite general acceptance of the concept by mid to  late nineteenth century internationallawyers, 
the standard of civilization was !ittle more than a "blunt legal  instrument". This is  reflected by 
his fifth and intentionally vague and  tautological criterion, that 'civilized states' adopt 'civilized 
nonns' and  customs, and avoid or outlaw practices considered barbarie such as  slavery (Gong, 
1984b:  ch.  1).  Clearly,  the  increasingly juridical  'standard'  of the  nineteenth  century  was  a 
European one.  Even seemingly unambiguous political concepts such as  'freedom' and  'security' 
cannot entirely be separated from the cultural context in which they are developed and applied. 
Somewhat  paradoxically,  the  'standard'  was  devised  as  a  means  of including  non­
Europeans in the society of states. The 'new' Europe had first begun to spread across the globe in 
the  late  fifteenth  century  through  trade.  As  the  full  potential  of that  economic  system  was 
unleashed  by  the  industrial  and  scientific  revolutions'  advancements  in  transportation, 
communication and weaponry, the occident colonized and subjugated Asia, Africa and the New 
World.  One of the many consequences of European sprawl was that by early in  the nineteenth 
century, a great deal of economic interdependence existed; indeed, the world was but a hop and a 
skip  away  from  becoming  the  global  international  system  we  !ive  in  today.  Increased 
interdependence  meant  that  relatively  weak  states  traditionally  outside  European  powers' 
calculations  or  influence  could  now  tie  up  railways  or  shipping  !ines,  hindering  trade  and 
creating disruptions, and of sewing disorder in the whole system in the worst cases. By bringing 
other 'civilized' states into European international society, the West would gain colleagues in the 
maintenance of order throughout the world. At least that was the idea.  As  such, the increased 
level  of solidarism  in  European international  society does  not by itself explain the  increased 
stringency of the rules of membership. The vital necessity for assistance in creating world order, 
which  also  increased  the  demands  of the  standard,  would  only  increase  with  European 
penetration of  the East and the South. 
The scientific revolution is also intimately linked to  the 'raising of the bar'. As Christian 
doctrine  gave way to  international  relations  guided  by natural  law  in  the eighteenth  century, 
positivism and  positive international  law would  redefine relations with Asia and  Africa in  the 
mid to  late nineteenth century. August Comte's six volume Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830­
1842) is obviously linked to  James Lorimer's famous  legal classification of states into  savage, 
barbarous  and  civilized  (Gong,  1984b:  pp.42-49;  Pyenson  &  Sheets-Pyenson,  1999:  pp.  419­
423). Comte had divided the evolution of thought, and consequently of human society, into three 47 
consecutive  stages:  the  theological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  scientific.  The  pinnacle  of 
intellectual evolution being the scientific mind, Christian moral superiority was thus transposed 
into  a sense of superiority that,  though perhaps  not purely the result of military and  economic 
preponderance, was greatly enhanced by it.  Greater means were taken as a sign of greatness tout 
court. Lorimer put into positive law in 1883 what Comte had contemp1ated four decades earlier, 
and  as  Gong correctly points out, what had already been in  the practice of European colonial 
powers for nearly two centuries. The mandate system of 1919 would be, as  the South African 
General  Jan  Smuts  commented,  nothing  but  colonialism  by  another  name.  Sadly,  positive 
international  law  aided  in  the justification of unequal  treatment  of those  areas  of the  world 
deemed  barbarous  or  savage,  and  a  clear  line  can  be  drawn  from  straight  from  Grotius  to 
Lorimer, and later to  others such as Oppenheim. Though he never openly advocated war on the 
Turks, Lorimer, like Grotius, believed that they did not belong to  the 'civilized races' (Howard, 
1984: p. 35-37; Gong, 1984b: pp. 26-49). 
Increased solidarity after Aachen does not equate with contemporary European unity by 
any  means, but the bellicose competition of the eighteenth century gave way to  contests of an 
extraterritorial and often economic nature that diffused continental militarism to  a great extent 
(Watson, 1984a). Even so, the Ottoman Empire represented a constant source of friction between 
the UK, France and  Russia.  The most intense rivalry after the Napoleonic Wars was between 
London and Saint Petersburg. Both their empires were expanding east, placing the Ottomans in 
the middle of the scuffle for several reasons. Of paramount importance to the British, who would 
somewhat replace France in the pecking order of Ottoman foreign affairs during the nineteenth 
century, were shipping and rail lines to the British Raj. The need to  control the Black Sea straits 
and  rail lines through Anatolia and Persia, and the Suez Canal from  1869 onwards, would place 
them in direct conflict with Russian influence in the Near-East, with the added complication of 
possibly alienating Muslims of which there were several million under British rule or influence. 
France, who had shifted alliances from the London to Saint Petersburg, was caught in the middle. 
Somewhat withdrawn from political ambitions in Turkey and the Levant given its ebbing status, 
coupled towards the end of the nineteenth century with the ineptness of  Napoleon III, the Quay 
d'Orsay was playing both sides in order to  protect the considerable sums of public and  private 
funds invested in the region. 
The Ottomans also leamed to  play sides against each other to  get what they wanted, and 48 
none had more talent for this game than Sultan Abdul-Hamid II.  It was perhaps a c1ever way to 
survive, but it had the dual effect of increasing tension amongst the world powers in  general. A 
revival of Christian missionary movements in the mid 1800's also strained relations between the 
Porte and  Europe (Gillard,  1984:  p.  96).  Russia and  France would use the plight of Christian 
Ottomans  as  a pretext to  gain  influence and  the right to  intervene on  behalf of Orthodox and 
Catholics respectively should these groups need protection. Stratford Canning (later Stratford de 
Redcliffe), twice British ambassador to  the Porte, even succeeded in placing his personal agenda 
for Britain to  gain such rights over Ottoman Protestants at the forefront of the Foreign Office's 
policies. 
The  1840's were marked by mistrust between France and  England mainly over Middle­
Eastem shipping, and between France and  Russia over capitulatory rights and  influence in the 
'Holy Land'.  Great Britain and  Russia were a distant  cry from  any steady collaboration given 
competitive expansionism in Asia. Mutual distrust was always in the background ofinternational 
agreements and  this particular triangle of antagonistic Russian, French and British goals created 
a kaleidoscopic pattern of alliance-shifting which left the Porte spinning at the centre. It would 
cause the Crimean War and  dictate the clauses of the resulting Treaty of Paris (1856), whose 
terms would actually precipitate the Eastern crises of 1875-78 and the subsequent 'balkanization' 
of the  late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In  1852, the Porte succumbed to  both Paris 
and  Saint Petersburg, granting them dominion over Catholics and  Orthodox respectively in the 
Holy  Land.  This  act  increased  tensions,  but  not  to  an  overwhe1ming  degree,  since  the  two 
collaborated in quelling national uprisings in Wallachia, Po1and and Hungary later that same year 
(Anderson,  1966:  pp.  116-117).  By  this  period,  an  anti  Russian  sentiment  was  brewing  in 
Eng1and,  and  in  1853, the Foreign Office and  the Quay d'Orsay had  agreed  to  check Russian 
advances into  the  Caucasus. The Tsar's intransigence in  the matter 1ed  to  a confrontation over 
capitulations that left hard-liners in the Duma pushing for dominion over all Orthodox Christian 
in the Ottoman Empire, an astonishing two-fifths of its overall population at the time. 
Russian sabre-rattling got out of control. In  mid-September, riots broke out in  Istanbul 
and  cries for blood overwhe1med the Divan, the Sultan's grand council, inta declaring war on the 
25th of that month. The British and French tried to  limit the hostilities by sending fleets into the 
Black Sea and  by inviting both parties to  peace talks.  The offer was declined by both sides in 
January 1854.  In March, the Foreign Office and Quay d'Orsay signed defence treaties with the 49 
Porte that ended up dragging them into combat at  the end of the month. The Crimean War and 
Treaty of Paris foreshadowed the First World War in many ways. For one thing, it was the first 
conflict fought  with modem weaponry and  in  which front-line journalists would  affect policy 
through  their  influence  over  public  opinion  (Ternon,  2005:  p.  169).  More  importantly,  it 
demonstrated  the  fallibility  and  escalatory potential  of the  balance  of power  in  the  Turkish 
context. The Crimean was an accidentai war in many ways.  Economic imperatives aside, given 
the Ottoman Empire's  geographically central location, misgovemment by the  Porte seemed to 
justify European involvement beyond what was within the 'regulatory bounds' of the balance of 
power. In other words, the stakes were just too high for the BOP to be applied unselfishly; raison 
d'état outweighed raison de système. 
Though  no  state  may  have  wanted  war,  they  were  ail  responsible  for  its  outbreak. 
England  would  reinforce  the  Porte;  it  was  part  of the  buffer  running  from  the  Bosporus  to 
Afghanistan, and its stability was detrimental to  Russian power and an obstacle to  her southem 
goals. Prussia and Austro-Hungary, being stuck in the middle, played the roles of mediators and 
moderators, though often negotiating outcomes that were in  their favour.  They held the balance 
as much as possible because ail out war between Russia and the DI<. would have left them caught 
in  the  crossfire,  and  rapprochement  between  France  and  Russia  would  likely  threaten  their 
security as weIl. Balkan instability was a particular danger to  the Habsburgs, though the rampant 
spread of nationalism was a source of concern to  ail. Needless to say Russia's Pan-Slavic foreign 
policies  in  the  Balkan,  Baltic  and  Black  Sea  regions  were  also  a  cause  of consternation  to 
Vienna. The old saying that politics makes for strange bedfellows applies to  nineteenth century 
Europe with the addendum that it  also  makes for  lots of them.  Everyone was  with and  against 
everyone else when it came to the Osmanli, and this Gordian knot of international relations made 
partition of  Ottoman lands impossible. The only option left was stabilization of the Porte, though 
this  too would be greatly complicated by Europe's competing interests. 
The  Treaty  of Paris  was  the  first  to  include  a  non-European  power,  though  most 
historians  and  international  relations  theorists  agree  that  this  was  more of a ploy  to  keep  the 
Ottoman Empire together by pulling it in under the full aegis of international law than an actual 
admittance into European international society (Gong,  1984b: pp.  110-113; Naff,  1984: p.  169; 
Anderson,  1966:  pp.  142-143).  Even then,  efforts were sceptical and  half-hearted.  A separate, 
uneasy multi-lateral agreement was  signed between France, Austria and  Great Britain (without 50 
the  Porte)  towards  mutual  defence  of Ottoman  territorial  integrity.  Austria  and  Russia  also 
agreed  bilaterally not  to  intervene  in  the  western Ottoman territories until  after  any  eventual 
cessation from the Porte. There were four major points to  the treaty of Paris. First, the Sublime 
Porte's sovereignty was to  be fully guaranteed under international law, including access to  third 
party  mediation  in  future  crises.  Second,  the  Porte  agreed  to  stop  tax-farming  the  Christian 
minorities  and  to  grant  religious  equality  throughout  the  empire.  Third,  the  Danubian 
principalities would remain under Ottoman suzerainty, and thus out of the Tsar's hands. Finally, 
the Black Sea would be closed to  ail military ships but equally open to ail merchant vessels. In 
the end, the treaty did little to  weaken Russia while tying the Turks' hands in the Black Sea. As 
of 1866,  Russia  completely ignored  the  naval  limitations  and  had  its  full  maritime freedoms 
officially reinstated in 1871. 
A  secondary concern of the treaty was  the millet system,  used by Ottoman Sultans  to 
govem their non-Islamic subjects. Islamic tradition held that Mohammad had decreed that Jews 
and  Christians  be allowed  to  carry  out justice  according  to  their  own  customs  within  their 
communities. This was the basis of the millet, a political institution purposed with self-regulation 
in civil and religious realms ofpublic life, traceable as far back as  1453 in Ottoman history. Each 
religious  community  had  its  millet  and  was  led  by  a  patriarch;  an  archbishop  each  for  the 
Orthodox, two Catholic and later Protestant millets, and a grand rabbi for the Jewish millet. The 
patriarchs oversaw communal affairs with a fair degree of autonomy though they liaised with the 
Sultan on a regular basis. Though an avant-guard institution in the early days of the empire, the 
millet  system  proved  to  belittle more than  a  source  of headache  throughout  the  nineteenth 
century.  This  practice,  which  included  extra taxation  for  non-Muslims,  did  not jibe with  the 
European  standard  of civilization at  the  time,  and  as  discussed,  tended  to  invite unwelcome 
European  interventions.  In  Jerusalem,  feuding  between  millets  was  commonplace  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire  had  no  shortage  of confessional  fault  lines.  The more  conflicted,  such  as 
between Greek Orthodox and Bulgarian Pomaks in Macedon, or between Druzes and Maronites 
in Lebanon to  name but two, were incessant sources of instability. In both cases, schisms were 
accentuated  by British-French rivalries  (Toynbee and  Kirkwood,  1927:  pp.  143-144;  Ternon, 
2005: pp.177-182). 
Education  was  part of the  millets'  mandate,  which  meant  that  non-Islamic  and  non­
Ottoman modes of  thought were preserved and  even entrenched,  and though the idea of the 51 
nation-state may have been slow to  spread  in  sorne of the Islamic parts of the empire,  it  was 
adopted quite naturally in the millets. They also accelerated the break-up of the Ottoman Empire 
by resisting the creation of a new Ottoman identity. The Porte's lands west of the Straits were 
already  ethnically  distinct  from  their  Osmali  overlords,  and  were  further  distinguished  by 
economic specialization and language. Sandwiched between three empires they did not want to 
ever join, the region was a veritable powder keg. The millet system shortened th~ fuse a little.  It 
is worth noting that there were cleavages between Istanbul and many Islamic provinces as weIl. 
Particularly in what is now Saudi Arabia, Muslims felt that the Caliphate had been perverted by 
western influences and  that returning to  a stricter, purer version of Islam was what the ailing 
empire needed. These were the Wahabists. 
They were not entirely wrong in their claims.  International aid had not come without a 
pnce.  Free  trade  had  impoverished  the  Turks  and  led  to  a  very  precarious,  and  now  fully 
Eurasian, balance of  power. Abuse of the capitulatory system would intensify after the Crimean 
War. Administrative reforms since Selim  III  had been steadily centralizing power, which had 
twa  effects.  Though  won  through  academic  merit  in  earlier  instances,  the  new  bureaucratie 
positions had at sorne point become hereditary, which by the 186ü's at the very latest, once again 
led  ta  an  ineffectual  and  corrupt  state  apparatus  (Anderson,  1966:  p.  168).  Second,  Istanbul 
ended  up isolating itself politically from  more distant provinces, which in  the end,  shared the 
same  fate  as  satellites  that  have  strayed  too  far  from  their  orbit.  Anti-European  sentiments, 
particularly against the British who bore most of the blame for the Crimean war, carried on into 
the 186ü's in great part because the reforms they demanded didn't seem to make sense. 
If the 'Eastern Question' were put into words, it would likely be phrased as  'how do  we 
Europeans keep the Ottoman Empire's decline from pushing our international society into an all­
out war?' Yet the track record of the nineteenth century shows that most reforms had the exact 
opposite effect. Educative and military progress caused rifts between governing elites. Legal and 
fiscal  transformations  likewise  alienated  the  majority  of middle  and  lower  class  subjects. 
Administrative changes helped disjoint the suzerainties. Ironically, the politically savvy Turkish 
intellectuals  of the  nineteenth  century  were  tackling  the  Eastern  Question  from  their  own 
perspective, and to  them, the primary duty lay in defining a new Ottoman identity that everyone 
could  live with,  thus  reversing nationalist fractures.  This would remain an impossible task so 
long  as  the  major  European  states  continued  to  interfere  with  internaI  Ottoman  affairs.  The 52 
Ottoman Council of State (1868),  a precursor to  parliament, in which third  of members were 
non-Islamic, and the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, which officially based citizenship purely 
on territoriality  (and  not  faith),  evoke  the  old  adage  'too  little,  too  late'.  The satellites  were 
already breaking free. 
The Ottoman case is  curious given that the Sublime Porte was unable to  meet Europe's 
standard of civilization, in large part because the demands of the European international society 
made it impossible. Generally speaking, both sides share in the blame for the uneasy unification 
of the  two  international  systems.  The  Treaty  of Paris  was  the  final  step  towards  full 
amalgamation at the system level and in light of Bull's theory, this argument holds water despite 
the lack of socio-political international convergence. Regular Ottoman-European diplomacy had 
been in operation far over six decades and the empire had been part of the European balance of 
power for much longer.  Yet the Treaty in  no  way granted the Ottomans a role in the concerted 
creation of international or even regional political arder, but only the most basic recognition of 
territorial sovereignty (and even that's a bit of a stretch considering the Black Sea clauses). The 
Treaty  of Paris  did  more  to  regulate  European  relations  where  Near-Eastern  policies  were 
concerned than it did far relations between Europe and the Ottomans. 
One Step Back - The Hamidian Era (1876-1908) 
The events leading up  to  Abdul Hamid's enthronement resemble the ones which would 
lead  to  his deposal  in  1908:  territorial  loss.  A Christian  rebellion against Muslim landlords in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in  1875  spread  through the Balkans. The Bulgarians were next,  then  the 
Serbs and Montenegrins in 1876. On the 30th of May, Sultan Abdul Aziz (Mahmud II's second 
son) took his life after being dethroned. The reign of Abdul Hamid II, who managed to have the 
legitimate  Osmanli  successor  declared  insane,  was  much  more  reminiscent  of the  old-style 
Ottoman patriarchy European statesmen found so  unpalatable. He is  most often described as  an 
autocratie,  paranoid  tyrant  who  was  childishly  obsessed  with  naval  ships.  Since  Ahmed  III, 
Sultans  had  had  to  juggle internaI  and  external  influences,  whereas  "le  principe  du  sultanat 
hamidien, basé sur le pouvoir absolu du monarque, qu'il importait de sauvegarder, consistait à se 
défendre  quotidiennement  contre  les  deux  monstres,  qui  de  droite  et  de  gauche,  pouvait 
l'assaillir, l'Islam et l'Europe" (Garnier, 1973: p. 42). Perhaps having earned the nickname 'génie 
du déspotisme', Hamid made a Trojan horse out of  the constitutional movement. Around the time 53 
of the Treaty of Paris, faith in the Ottomans' ability to  reform was waning. On the other side of 
the veil,  crisis  upon  crisis  beginning with  the  Cretan  rebellion  of 1860  likewise  meant  that 
Ottoman subjects were losing faith in the Sultanate. When Hamid came to  power, he outright 
rejected a proposed armistice, bolstering his reputation back home, but he simultaneously pushed 
through  the  composition  of a  constitution  he  would  hide  behind  when  facing  Europe.  The 
inauguration of a  constitution guaranteeing freedoms was a we1come  event in many European 
foreign  offices  because  it  would  provide  a  check  to  Russian  intervention  over  Orthodox 
Ottomans (Berkes, 1964: p. 225). But again, European international society would be hoist on its 
own  petard.  The  new  constitution  provided  for  a  parliament  composed  of a  Senate  whose 
members were appointed for life by the Sultan, and a Chamber of Deputies elected by provincial 
administrations  in  which  the  Sultan  would  always  had  the  final  say.  The  document  itself 
provided very weak protection of the people, but ultimately safeguarded the patriarch's power. 
Not surprisingly, it was inspired by the French (1814) and imperial German (1871) constitutions, 
both of which were created by heavily autocratic regimes (ibid: pp.232-242). Parliament opened 
on March 19,  1877, seating members of ail  faiths and ethnicities. lt lasted eleven months less a 
week before Abdul Hamid prorogued it,  doing so in  perfect concordance with the constitution 
itself on the grounds that financial and diplomatic crises threatened the empire's very existence. 
It would remain closed for the next thirty one years. 
Hamid did  manage to  bring  palpable material  improvements  to  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Railways.  reach  increased  greatly even before the Paris-Vienna-Istanbul  line's completion  in 
1888. The Sultan also posted 30 000 km of telegraphic line. It was said of the Ottoman Empire 
that it  was the only place in he world where the telegraph could be found in places where tracks 
had not yet been laid. Hamid had indulged his paranoia by creating a very large network of spies 
to  keep  tabs  on  his  own  governrnent,  and  the  telegraph  was  merely  a  means  to  that  end. 
Otherwise, he was deeply superstitious and did not trust telephones or electricity. The POlie had 
defaulted on its debts in October, 1875 and Hamid was basically keeping the lion's share of state 
revenue  in  his  personal  accounts,  tithing  a  smaller amount to  Islamic  institutions,  and  using 
whatever was left to  make arms purchases from  the West and  for the empire's payroll -which 
included salaries for the Sultan's 900 cooks as  weil  as  a bribery fund  to  'influence' journalists 
(Garnier,  1973:  p.  39-43).  In  1881,  the despot's hand was forced away from  the Porte's purse­
strings. The Council of the Ottoman Debt, composed of seven European members representing 54 
various bondholders, took control of revenues accruing from salt, tobacco, stamps and alcohol as 
weil  as tributes from Rumelia and Bulgaria, and was to manage these funds to service the public 
debt.  Lord Derby, Disraeli's Foreign Minister and  an ardent critic of foreign-imposed reforms, 
complained  two  years  before  the  debt  council's  establishment  that  even  then,  "the  daily 
surveillance of which Turkey is the object in her own domestic affairs has reduced her sovereign 
authority to practically zero" (from Anderson, 1966: p. 226). The deal was not at ail unfair in that 
it  did  not  overburden  Turkish  finances,  but  it  was  nevertheless  degradingly  intrusive  and 
flagrantly disrespectful of Ottoman sovereignty as guaranteed by the Paris terms. 
At the  cusp of the Hamidian era,  we also  begin to  see loss of reformative confidence 
manifest itself in  the  first  inter-European agreements  for  partitioning in  the  eventuality of an 
Ottoman  collapse,  as  weil  as  yet  another  major  shift  in  alliances  over the  Eastern  Question. 
Austria  and  Russia had  tried  to  jointly stabilize the  Bosnian crisis  of 1875,  but  their  failure 
resulted in the Berlin Memorandum of 1876 in which they agreed that Austria would get Bosnia­
Herzegovina and  that Bessarabia would go to  the Russians should the Porte lose control over 
them.  That  particular  contingency  never  panned  out,  however.  The  borders  were  set 
multilaterally in  1878  by  the  Congress of Berlin, with but a symbolic representation from  the 
Porte.  "Bismarck, as chairman of the congress, bullied mercilessly Caratheodory Pasha, the chief 
Turkish delegate, a sign that the Ottoman Empire itselfwas only a minor factor in the solution of 
the problems facing the congress" (Anderson, op cil:  p.  210). Vienna got control of Bosnia but 
the rest of the  area became,  for  lack of better term,  more balkanized. Many detailed volumes 
have been written about the various national movements, but here, it suffices to  note that they 
added even more complexity to  the international relations of Europe. The simple explanation is 
that  international  political  order,  the  customs  and  shared  norms  between govenunents  which 
create varying degrees of predictability, was diluted by sheer numbers. Second, should it exist at 
ail, the degree of shared norms is much lower with new states, which are truly telTa incognita in 
terms of their internai political landscapes, not to  mention that their domestic disorder can spill­
over  into  the  international  system.  (Lyon)  On  top  of that,  and  more  specifically,  they 
complicated the balance by making Austria and later Germany, previously neutral players, much 
more  active  competitors  in  the  east.  Odd1y,  this  left  the  British  in  a  buffering  raIe  between 
Vienna and Saint Petersburg. 
Ang1ophobia had been mounting in Turkey with every added imposition, and events such 55 
as  the Suez Canal purchase and especially the Debt Council only upped tensions. Anti-Turkish 
sentiments were also  growing stronger in  London since the end of the Crimean, which Abdul 
Hamid exacerbated to  a great degree. Prime Ministers like Palmerstone and Disraeli had no great 
fondness  for  the Turks,  but they remained both  cautious  and  poised.  In  1876,  Gladstone had 
published  The  Bulgarian  Horrors  and the  Question  of the  East,  condemning  Ottoman  war 
atrocities  in  matting the rebellion.  When elected Prime-Minister four  years  later, he withdrew 
from many commitments to the Porte made by his predecessors: 
Between him and the Sultan laya gulf of mutual incomprehension and suspicion which 
proved  quite  unbridgeable  and  which  rapidly  widened.  Layard  (British  minister  at 
Istanbul  1877-1880)  had  to  confess  that  the  Sultan  felt  "a  kind  of horror  of Mr. 
Gladstone' and the English statesman repaid the compliment by saying that 'the mind of 
the Sultan, who is the Turkish government, is a bottomless pit of fraud and falsehood, and 
he  will  fulfill  nothing except under force  or the  proximate threat of force  (Anderson, 
1966: p.  224 - parentheses added). 
Abdul  Hamid  would  ally  himself with  Russia,  reverSIng  the  traditional  relationship 
between the two  empires and  leaving the UK farther out in  the cold.  By the  1880's, Germany 
began filling the void with its  policy of drang nach Osten.  Berlin had  come to  fear a renewed 
Franco-Russian  alliance  and  would  address  the  problem  byextending  its  influence  in  the 
Caucasus through economic policy and by constructing the Bagdad railway to  funnel  in  well­
priced  high-quality  manufactured  goods.  Berlin's  ingresses  into  the  Porte's  politics  were 
channelled through military reform, of course. German holdings in Turkey would grow fourfo1d 
between  1880  and  1914,  intensifying competition, rivalry and  tensions  between Europeans  In 
Turkey (Garnier, 1973: pp. 68-73). 
Social changes affected the empire as  weIl. There were many more Turkish intellectuals 
during  the  Hamidian  era  owing to  the  ever-increasing number of graduates.  But  where  "the 
Tanzimat  intellectual  was  both  valued  by  others  and  satisfied  with  his  life,  the  Hamidian 
intellectual was frightened, oppressed, feared and suspected" (Berkes, 1998: p.  274). The sultan 
had  surrounded  himse1f with  "professional  obscurantists"  and  religious  aristocracy,  and  had 
granted the police the right to  enforce Sheriat laws on the spot in cases of ma1feasance.  Abdul 
Hamid  was  proceeding  to  rewrite  Turkish  history  and  his  use  of Islam  was  but  a  front  to 
legitimize his rule and  to  resist European influences.  Like his  constitutionalism, his  theocracy 
was  a  sham.  It was  the  schools  that  resisted  obscurantism.  Secondary education  and  higher 56 
leaming had  reached  a sort of critical  mass;  more schools meant better teachers  and  more of 
them,  which  in  turn  led  to  better  education,  and  so  on.  Hamid  could  not  reverse  e<;lucative 
reforms  because  graduates  of western  learning were  ever-increasingly  needed  to  accomplish 
bureaucratie  functions.  Furtherrnore,  by the  1890's,  and  more  so  at  the  turn  of the  century, 
Turkish  youth  were  generally  much  more  aware  of the  world  beyond  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Reading for leisure began to appear and now, the most popular works were not only secular, but 
fictional.  Fortunes were made from  translations of Jules Verne's and  Alexandre Dumas' works, 
and  Western-style magazines complete with photos appeared, catering to  the newer urbanized 
and  industrial  classes  generated  by the  railways.  Though  the  Sultan's  religious  censors  were 
officially in control of what was legally legible, the influx of publications on railways through 
foreign post offices, over which the Seyul-Islam had no jurisdiction thanks to  past capitulations, 
was  beyond  their  grasp.  So  were  the  growing  number of Turks  capable of translating  from 
French,  English  and  German.  Hamid's  fiscal  and  foreign  policies  were  his  undoing  in  the 
diplomatie community,  but back home, it  was the schools that stalemated the dissemination of 
his ideology (ibid: pp. 276-294). 
It  was only a matter of time before he ran the Porte into  the ground, but the series of 
revolts that would spell his undoing would ultimately bring down European international society 
and  cause  a  revolution in  the  principles of order in  international  relations  globally.  The new 
Balkan states caused  friction between Russia and Austria.  Fearing an  alliance between France 
and  Russia, the Germans were already preparing for  war in the late  1890's.  In  the midst of ail 
this,  the Porte was still shedding its possessions, near and far.  The 1880's saw the arrivai of the 
British in Egypt through financial  controls- again because of foreign debt.  Europe backed the 
Greeks in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, forcing the Porte to  cede land in exchange for money. 
In  1902,  France took most of  what was  left of the Ottoman's North African lands  and  when 
Macedon rebelled in 1903, Britain once again imposed an international financial commission to 
oversee their debt payments through a bit of gunboat diplomacy.  There would be many more 
national uprisings to  come, of course, but Macedon was  the breaking point for  young officers 
who  could no longer stand by as their empire fell  to shambles. The Young Turks would reinstate 
the constitution of  1876 as part ofyet another reaction to loss. Chapter III
 
Global Metamorphoses: The End of Empires and the Birth of
 
Nations
 
This  chapter will  describe and  analyze the major internaI  changes resulting from  two  hundred 
years  of reforms  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  as  well  as  the  drastic  and  rapid  evolution  of the 
traditionally accepted principles that perpetuated order in the international system. 
Tail End of the Whip: Turkish Nationalism 
State-driven modernization  had  created  a  cunous  situation  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 
general,  but nowhere more so  than  in Turkey proper.  As  with  the  Japanese who  started their 
process much later than the Turks, or as with the Russians before them, the Turks had imported 
foreign  institutions  in  a  state-driven effort  to  modernize.  The central  difference was they had 
been neither able to  impose these social technologies as Russia had, nor willing to  adapt them to 
the Ottoman way of life as the Japanese had done with respect to  their own culture. The Porte's 
new  institutions  thrived  anyway.  To  use  a  biological  simile,  the  novel  Western  educative, 
administrative and judicial configurations were like foreign species that, once having crossed the 
Hellespont, proceeded to  decimate the local  fauna because they were simply better adapted  to 
survival in comparison with traditional Ottoman institutions which were clearly ill-suited to  the 
European-dominated  international  political  climate  of the  nineteenth  century.  As  noted,  men 
educated  in  the  European  traditions  were  increasingly  placed  in  high  bureaucratie  functions 
within the Sublime Porte, amongst the upper (but not top) echelons of its military, and in other 
socially  important  positions,  without  being  given  any  real  executive  or  legislative  power. 
Ottomans remained exterior to  European international society and  'europeanized' Turks were on 
the  outside of their  own  society  looking  in.  The Young  Ottomans  and  their  successors,  the 
Young Turks, were no exception at first. The movement had started out as a sort of secret society 
modeled on the Freemasons, understandably so  given the Hamidian era's politically oppressive 
atmosphere. 
The  first  chapter  of Young  Ottomans  emerged  from  Istanbul  in  1889,  its  members 
recruited  from  the  capital's  military academies and  medical schools.  The date may have been 58 
coincidental, but the symbolism of the French revolution's centennial anniversary was not lost on 
the group.  The establishment of the original chapter was followed  by many more in  the major 
Rumelian cities. 
1 Outside Istanbul, Paris and Salonika would host the most important branches of 
the  movement  which  spread  to  most  major  European  cities  via  expatriated  Ottomans.  The 
various Young Ottoman clubs remained geographically and ideologically scattered until the Paris 
and  Istanbul  chapters  united  in  1907  to  form  the  Committee for  Union and  Progress  (CUP), 
which at  least solved the first problem. It  is from  this point on  that CUP members came to  be 
called the Young Turks (Ternon, 2005: pp. 231-234; Garnier, 1973; p.  91). 
Young Turks, who would have been considered radicals by the majority before and likely 
even after the emergence of the CUP, would  not ordinarily have anything to  offer that would 
rival  the social bonds provided by the family, the community and guiIds.  But again, the opening 
of  Anatolia and the Caucasus by rail, urbanization and the appearance and popularization of print 
media introduced Turks to  Western modes of thought, and  as  a result, the traditional social ties 
were  loosened.  As  fitting historical patterns, the Macedonian nationalist revoit of 1908  would 
create a backlash against orthodoxy which would allow the Young Turks to  gain a measure of 
popular legitimacy. Macedon, an  often rebellious province, had many Ottoman troops stationed 
there in  order to  deter its natives' penchant for  defiance. During the crisis, the Sultan's general 
and  his  second-in-command  were  assassinated  and  people  from  Monastir  to  Kosovo  spilled 
riotously into the streets. Mutinous Young Turk officers took control of the armed forces across 
Rum and bombarded the Sultan with pleas if not demands to restore the Constitution. 
Sur le  désir  exprimé par  le  peuple  et  par  ordre  de  Sa Majesté  impériale  le  Sultan,  la 
constitution promulguée le 23  décembre 1876 et  qui  avait été rapportée, est de nouveau 
rétablie.  L'assemblé générale (Sénat et  Chambre des Députés) pourra se réunir dans les 
termes préscrit par la loi (Imperial edict taken from Ternon, 2005: p.  235). 
The CUP, the political arm of the  Young Turks, ushered  in an  era of true convergence 
rather than of mere imitation, not only because they were the first Westem-educated men to pull 
off a coup or even because they restored the constitution, but because they were the first to  try 
and seek a working integration of  the two different political cultures in question. Needless to say, 
the Young Turks were unified in  and by their rebellion, and  in  that none of them, not even the 
most ardent Westemist, envisioned the abolition of the sultanate or the  caliphate. Their plans 
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were all  more reformative rather than outright revolutionary.  They all  wanted to  create a new 
order while keeping the best of the old  customs. Nevertheless, they were divided on what was 
baby and what was bath water. This had not gone unnoticed in European foreign ministries as the 
Quai d'Orsay archives reveal: 
Dans  cet  empire musulman,  les  Jeunes  Turcs  proclament les  droits  égaux  de  tout  les 
individus, sans distinctions de Croyants et d'Infidels. Un Turc est à la fois  membre de la 
nation turque, de la famille des peuples musulmans, et de la  civilisation européene (Les 
mouvements Jeunes-Turcs, d'après les Archives du Quai d'Orsay from Garnier, 1973; p. 
80). 
This passage hints at  the internaI division of the CUP into its three main branches:  the 
Westernists, the Islamists and the Turkists, each of which had a different, though equally murky 
plan  to  renew their govemment and  empire through different combinations of Islam, science, 
nationalism and personal freedoms.  To begin with the familiar,  the Islamists for the most part 
proposed more of the same (a good number of them were in fact remnants from the Hamidian 
era).  In  their minds,  what the empire needed was  a  reinvigoration of the  caliphate through  a 
return to  Orthodox Islam and a continued appropriation of western technology.  In  other words, 
modernization wasn't working because Islam had  been perverted. Their chief proponent, a poet 
named  Mehmed  Akif,  lauded  the  Japanese  for  becoming  technologically  proficient  without 
succumbing to  the superficial trappings of western  cultur~.  He also  believed that the Japanese 
had  adopted all the best aspects from Islam into Buddhism (Berkes, 1964: pp. 340-342)! 
The Westernists, for their part, wanted to  radically transform Ottoman society starting at 
square  one,  the  Ottoman-Islamic  system  of values.  To  them,  modernization  was  first  and 
foremost  an  internaI  and  psychic  transformation  rather  than  a  purely  material  one.  The 
Westernists were not against Islam, just the Islamic state, and  as  long as  the masses remained 
unedueated,  ignorant  and  superstitious,  the  empire  would  lag  behind  the  'eivilized  world'. 
Obviously, these two factions bitterly opposed eaeh other. The Islamists, whom had lost mueh of 
their  sway  at  the  end  of the  Hamidian  era  given  the  deplorable  and  noticeable  losses  of 
sovereignty, still had one very valid point when eonfronting their rivaIs:  the Westernists simply 
did  not  reflect  the  eommon  Ottoman's  point of view.  They completely  ignored  the  issue  of 
modernizing  within  the  confines  of the  Sheriat.  No  matter  how  dissatisfied  or  disappointed 
average Ottoman Muslims may have been, and they were now even more of an overwhelming 
demographic  majority  given  territorial  losses  on  the  Western frontier,  they  would  not  easily 60 
accept a life outside of the Sheriat (Garnier, 1973: pp. 105-107).  On the other hand, the Islamists 
could  hardly refute that their way had been tried and  had  failed  several times over.  This bitter 
and inesolvable argument was a major boon towards the flowering of a Turkist position which 
had budded during the Tanzimat. If we consider Revolutionism as Martin Wight described it,  as 
the dissemination of anti-status quo ideologies across the international system, then the Turkists 
of the  post Hamidian era represent  the tail  end  of a  change  in  the ordering principles of the 
European,  and  later  global  international  system  which  began  with  the  French  Revolution. 
Nationalism was finally taking root in the Ottoman heartland. 
The three splinters of the Young Turks had  an  uneasy, albeit productive chemistry.  On 
their side, the Turkish nationalists came to  realize that the Westernists' assessment was on the 
mark.  The Turkists' most relevant  thinker,  Ziya Gokalp,  had  understood  that  the  idea of the 
Umma, of a unitary Muslim nation, was neither practicable nor would it allow the emergence of 
Turkish national identity. The prevalent branch of  nationalist thought up to and during WWI was 
called  pan-Turkism.  Likely  inspired  by  the  Russian  pan-Slavic  movement,  it  was  based 
predominantly  on  a  racial  definition  of identity,  though  language  was  also  a  determinant. 
Inspired  by  Durkheim,  Gokalp  perceived  national  identity  as  a  constructed  reality.  Shared 
understanding and shared experience were the keys.  For there to  be a Turkish nation, there had 
to be a revival ofpre-Islamic traditions that would unite Turks (Ternon, 2005: p.  274). As noted, 
a Turkish identity had  been forming  since the Tanzimat.  Linguistically,  Arabie and  Farsi  had 
replaced Turkish very early on in the empire's history as the languages of the intellectual elite. 
They were the  Latin  and  Greek of the Islamic states-system if you  will; Turkish was  for  lay 
people and when it was transcribed, it was done so in the Arabie script. Since the late 1800s, the 
common Turkish language was  making a  comeback with authors  such  as  Namik Kemal,  and 
purging  it  of its  Persian  and  Arabie  influences  became  a  central  policy  pursuit  amongst 
nationalists later on. 
Young Turk and Turkist Mehmed Emin (1869-1944) wouId carry the torch lit by Kemal's 
generation. Trained as a civil servant, he also wrote poems largely influenced by folk tales which 
idolized the Anatolian peasant: 
1 am a Turk; my faith and my race are mighty,
 
My chest, my essence is filled with fire,
 
A man is the slave ofhis fatherland, 1shall go.
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1shall not let the book of  Mohammed be removed,
 
1shall not let the balU1er of  Osman be taken,
 
1shall not let the enemy attack my homeland,
 
The house of God will not be destroyed, 1shall go.
 
(exerpt from "Going to Battle" by Mehmed Emin) 
Active measures to  purge the Turkish language of Persian and Arabie, and to  adopt the simpler 
Latin script, came to  the forefront during the early Kemalist period of the 1920s, but they began 
in  the  new  constitutional  era and  even included  a  debate  about whether to  call  the  language 
Turkish  or  Ottoman
2 
.  The  national  sentiment  is  palpable  in  these  lines,  but  so  are  the 
complications of shedding the old identity, which was not only Islamic, but Ottoman and multi­
ethnie. Something, or rather someone would have to go. 
Akif was not the only one of his contemporaries to draw comparisons with the Japanese, 
though his was the most erroneous. Japan was on the minds of many at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Their victory over Russia in the Manchurian conflict of 1904-05, which was conducted 
under the strict letter of international law,  had  shown the world that the Nipponese were both 
ready and willing to  assume a position of regional governance. Their continued presence at the 
European table during the 1907 Hague conference merely confirmed this.  Obviously, since the 
Ottomans themselves were making the comparison, one can infer that they were well  aware of 
Japan's progress, however misguided they sometimes were in drawing parallels. With a hundred 
years'  worth  of hindsight,  we  can  clearly  see  that  prior  to  the  irreversible  demise  of Edo's 
isolationism in 1868, the Land of the Rising Sun had known four centuries of near-total stability 
under the Tokugawa emperors. It  had perfected and  consolidated a very efficient bureaucratie 
system,  a  feat  facilitated  by several  other factors  including  a  great  measure of geographical 
seclusion  from  outside  influences,  the  relatively  small  size  of the  domain,  and  military 
superiority over its immediate proximity. 
The near total  ethnie and  religious  homogeneity only aided  in  creating a unity  which 
simply  did  not  exist  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  fact,  the  Nipponese  represented  the  total 
antithesis of the  Osmanli. Identity, taxation,  and  constant effective governrnent had all  existed 
befme Commodore Perry showed up at Edo in 1853. So stable was the Japanese feudal system 
2 The word 'Turk' was considere'd derogatory until weil into the nineteenth century when nationalist aspirations made 
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that European institutional practices were, in many cases, merely superimposed on pre-existing 
social structures which persist to  this day.  Japan tripled its GDP between the start of the Meiji 
period and the outbreak ofWWI. At the latter date, its industrial economy already rivalled that of 
France. Curiously, Japanese technical proficiency and military prowess did not spill over into the 
cosmopolitan  cultural  arena.  In  other  words,  by  1907,  Japan  had  more  or  less  entered  the 
European  international  society  as  a  co-opted  regional  power,  but  even  as  late  as  the  treaty 
negotlations in Paris in  1919, there are several examples of the Nipponese not quite 'fitting in'. 
Language presented a barrier at Versailles. The Mikado's envoys, including his ambassador to 
Britain,  had  a  hard  time  expressing  themselves  in  English,  prompting sorne  very  derogatory 
comments from Georges Clemenceau
3 (MacMillan, 2002: pp. 307-310). 
Cosmopolitan Society and Turkish Elites: The Missing Link? 
The argument Islamists used  against Westernists was not entirely without merit against 
the more evolved though less inclusive position of the Turkists: no matter how contemporary or 
logica1 the idea of the nation-state may have seemed to  them, it was nevertheless an idea being 
developed by a Turkish intelligentsia that had  little in common with the Ottoman in the street. 
Whereas nationalist movements in Europe had generally been 'bottom up' affairs, modemization 
was  an undeniably 'top-down', state driven phenomenon amongst those Asian nations wishing to 
meet the European standard of civilization in the nineteenth century. To claim that nationalism in 
the post 1908 empire was state-driven only captures half the story. At that this time, it was more 
the product of friction between opposing sides within a bifurcated state apparatus  than the result 
of coherent policies issued by a strong, united govemment with specifie aims in mind. Turkish 
intellectuals were working towards the development of a coherent ideology within a movement 
that was itself splintered, however. 
The emergence of Turkish nationalism brings Cosmopolitan society into the foreground 
in  the  convergence of European  international  society  and  non-European  states.  The Sublime 
Porte lay outside the bounds of the former, but it still managed to produce a certain class of men 
which  understood  Western  thought,  and  who  could  adopt  western  ideas  and  customs  with 
relative ease. 
3 Clemenceau and Prince Saonji, head of the Japanese delegation, had actually been classmates in law school at the 
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Avec leurs  camées d'Auguste  Compte à  la  cravate,  les  Jeunes-Turcs,  adeptes  aussi  de 
Heackel, Voltaire, Rousseau, affichaient leur résolution de conduire l'Islam à leur gré. Ils 
buvaient du cognac, mangeaient du jambon, se proclamaient partisans du  laïcisme, de la 
séparation de l'Église et de l'État (Garnier, 1973: p.  100). 
These were 'cosmopolitan Turks',  which begs the question 'what is  the exact relation between 
Cosmopolitan Society and  International Society in the process of convergence?' The two  most 
obvious ways this complicity would operate are first,  a power is  socialized and inducted at the 
state  level,  then at  theindividual level,  meaning that it joins international society and  then its 
inhabitants become members of Cosmopolitan society by the changes that come with state-Ied 
modemization. The second option is the reverse; people change first, become 'Cosmopolitan' and 
then change their state. At least superficiaUy, most cases appear to be somewhere in the middle. 
The Japanese represent the archetype for the first possibility. The Turks faU  much closer to  the 
second. 
The emergence of a global Cosmopolitan class coincides roughly with the development 
of much more intrepid means of communications and transport in the late nineteenth century, or 
in  Buzan  and  Little's  words,  with  an increase in  "interaction capacity"  throughout the system 
(Buzan &  Little, 2000 : ch.  13).  Simple logic dictates that the existence of a truly global extra­
national  society of the sort described by the ES, defined  in Kantian thought as  a global  inter­
human  community  which  transcends  borders,  is  impossible  without  a  rather  explicit 
understanding of what values  exist outside any given  international  society within the  system. 
This  is  not  possible without  a  certain  degree  of social  and  cultural  exchange,  be it  through 
translation of the great literary and philosophical works, or even through more mundane means 
such as travel. The mid-to-Iate nineteenth century aUowed for a much greater degree of exchange 
and  mobility  through  the  telegraph,  international  postal  delivery,  steam  power  and  later 
magnetism, rail and so on. The ES places no fixed date on the birth of Cosmopolitan society, but 
it  is  difficult  to  imagine the possibility of such phenomena before the  mid..:to-Iate  nineteenth 
century because of low interaction capacity and because European expansion had not yet unified 
and  globalized the international system. Ideals and customs such as nationalism and laws of war 
were largely confined to  European society including the Americas,  though  other international 
societies had their own versions ofmany such principles. 
Dates  may vary from  region  to  region  as  weIl.  In  the  Ottoman  case,  they  had  been 64 
exposed  to  European  Cosmopolitanism  ahead  of the  curve,  but  to  no  avail.  The  effects  of 
,increased  interaction capacity on  Cosmopolitanism can be observed in  the marked spike in  the 
number of IOOs and  INOOs towards the end of the nineteenth century, from the revolutionary 
Communist movement which held its first international rally hosted by Marx himself in  1864 to 
the benevolent Red  Cross,  which  became  international  in  1896.  These are  but the two  most 
obvious examples. "The main event of the development in social interaction capacity during this 
era was  the  development of a  much  richer,  deeper,  better organized,  more  formai  and  more 
extensive  international  society that  had  ever existed  before"  (Buzan  &  Little,  2000:  p.  289). 
There is an obvious ingestion of at least sorne Asian thought within Europe through its elites, but 
for the  most part,  Cosmopolitan ideas  were European.  Industrialization  would  also  create  an 
international  capitalist  class  and  commonalities  between  bourgeoisie  and  working  class 
internationally,  which  also  led  to  culturally  lopsided  center-periphery  relations  (Wallerstein, 
1974). With an increase in the interaction c;apacity of the various parts of thenew global system 
came a  new  global  awareness  of the  plight of 'the  other',  what  Ronald  Dore  has  called  the 
"fellow-feeling",  an  understanding that  'we're  all  in  the  same boat'  for  lack  of a better term. 
Sympathy  for  'the  other'  is  an  indispensible  pre-condition  towards  the  existence  of  a 
Cosrnopolitan society (Dore, 1984: pp. 412-415). Thes'e issues are part of a much broader study 
than is possible to undertake here, yet it would have been remiss to neglect them altogether as the 
track that Turkey followed to statehood clearly passes through Cosmopolitan society. 
Prelude to Paris 
Abdul Hamid abdicated and  left Istanbul for Salonika April  25,  1908  aboard his  lavish 
and  previously unused  personal  train,  with  nothing but a pitiful  group  of four  eunuchs,  four 
concubines  and  fourteen  servants.  The  new  constitutional  governrnent  became  an  oligarchy 
shared by the CUP and the new Sultan Mehmet V.  The first controlled the parliament, the other 
the senate. As with the internai divisions of the CUP, the friction was productive in the sense that 
it forced  the Young Turks and old-guard Ottomans alike to  face the tough questions avoided in 
the past, which, if  answered, would allow them to redefine themselves and create a new polity. In 
its last decade of its  existence,  the  Ottoman governrnent  was  openly debating modernization 
policy as  weil  as  the role of the European international society in that process. The Porte was 
becoming confronted  with problems  that reflected  its  bipolarity.  Unfortunately for  the Turks, 
progress  was  stifled  because  the  six  years  between  the  advent  of the  new  constitutional 65 
government  and  the  outbreak  of the  Great  War  were  consumed  by turmoil  and  an  almost 
forgotten  violence,  obscured  by the magnitude of what came next.  In  1908,  Austria annexed 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina and  Bulgaria seceded from  the Ottomans.  The Albanians revolted  in 
1910-11. Italy took Tripoli (Libya) by force in  1911. In  1912, the Balkan states created a series 
of  bilateral agreements, and so when tiny Montenegro declared war on the Porte on October 8 of 
that year, it was joined by Serbia and Bulgaria despite Saint Petersburg's threats to cut off aid. By 
1913,  Macedonia  and  part  of Thrace  were  gone.  Serbian  expansionism  endangered  the 
Habsburgs' Balkan suzerains, and  anything that gave Austria reason to  move aggressively into 
the Balkans alarmed Russia, one third of whose annual exports sailed through the Straits at this 
point. 
The major powers ail needed the Bosporus to remain Ottoman because none could afford 
to  let another hold it,  and  the Porte was easily pliable anyways. Albania won its sovereignty in 
1913  and became but one more unpredictable element in the system. The institution known as 
Balance of Power was being strained to  its  limits.  The planet was  colonized. The safety valve 
provided by overseas expansion had  been exhausted, creating the foremost rivalry of the early 
twentieth century that pitted Germany against Britain. The former, as Keynes notes, was propped 
up on large and diverse foreign direct investment and overseas trade which it needed to  protect, 
prompting it to  increase its navy's tonnage. This policy triggered an arms race between the Reich 
and  the  British that  the  BOP  could  not  stop  (Keynes,  1920:  pp.  1-4).  Anti-hegemonialism's 
second massive failure was at hand. 
In  the  years  leading up  to  the  war,  the  Ottomans  had  see-sawed  between  British  and 
Gennan alliances.  With the Young Turks, the Ottoman Empire had shifted back to  the British, 
but the Balkan outbreak of 1912 retumed them into the German camp anew. The naval arms race 
had  once more made a gambit of the Bosporus, and  as  no  one had jostled it too  hard  yet,  the 
Ottoman Empire held its precarious position like the pin in a very large grenade. In truth, it was 
just a matter of time before sorne event would pull the pin on one the many grenades of the era 
which  could  have  started  the war,  but we ail  know what happened  next.  There  is  no  need  to 
discuss the whole war, but there are a few details that cannot be omitted. Chief among these are 
the  secret Constantinople Agreement, the Treaty of London which further involved Italy in the 
breakup of the Porte, and the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, one of the last treaties involving the 
Tsar.  They were ail  signed during the war and  each would  shape the outcome of the Turkish 66 
peace talks more so because ofthe impossibility oftheir application than anything else. 
The first secret pact to  address the Ottoman question was the Constantinople Agreement 
(March  18,  1915)  in  which  the  Russians,  with  Britain  and  France's  consent,  secured  for 
themse1ves  both shores of the Bosporus, the European shore of the Sea of Marmora as  well as 
Istanbul, which they would guarantee as  a free port. The Italians had  played out the start of the 
war in  a  more  Machiavellian  style.  The  terms  of their  engagement  to  the  Central  Powers 
stipu1ated  that  they were only obliged  to  intervene if Germany or Austria were attacked  first. 
They remained neutral unti1 the first sign that the Allies were going to win, then they turned coat. 
The territory that Italy wanted was under Austrian control, and Britain and France needed he1p. 
They were obligingly happy to  promise away chickens that had not yet hatched to  get it.  Under 
the secret Treaty of London (April 26,  1915), Rome was guaranteed its  demandsfor Southern 
Tyrol and  the  port of Trieste.  The Entente  even sweetened  the  pot with a number of Adriatic 
IsI~nds, the Albanian port of Vlore, a protectorate over the rest of Albania, the Dalmatian coast, 
and yes, a share of the  Ottoman Empire should it  fall,  though the wording of the contract was 
extremely vague on this last point. 
The Porte's fate was still up in the air in 1915. Like Italy, it had remained cautious at first, 
but provoked an Allied declaration ofwar on November 5,  1914 when it closed the Straits to  all 
but German shipping. It was fighting the Entente on six  fronts  in total. A British expeditionary 
force was in Mesopotamia gunning for Bagdad, another toward Suez from the west, and Russia 
was  breathing down its neck  in  the north.  Mehmet's call to  the Umma for jyhad had the exact 
opposite effect in the Hejaz, prompting local Arabs to revoIt against the Porte's rule. The calI had 
fallen  on deaf ears  everywhere  else,  including in  the  British  Raj,  much  to  the War Cabinet's 
relief.  The  Umma,  the  Islamic  international  society,  was  no  more,  or  at  the  very  least,  the 
Ottoman Caliph at  its  head  was  no  longer seen  as  the  rightful  leader of the  faithful,  and  its 
constituent  parts  had  either  been  absorbed  into  the  European  system,  or  were  about  to  be 
(Toynbee,  1925:  pp.  75-76).  Alone and  surrounded, the Turks  were still  redoubtable on  their 
home soil as Mustafa Kemal would demonstrate at Gallipoli. He would make his name there at 
the  expense of the Commonwealth troops who tried to  bridge the Hellespont.  On its  own, the 
Treaty  of London  might  not  have  caused  tremendous  problems.  Of course,  Italy  would  be 
gaining sovereignty over a large number of Germanie and Slavic peoples, yet such is the nature 
ofimperialism. But there were other, irreconcilable secret deal as weil. 67 
The most infamous of them, the one whose repercussions we are still dealing with today, 
bears  the name of its creators, Mark Sykes, a British aristocrat who had travelled from Cairo to 
Baghdad and has been described as  "one of those wealthy dilettantes who fluttered  around the 
fringes of British diplomacy", and Georges Picot, a French career diplomat who had been Consul 
General  in  Beirut before the war,  and who had very close ties to  French colonial lobby groups 
concemed with the Middle East (MacMillan, 2002: p.  383). They drew up the plans for an idea 
that would shape the future,  an  idea that the Concert had  flirted  with for  a century and which 
they had already partiaUy enacted in the Balkans: they retraced the map of the Ottoman Empire. 
Sykes-Picot (16 May, 1916) was just an elaborate pie-sharing arrangement, intended to divvy the 
Ottoman  spoils  at the  end  of the  war.  No  more  trying  to  reform  the  empire  with  external 
pressure.  Under the  agreement,  the French  would  annex  the  coastal  regions of what is  today 
southern Syria, Lebanon and northern Israel and would set up  local governrnents over which it 
would  have  a  sphere  of influence  in  the  area  extending  over  northern  Syria,  southern  Iraq 
(including Mosul) and Jordan. The British would get the Mesopotamian provinces surrounding 
Basra and Baghdad, and their sphere of influence would  extend south of the French zone from 
about 200km east of Suez aU  the way to  the south-western edge of thePersian Gulf, excluding 
the Hejaz  (no  one  then knew  that  the world's  largest  oil  field  was  under all  that  apparently 
worthless sand). To avoid conflict, Palestine would be placed under international administration. 
In  an  addendum  to  the agreement  later that May,  Russia would  claim  the  northern  Ottoman 
provinces abutting its southern borders: Armenia, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. 
When  Italy  somehow  found  out  about  the  Constantinople  Agreement,  it  claimed  the 
Ottoman  city  of Smyrna  (now  Izmir),  an  important  port-town  on  the  Aegean  coast.  Lloyd­
George, who himself called the plan "fatuous", notes that Sykes also disapproved of it, but that 
he was under pressure from  the Foreign Office to  conclude the deal  (Lloyd-George,  1936:  p. 
1826).  Of course, these deals were struck at  the worst of times,  when  outlooks were grim and 
promises were, in many cases, almost meaningless considering the duress under which they were 
made.  Russia's  uncontested  claim  to  Istanbul  reflects  this  desperation.  Still,  Sykes-Picot  was 
archetypal  of Concert  of Europe-era  relations.  First,  it  was  passive  and  diplomatie  in  its 
competitiveness; it was yet another clever balancing act placing the French between the British 
and the Russians while effectively surrounding the Central Powers. Second, it was imperialistic; 
the  greatest international powers of the day were going to  manage or supervise the affairs  of 68 
those problematic peoples that didn't live up to  the standard of the times and that had caused so 
much  trouble for  'the civilized world'.  Toward that aim,  the great powers of the  international 
society were also enlisting the help of lesser European states such as  Italy, and later Greece, to 
manage the Ottomans. Third, the three-tiered classification was directly related colonialism and 
to  the nineteenth century's positivist standard of civilization. 'A' mandates referred to  states that 
were  nearly able to  govern themselves and  that would, in  a short but undefined period, reach 
total  independence.  The  Middle-Eastern  areas  of the  former  Ottoman  Empire  fit  into  this 
category. The 'B' mandates would be administered by a 'civilized' state until they were deemed 
self-reliant, and 'C' mandates were to  be ruled as part of a civilized state's own territory for 999 
years with virtually no other regulatory stipulations. 
When the Cat's Away... 
Sorne very major changes were on  their way.  But by the time the post-war celebrations 
relented  and  that  people  and  governments  began  to  ascertain  the  level  of destruction,  the 
situation in  most of Europe and much of Asia in January 1919 could only be described as  near 
total  chaos maintained in and  by an  international power vacuum.  International  Society and  its 
most  powerful  members  were in  shambles.  Sièk  and  wounded troops  lay  scattered  across  the 
globe and starvation and the Spanish flu may have killed as many as the war did
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crumbling, entire cities were ablaze and anarchy was commonplace. After having survived Red 
October,  Russia had  pulled  out of the war with  the  Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in  order to  fight 
another war internally between its 'Reds' and its 'Whites'. Arguments about how to deal with the 
Boishevists  consumed  the peacemakers,  who  in  many cases,  Winston  Churchill  and  Marshall 
Ferdinand Foch most notably, thought of Communism as  a sort of second great plague. They 
wanted to  invade to  restore a Tsar or a democratic government. Even Clemenceau, no  lover of 
Russia  nor  of monarchy,  was  shocked  at  the  assassination  of the  Russian  royal  family  and 
wanted  to  isolate the Bolsheviks, "surrounding them, as  it  were,  by a barb wire entanglement" 
(MacMillan, 2002: p. 63-72). 
Capitalist states feared the Bolsheviks to  an often exaggerated extent, who, as far as they 
saw, were solely concerned with the violent overthrow of the entire capitalist world order. It did 
not help that there were workers' uprisings worldwide, even in such relatively uneventful places 
4 Atatürk himself nearly feU victim ta the Spanish Flu and was bed-ridden far several weeks. 69 
as  Winnipeg. Nevertheless, a military incursion into Russia was impossible at  the time for  lack 
of fresh troops, money and reliable intelligence. Initially at least, the grudging consensus boiled 
down  to  letting the Russians  work  it  out on their own.  They would  recluse  themselves  from 
European diplomacy for almost five years, which would neither lend stability to the Eastern front 
nor  alleviate  international  alarm  over  the  spread  of Marxism.  The  impacts  of the  French 
Revolution were still  being felt  in  the Balkans and  the Near-East,  and  even  an  absent Russia 
would  have  much  influence  over  the  future  of the  Turks.  The  Austrian  Empire  had  also 
disintegrated  in  October of 1918.  One after the next,  Poles,  Czechs,  Rumanians,  Slovaks  and 
Hungarians  proclaimed  new  capitals.  Austrian  Prime  Minister  Karl  Renner  stated  at  the 
conference, "We stand before you as one of the parts of the vanquished and fallen Empire. In the 
same way as  the other national states, our Republic too has sprung to  life, consequently, she can 
no more than the former be considered the successor to the late monarchy" (MacMillan, op cit:  p. 
246). The British tended to agree, to the Italians' chagrin. 
Ideologically,  the  end  of the  First  World  War  represents  an  international  historical 
milestone. The principles that governed and maintained order in the International Society were 
'put through the ringer', resulting in another great identity crisis as had occuned at the end of the 
Renaissance.  Around  the world,  the  political  catch phrases of the  day were  "Wilsonian self­
determination"  and  "autonomous  development".  Of course,  these  were  not  new  ideas.  The 
novelty lay in  that these ideas were now being championed by Europe's 'saviour', who fulfilled 
an almost messianic role.  The most common criticism of Woodrow  Wilson  (aside from  his 
vanity and  stubbornness) was  that despite his good  intentions, his  plans tended  to  be idealistic 
without any consideration towards practical application. National self-determination was perhaps 
a worthy goal,  but Wilson's  Secretary of State Robert Lansing questioned  his  Commander in 
Chief at the start of 1919. 
When the President talks  of "self-determination",  what unit has  he  in  mind?  Does  he 
mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? [...] It will raise hopes  which can never 
be realized. It will, 1fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end, it is bound to be discredited, 
to  be called the dream of an  idealist who failed to  realize the danger until it was too late 
to check those who attempt to put the principles into force (MacMillan, op cit: p.  Il). 
But it was  already too  late.  Across Europe, in those parts of former empires which had 
been subjugated, and especially among the youth who generally felt by this time that the war had 
been fought for the interests of old men at the expense of the young, the President's rallying cry 70 
had  already struck a  deep chord.  Wilson felt  that the war had  not just been fought  to  defeat 
Germany, but also, as he told crowds in Paris, "to end the very causes of war, to substitute for the 
old system of alliance and balance of power politics a new order based upon justice and upon the 
rights  of ail  people to  determine for  themselves  their own governments"  (Mee,  1980:  p.  Il). 
South African General Jan Smuts, writing in December of 1918, summed up the dilemma that 
Lansing had foreseen quite weil. 
The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria and Turkey are mostly 
untrained politically;  many of them  are  either incapable or deficient in  power in  self­
government; they are mostly destitute and will require much nursing towards economic 
and political independence. If there is going to  be a scramble among the victors for  this 
loot, the future of Europe must indeed be despaired of.  [...] The vital principles are:  the 
principle of  nationality involving the ideas of political freedom and equality; the principle 
of autonomy which is the principle of  nationality extended to the peoples not yet  capable 
of complete independent statehood; the principle of political decentralization, which will 
prevent the powerful nationality from swallowing the weak autonomy which has so often 
happened  in  the  now  defunct  empires;  and  finally  an  institution  like  the  League  of 
Nations (LON) which will give stability to that decentralization and thereby guarantee the 
weak against the strong (from Toynbee, 1925: p. 51). 
What Wilson wanted, and Smuts cautiously hoped for, would be impossible in ES theory 
and  in reality. The ES  holds that, in terms of international society, qui dit justice dit solidarité. 
Despite  ail  criticisms  aimed  at  Wilson,  he  clearly  did  have  his  finger  on  the  pulse  of 
Cosmopolitan society.  The world  was  indeed  calling for  a  new order founded  in nationalism 
rather than imperialism, but the truth of  the situation was that such underlying principles could 
only come to life in an international society where a common conception of not only order, but 
of justice existed.  The League of Nations would have had,  in Wilson's mind, an  international 
policing role as weil, unifying its members in common retaliation against treaty violators. Such 
international  action corresponds exactly to  Hedley Bull's description of 'just war'  in  Solidarist 
International Society, which is  confirmed by the language of the League's Covenant. The most 
notable  examples  are  the  Covenant's preamble,  which defines  the League's  goal  to  "promote 
international cooperation and to  achieve international peace and security", and the more concrete 
Articles  la,  Il and  12,  which  stipulate  that  ail  members  of the  League  are  responsible  for 
defending  any of the others  in  cases  of territorial  aggression  and  that  the  League,  or more 
precisely,  the  International  Court  of Justice  would  serve  as  an  institution  for  arbitration  of 
disputes.  AIso, Article 16  effectively renders non League-sanctioned military action a violation 71 
of  the Covenant (Nathan, 1925: pp.124-129). 
The  Covenant  was  clearly  built  on  Solidarist  principles,  right  down  to  its  making 
neutrality in cases of war legally impracticable for  its  members.  Yet the world was brimming 
with new states. There were the Balkans of course, but also Eastern Europe as a whole had been 
reshaped. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary were born and Poland re-emerged. Bolshevism 
had created  not  only  a  new  form  of government,  but independent  states out of the Ukraine, 
Georgia,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Finland,  Armenia,  Kurdistan  and  Azerbaijan,  only  one  of which 
survived  the  year.  The British  were  loosening their  grip  over the  Commonwealth which  no 
longer spoke with a single voice.  Australian intransigence over the Japanese proposaI  to  tack 
racial  equality on to  the religious  equality  clause of the Versailles terms  at  Paris  created bad 
blood between Tokyo and London. In short, the sort of solidarist international society envisioned 
by Wilson and his followers was an impossibility given the number of new states and divergent, 
even mutually exclusive polities in the now-global International Society.  Tt  is  almost formulaic: 
more states plus less in common equals pluralism. In  other words, as  the system became global 
in the  nineteenth century, its most powerful states had, by the twentieth, pulled the rest of the 
world  at  least into  the periphery of the dominant European International  Society.  Though the 
lesser and peripheral powers were intended to  be managed by the global ones, the Great War in 
fact  marks a sort of 'point of no  return' for a pluralist shift that had already commenced by the 
late  1870's.  National  self-determination  gained  its  legitimacy  at  the  expense  of great-power 
management. 
The impossibility of Wilson's vision was further compounded by several factors, not least 
ofwhich being that he wished to  pursue both pluralist and solidarist courses at once by bringing 
even more new states into the system and creating an  over-arching international body.  Second, 
the  British and the French would behave exactly in  the fashion that Smuts had feared  and that 
Wilson  abhorred.  The  traumatized  French  demanded  very  heavy  assurances  against  German 
militarism which the British conceded for a bigger share of the Middle East, a strategie boon in 
the  preservation of their empire's land  and sea routes.  In  English School terms once again, the 
various levels in the system were moving in  different directions at the same time. Most of the 
European governments were acting like perfect Realists at the International Society level. Wilson 
and various members of European Cosmopolitan Society on the other hand, behaved more like 
'Revolutionists'.  The dichotomy actually made adhesion to  a via media impossible during the 72 
early  interwar  period.  Despite  forty-seven  states'  adhesion  to  the  LON  right  from  the  start, 
criticisms  made  by the  pessimistic  Carr  as  well  as  the  more  even-keeled  Toynbee,  that  the 
League was merely another means for the strong to  impose their will on the weaker states, were 
never far behind. 
Wilson  loathed  secret  deals.  He  thought  the  Treaty of London  and  Sykes-Picot were 
abominations and desired "open covenants of  peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be 
no  private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly 
and  in  the  public  view"  (Wilson,  Fourteen  Points:  Point  1)  .  On  their  side,  the  Europeans 
generally found  the American head-of-state naïve and  unrealistic.  One junior British diplomat 
cornrnented  that the President was  "as  a debutante is  entranced by her first ball"  (MacMillan, 
2002: p.  3). The sentiment was shared all the way to the top. Lloyd-George noted of  Wilson that 
"[hJe  shunned  the  sight  or  study  of unpleasant  truths  that  diverted  him  from  his  foregone 
conclusions" and that he may also have "regarded himself as a missionary whose function it was 
to rescue the poor European heathen from their age-long worship of false and fiery gods" (Lloyd­
George, 1972a: pp.  139-140). Clemenceau was perhaps Wilson's harshest critic, even poking fun 
at him for wanting to  eventually hand Istanbul over to  the League of Nations. "When you cease 
to be President, we will make you Grand Turk" said Le Tigre (Mee, 1980: p.  67). 
If Cosmopolitan and  International societies were moving in different directions, Lloyd­
George and Clemenceau, like Lansing, represented the old International Society, and they were 
not  going  to  change  easily.  Given  the  emerging  international  pluralism,  a  peace  treaty  that 
created  additional  ideological  divide  rather  than  increase  unity  between  the  world's  leading 
powers,  and  between those powers  and  the  lesser ones,  was  doomed  from  the  start.  Another 
factor that detracted from international order relates to American ascendance to the rank ofworld 
power and the US refusaI to clutch the reigns ofworld-power management. Up to President Taft, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  had remained  steadily  in  force.  Wilson,  a  Democrat,  had  nevertheless 
gained  the support of the  Republican Party for  entering the war.  He then  alienated them  by 
refusing to appoint a single Republican to  the Paris delegation, a mistake that would prove fatal 
for  many. The Republicans would take the Senate majority during the peace talks. Writing from 
his  deathbed, Theodore Roosevelt commented that "Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his 
four supplementary points and his five complementary points and all his utterances every which 
way have ceased to  have any shadow of right to  be accepted  as  expressive of the will of the 73 
American people" (Mee, 1980: p.14). 
Matters were made worse on January 25,  1919 when the President issued a press release 
stating that the establishment of the LON should be made an integral  part of the forthcoming 
peace treaty,  a  proposition previously  turned  down  by  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd-George.  "The 
League of Nations should be the gilded ball on the dome of a cathedral  and  not a foundation 
stone" (Lloyd-George,  1972a: p.  121). Obviously, the news did not go  over well in Washington 
either, where it was argued that the League was a catch 22:  if it worked as  it was meant to,  it 
would erode American sovereignty and  draw the US  into further European imbroglios. On the 
other hand, a weak League with little or no  international power was just a shibboleth (Nathan, 
1925:  p.  132).  The Republican-led Senate would refuse to  ratify the Versailles Treaty, further 
diluting the legitimacy ofboth League and Treaty. Of  the major empires of the Western Eurasian 
continent,  two  had  fallen  including the Ottoman. Two, the Belgian and  the Dutch, were total1y 
marginalized. The remaining two,  the French and the British, were completely broke, starving, 
and  exhausted  in  almost  every  other way.  Germany  and  Russia were  ostracized.  The age  of 
empires was over and with it, for the time being at least, was the direction of the world's politico­
economic  affairs  by  the  system's  strongest.  Great  power  management  was  not  likely  to  be 
possible, but that wouldn't stop sorne from trying. 
The  inability  of the  European  international  society  to  arnve  at  a  Grotian  mid-point 
solution  to  post-war  dilemmas  can, further  be  explained  by  the  failure  of the  other  major 
institutions at the time of the peace talks.  In the immediate aftermath of the war to  end ail  wars, 
diplomacy had  been reduced to  a dangerous state. Like ail  international institutions, it relies on 
precedent, and nothing in the past even remotely resembled the situation in 1919-1920. Besides 
their large number, inexperience and the lack 'history' between them and the core of international 
society,  the new  governments  instal1ed  parliamentary systems which were often congested  by 
infighting,  usual1y  over class  or ethnic issues.  These internai  instabilities spilled over into  the 
international realm via incomprehensive foreign policies. Sorne, such as  Russia and  as  shall be 
expounded in the next chapter, Turkey, briefly even had more than one centre of power, further 
complicating matters with the question of  rightfullegitimacy. European nationalism of  the 1920's 
was inherently Janus-faced. Irredentist claims were greatly exaggerated, and more often than not, 
the Big Three's various committees at Paris were absolutely overwhelmed by the task of fixing 
borders fairly between national claims and actual ethno-linguistic lines. In many parts of former 74 
empires, populations were just too jumbled to  create single-ethnicity states without complicated, 
unpopular and  simply inhumane population exchanges.  And besides that,  delegations  at  Paris 
often 'fudged the numbers'. 
The end results were borders that didn't always make sense. Nearly forty percent of new 
Poles didn't speak Polish. Forty-five percent of  new Czechs did not speak Czech. Throughout the 
1920's, one border region or disputed city after another was  at the centre of a crisis associated 
with nationalism; Teschen, Smyrna, Erzurum, Vilna, the Burgenland, the Sudetenland, Western 
Thrace, Klagenfurt, Upper Silesia, and certainly the Ulster Boundary all  caused more than their 
share  of woe.  In  the  European  parts  of the  former  Ottoman  Empire,  states  refused  the 
peacemakers' insistences that they sign treaties guaranteeing the safety of  minorities because they 
were  reminiscent of the old  capitulations for  Christians demanded by the  Christian powers of 
Europe (Lyon,  1973:  p.  42).  From the arbitrariness of the reparations to  various settlements of 
conflicting claims, international law wouId  further expose the new world order for the sham that 
it was.  The most blatant sign to  that end  was the exclusion of Germany from the talks.  Even 
France had  been  present  at  Vienna a  century prior,  again  showing that  there  was  simply no 
precedent for the plight of Europe in  1919. There were severa1 more examples of the Big Three 
neglecting  not  only the  infamous  and  as  of yet  untested  Fourteen  Points,  but  even  keystone 
international  laws  surrounding  sovereignty  were  often  ignored.  Even  Wilson  the  idealist 
wavered, supporting Italian claims to  the clearly Austrian Southern Tyrol, but that was nothing 
compared to the affronts to international law centered on Turkey, the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
and  the Treaty of Sèvres. When it came to Ottoman partition, all bets were off. 
By all accounts, the Turks fought valiantly. Cut off from their allies and aggressed on all 
fronts,  surrender was  only a matter of time.  Their main problem had been logistical. They had 
switched  over  to  European  weights  and  measures,  unified  their  currency  and  adopted  the 
Gregorian  calendar, all  to  coordinate better with their European allies.  Nevertheless, food was 
not  getting to  the front lines, sometimes for lack of transportation. By February 1918, Ottoman 
Foreign Minister Balil Bey was  already giving President Wilson assurances of his  support for 
new Arab independences where it would be necessary. After the rebellion led by 'Lawrence of 
Arabia',  the Porte was starting to  comprehend that trying to  hold on to  these provinces would 
only weaken it.  Ziya G6kalp had endorsed the idea, which helped with its popularity. After the 
worst decade in  Ottoman history, most Turks understood that the Arab and European provinces 75 
were more of a burden than an  asset, and when it  cornes to  cutting losses, better late than never 
(Toynbee and  Kirkwood, 1928: pp. 61-62). After the roughly LI million square kilometres lost 
in Europe right before the war, Arab dismantlement finally cost the CUP its political existence, 
and  it  fell  on  October  7,  1918.  On  the  30th  of that  month,  with  a  whole  new  Ottoman 
government behind him
5
,  AdmiraI  Rauf surrendered to  his  British counterpart at  Mudros with 
assurances that President Wilson's Fourteen Points would be respected  (Anderson, 1966: p.  348­
350). Point XII reads: 
The  Turkish  portions  of the  present  Ottoman  empire  should  be  assured  a  secure 
sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationalities  which  are  now  under Turkish  rule  should  be 
assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of 
development and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened  as  free  passage to  the 
ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 
But the surrender had been unconditional, and its seventh stipulation broadly granted the Allied 
Supreme Council the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which 
threatened  the security of the Allies.  Italy and Greece would show up in Paris with their hands 
out asking for  what had  been promised them, and  in the nearly two  years between the Porte's 
surrender and the onset of negotiations over the Arab and Turkish provinces, the seventh clause 
wouId be invoked. It was a sheepskin draped over wolves nipping at an Ottoman carcass. 
Greek participation in the war and  at the peace conference was both unpredictable and 
troublesome. They had much in cornmon with the Italians. Italy and Greece shared the status of 
minor powers in the European International Society, and as  such, they were being both invited 
by the leading states to  pick up slack in global  management. The two  stood to  gain quite a lot 
from Ottoman dismembelment. Both also had more appetite than teeth. Despite their illustrious 
histories,  Greece and  Italy were relatively new European states.  Italy had  unified  in  1870 and 
Greece won its hard fought independence from the Porte in  1832, but only regained the bulk of 
its territories in 1897. Both were nearly broke and the pair ofthem had shaky govemments, tom 
between  drastically  opposed  factions  for  lack  of rnoderate  centrists.  In  the  Greek  case,  its 
government and its people were tom between a liberal parliament and  a conservative king. The 
schisrnatic Greek govemment delayed Greece's entry into the war. In  1915, during the final days 
of the age of empires, the old-fashioned King Constantine had refused Entente offers of Turkish 
5 Mehmet V had died in July and had been  replaced by his younger brother Mehmet VI by the time of the Porte's 
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territory.  The Allied proposaI had  included the much-coveted port of Smyrna, but the monarch 
refused  on the grounds that he was married  to  the Kaiser's sister.  Constantine would not even 
agree  to  a unilateral  declaration of war on  the  Porte since that would  implicate Bulgaria,  the 
Kaiser's  close ail y,  against Greece.  It  is  comprehensible though  ironic that the  institution that 
failed  to  create  a  balance  capable  of preventing  the  war  also  created  a  balance  that  greatly 
delayed  its  end.  French commandos deposed  Constantine and  replaced  him with  the  Entente­
sympathetic Prince Alexander. The Greeks supplied fresh troops who drove a wedge through the 
Balkans, cutting offCentral supply lines and tuming the flank on Austria. 
The war had started in the east, it was perhaps fitting that the decisive blow come from 
there as weil. Athens would demand a heavy price for landing it. At St. Jean de Maurienne (April 
19-21,1917), a final  secret treaty conceded Smyrna, a Turkish economic hub populated mostly 
by Ottoman Greeks, to  the  Italians, by then full  members of the Entente.  That decision would 
come to haunt everyone involved. The agreement was never ratified by the Kremlin and right out 
of the gates at Paris, the British would argue that it was nugatory. Despite the twenty-one month 
lag  between  Mudros  and  Sèvres  (August  10,  1920),  the  Ottoman  dilemma  came  up  in 
conversation from  the start,  and  two  facts  are  abundantly clear:  the European members of the 
Supreme Council had not signed on for Wilson's Point XII, and the most vehement opposition to 
it came from British Prime Minister. 
From the moment the war was declared, there was not a British statesman of any party 
who  did  not have it  mind  that if we  succeeded  in  defeating this  inhuman Empire,  one 
essential condition of the peace we should impose was the redemption of the Armenian 
valleys  for  ever  from  the  bloody  misrule  with  which  they  have  been  stained  by the 
infamies of the Turk (Lloyd-George, 1972b: pp. 811-812). 
Intemationalization of the Straits, of Istanbul,  annexation and  mandates  were  ail  ideas 
regularly  entertained  by  the  Supreme  Council,  and  the  common  understanding  in  Allied 
diplomatic circles was  that the  Ottoman Empire had  effectively ceased  to  exist,  and  that very 
large sections what was left, even theTurkish parts, would fall under foreign administration. By 
aIl  accounts, Lloyd-George's sentiments were part of a Liberallegacy handed down by Gladstone 
(Temon,  2005:  p.  315).  Lord  Curzon,  his  cabinet  minister  responsible  for  foreign  policy  in 
eastem affairs likened the Porte ta "a canker that had poisoned Europe" and he likewise wished 
ta  use an  imposed peace treaty as  a remedy.  "The presence of the Turks in Europe has been a 77 
source of unmitigated evil to  everybody concerned. 1 am not aware of a single interest, Turkish 
or otherwise, that during nearly 500 years, has benefited by that presence" (Macmillan, 2002: p. 
373). 
Even the US  State Department had officially proposed to  accept mandate-ship over the 
Straits, Annenia and possibly elsewhere, as  weil as the internationalization of Istanbul at the end 
of the  war,  contrary to  Wilson's  Point XII  (ibid:  p.  376).  The Turks'  position  in  international 
society was  precarious  before  the  war,  and  certain  events  between  1914  and  1918,  with the 
Annenian massacres heading the list, worsened their international image. After ail, they had also 
been  on  the  losing  side  of a  war,  and  the  massacres  had  only  reminded  Europe  of the 
ineffectiveness of the millet system. Moreover, the British would assume the lead over the more 
sympathetic French in  the Levant. Strategic concerns aside, there was a real fear at the Foreign 
office that Boishevism, Nationalism and Islam would combine in  ail  those 'backwards peoples' 
from  Turkey to  China's western edge and not only set the British Empire aflame, but overthrow 
capitalism, democracy and western civilization itself. This may seem like a paper tiger now but 
at the time it certainly did not. As a resuit of ail this, no real objections were raised amongst the 
Western states when the Italians landed at Adalia on April 29,  1919 and the Greeks at Smyrna on 
May 15. Rome was cashing in on the Treaty of London and Athens had been sent in under Allied 
naval coyer and  by invoking the seventh clause of the Turkish surrender
6
.  With regards  to  the 
peace treaties, 
[t]he Devil's Advocate could show another side of the picture. He could present a list of 
entire nationalities still  submerged and  of substantial minorities unredeemed.  He could 
cite  instances  to  prove  that  the  Peace  Conference had  meted  out  one  measure  to  the 
victors and another to  the vanquished, and he might argue with plausibility that the gains 
had been cancelled by the losses, and that the general effect of the settlement had been to 
reverse  the  positions  of 'top-dog'  and  'under-dog'  without  aitering  their  relations  or 
refonning their behaviour (Toynbee, 1925: pp. 60-61). 
With the exception of the Treaty of Versailles, no other treaty fits this description as weil 
as  that of Sèvres, The 'dogs' that Toynbee alludes to  are Gennany and  France respectively, of 
course, but the Turkish treaty engendered its  own set  of reversaIs.  Britain had  taken  over for 
Russia as  the Islamic world's number one enemy, and TUl'key,  for a time at least, would be the 
under-dog to  Greece, But the Turks' relations with the major powers and  the behaviour of those 
6 Reports that the Greek citizens of  Smyrna were being massacred by Turks had been fiowing into Paris, but they 
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powers with  regards  to  the Turks had  remained  constant,  though  the  Supreme council would 
really drop the hammer on Istanbul with the Treaty of Sèvres' terms. Territorially, save for the 
Anatolian interior, the Porte was forced to renounce suzerainty over everything else. The Levant, 
Middle-Eastern, Arab and North African provinces were to become British and French 'A' or 'B' 
mandates. The Straits and Istanbul would be administered internationally. The Dodecanese and 
other  islands  were  given  to  Italy.  Greece  received  a  few  islands  as  weIl.  Smyrna  and  its 
hinterland would be administered by Athens for a period of five years, after which its fate was to 
be self-determined through referendum.  Perhaps most humiliating was  the preservation of the 
Capitulations,  including  the  Ottoman  Debt  Council.  Turkish  finances  would  remain  under 
European control and now being in  the age of early flight, it was decided that Turkish air-space 
was to  remain  under  Allied  control  as  well.  The  Allied  powers  were  to  guarantee personal 
freedoms  in Turkey. Yet the real  story behind the Treaty of Sèvres, its subsequent repeal,  and 
Turkey's  tentative  entrance  into  European  International  Society can only fully  be understood 
after a political and historical analysis ofwhat happened inside Turkey between 1919 and 1924. Chapter IV 
Its Name is Republic: Kemal's Turkey 
This ehapter will describe and analyze the final steps, both internaI and international, in Turkey's 
adoption of a secular republican government as weIl as its admittance into international society. 
Slicing the Pie 
Allied  forces  offlcially took  possession of Istanbul  in  January  1920,  but according  to 
historians, the difference was unnoticeable. The city's western banks had long hosted hordes of 
European businessmen and dignitaries, but immediately after the end of the war, it  was  choc-a­
bloc with foreign troops and ships as  weIl. British soldiers, of whom there were over a million in 
the former  Empire,  were primarily confined  to  the  Mediterranean  coastal  regions  in  Turkey. 
Mehmed VI pondered how to save his throne and what was left of his empire, and to  the Sultan, 
the two goals were one and the same. The only salvation he could foresee lay in cooperation with 
the Allies (Garnier, 1973: p.  188). 
While  the  patriarch  worried  and  schemed  in  his  palace  chambers,  Italian  forces  had 
discretely moved into ports a10ng the Adalian coast over the winter. The official date of April 29 
for  Italian  occupation perhaps  merely  reflects  the  acknowledgement  of a fait  accompli.  The 
Entente had  promised so much it  could neither reasonably justify nor grant under to  Italy, and 
this  became painfully obvious to  Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando during the Big Four's 
Turkish negotiations. The deck was stacked against Italy. No one had envisioned such a thing as 
a Czechoslovak or Yugos1av  state when Habsburg possessions on the Adriatic were auctioned­
off.  Rome's engagement to  the war effort was often called into question and their Machiavellian 
tactics  were  ill-appreciated  in  diplomatie circles.  Lord  Balfour  had  even  referred  to  them  as 
'swine'  in  public (Mee,  1980:  pp.  58-59).  In  Paris,  many  envoys  felt  that  the  Italians  were 
constantly asking for more than they deserved.  They had switched sides, fought half-heartedly 
and  more  than  once,  they  had  delayed  military  engagement,  leaving  their  allies  to  fend  for 
themselves.  Italy's  tactics at the table evoked the same sentiments as  in  the field.  It  tended  to 
think  only of itself when bargaining,  seemingly sharing no  understanding of or effort  in the 
maintenance  of international  order.  Orlando  himself was  able  to  do  little  to  change  Allied 80 
perceptions.  He  spoke  neither  English  nor  French  and  was  prone  to  ridiculously  emotive 
outbursts. He was also too rigid. The Italian Prime Minister simply would not compromise with 
Yugoslavia  over  Fiume.  Wilson  resented  the  Italian  delegation  because  he  had  agreed  to 
concede the undeniably German Southern Tyrol to Rome who later refused to budge reciprocally 
over the Adriatic port'. 
When the Italian delegation submitted its Turkish demands in early April, few among the 
Big Three's committee members paid any serious attention. The problems were not on the Italian 
side alone of course. The Treaty of London was incredibly vague. It stated only that Italy would 
receive "a just share" in the event of Ottoman collapse (MacMillan, 2002: p.  427; Mee,  1980: p. 
56). The Allies were perhaps right to  claim that the secret pact was nugatory since Russia had 
never  ratified  the  more  precise  Saint  Jean-de-Maurienne  amendments  delimiting  the  Italian 
tenitory and  zone of influence in  southern Asia Minor (which originally included Smyrna).  In 
truth, they had also been caught stealing from Peter to  pay Paul since the Big Three had by this 
time  more or less  decided to  hand  over Srnyrna to  the Greeks.  Furthermore, the agreement at 
Saint Jean had never sat weil with the French, who felt that Rome was getting much reward for 
little work, and it suited the Quay d'Orsay to see the London clauses undone altogether. Paris did 
not want a strong Italian presence hindering French trade and  investment in the Mediterranean. 
Sensing  he  was  about  to  lose  promised  possessions  on  the  Dalmatian  and  Adalian  coasts, 
Orlando walked out of the Paris talks on April 21, 1920. 
The timing was calamitous. Japan and Belgium had been threatening to abscond as weil. 
The  perceived  legitirnacy of the  all-encompassing treaties was  becoming a major thorn  in  the 
peacemakers'  side.  Since  they  had  been  conceived  by  so  few,  they  needed  to  have  their 
legitimacy  buttressed  by the  consent  of a  good  number of important  or  respected  powers  in 
international  society? To make things  worse,  the  German delegation  was  scheduled to  arrive 
eight days later to receive its terms at Versailles. During Italy's absence, the Big Three sat down 
to  discuss  the  fate  of Turkey officially  for  the  second  time.  Since the  start  of April,  reports 
1 The fiasco at Fiume orchestrated by Gabriele d'Annunzio and bis motley crew of armed bandits later in September 
1919 only made things worse when the militant poet turned the city into a fifteen-month party (MacMillan, op,  cil: 
p,302). 
2 The full  conference had  only met eight times,  Most of the 'real' dealings were carried out by the Big Three. The 
other  parties  concemed  would  later  be  'invited'  to  receive  their  tenTIS,  Many  negotiations  actually  took  place 
private1y  between  plenipotentiaries  who  developed  working,  and  even  personal  relationships  between  1919  and 
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infonned  that  Italian soldiers were making incursions  in  Asia Minor and  neither of the  three 
other Allied leaders were about to allow unilateral moves, if not for the sake of the peace or the 
Turks,  then in the name of international  order.  Someone had  to  stop  the  Italians,  and  Greece 
would be first in line. As much as  Rome and Athens shared in terms of international status, the 
difference in  the nature of their  respective diplomacies,  owing a  lot  to  the  characters of their 
leaders, would make all the difference in the world. 
Former  Greek  Prime  Minister  Elutherios  Venizelos  was,  by  ail  accounts,  a  very 
charismatic man
3
.  He had  fought  the Turks all  his  life.  His  father  and  four  of his uncles had 
fought  the  Ottomans  during  the  Cretan  rebellion.  He  began  his  legal  studies  at  the  age  of 
seventeen  and  had  been  one of the  first  graduates  of the  newly  reconstituted  University of 
Athens,  whose mission it  was  to  instil  Greek  culture in  youth by reviving instruction of the 
Classics.  Venizelos  wanted  to  rebuild  a  Greek  nation  spanning  from  Albania  to  Anatolia, 
comprised of long-Iost territories and including Constantinople as  its capital (MacMillan, 2002: 
p.  348). He was tough, he was smart, he was chatming and most importantly, he had the respect, 
if  not the admiration of the peacemakers at Paris, most of all Lloyd-George, who had dubbed hirn 
"the greatest statesmen Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles" (Lloyd George, 1972b: 
p.  775). Greecè's claims were no less ambitious than Italy's, but the Greeks had not yet made any 
blunders  at  the  conference,  and  had  by all  appearances,  acted  more  as  team  players.  Their 
demands,  put  forth  in  February  1919,  were  all  in  line  with  ethno-linguistic  and  nationalist 
principles.  Though there was  much debate over the  accuracy (and  honesty) of their statistics, 
Athens was claiming areas  that had  at least a small  Greek presence.  By ail  accounts, Smyma, 
more  than  any  other Turkish  port  on  the  Mediterranean,  was  a  predominantly  Greek  town, 
though  its hinterlands were almost totally Turkish.  Venizelos successfully argued  that it didn't 
make sense to hand it over to  Italy. Greece presented a less offensive choice to  the peacemakers. 
Despite doubts, France went along with the idea with a purely balance-of-power reasoning in 
mind:  Greek presence would diminish Italian strength in the eastern end of the Mediterranean. 
Along the same lines, the British felt that Hellas would provide a check to  France. Both France 
and Britain were certainly tired of propping-up a dangerously ineffective Ottoman government. 
(MacMaillan, 2002: pp.347-355) 
On May  13,  with the  Italian  delegation back in  Paris,  Lloyd-George,  Orlando  and  his 
3 Elutherios means 'liberator' in Greek. 82 
Foreign  Minister  Sydney  Sonnino,  met  in  Lloyd-George's  Parisian  apartments  to  discuss 
Anatolian partition. The Italians asked for land in the south and Smyrna. The second request was 
denied, but later that day,  the Big Three met and  the consensus was  to  grant Italy territory in 
Southern Anatolia. France would take the northern half, Greece would receive Thrace, Smyrna 
and its suburbs, as well as Cyprus and the Dodecanese. It was still assumed at this point that the 
US would accept a mandate over Istanbul and Armenia. The plan had many detractors however. 
Clemenceau and the Greek General Ioannis Metaxas both doubted Greece's ability to  maintain 
order over such a large swath of territory when its government and infrastructure were so shaky. 
Others, such as  Winston Churchill, feared that an ill-conceived dissection of Turkey would lead 
to  intenninable strife in the Middle East (MacMillan, 2002: p.  435). One thing was for certain, 
Turkey was once again at the heart of discord between the European superpowers (Toynbee and 
Kirkwood,  1927:  p.  122).  In  the  end,  these  plans  came  to  nothing.  Clemenceau  would  offer 
Lloyd-George the choice of pistols or swords when he found out that the British Prime Minister 
had  flip-flopped  in  favour  an  American  mandate for  the  whole  of.  Mounting pressures  were 
temporarily eased  when  the  Orlando  government fell  on June 19,  1919.  His successor, Prime 
Minister Francesco Nitti, perhaps wisely chose to  turn his  back on Italy's foreign debacles  to 
concentrate  on  its  monumental  internaI  political  and  economic  problems.  AIso,  Republican 
opposition and  a massive stroke would prevent Wilson from  accepting mandates in  the Straits, 
Armenia and Kurdistan by November, 1919, though it had become clear to most that this was the 
case by the end ofJuly Anatolia (MacMillan, 2002: p. 436-441). 
Before he had fallen ill, Wilson had shown reservations about wholesale partition. Sorne 
shared the President's hesitation to  detract so  much from  Turkish sovereignty, but if there had 
been any remnant of hope for  a strong and independent Anatolian State, it had evaporated with 
Damad Ferid Pasha's plea to  the peacemakers.  Ferid was  the Empire's Grand Vizir
4
.  When he 
appeared at the head of the Turkish delegation before the Big Four's representatives at the Quay 
d'Orsay on June  17,  he would deliver a prepared note that would essentially blame everything 
from  siding with Germany to  genocidal war crimes on the Committee for  Union and  Progress 
(CUP). 
4  Ferid  was  widely  regarded  as  incompetent.  He  had  eamed  the  Sultan's  trust  and  approval  by wedding  the 
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The great trial  of the Unionists at  Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the 
leaders of  the Cornrnittee -who aU ofthem occupy high positions in the State- for the war 
and  the  other  tragic  events;  that  is  the  rehabilitation  of the  Ottoman  nation.  Thus 
rehabilitated  in  the  eyes  of the  civilised  world,  our mission  will  henceforward  be an 
intensive  economic and  intellectual  culture  in  order to  become a  useful  factor  in  the 
League ofNations (Lloyd-George, 1972b: p. 653). 
Ferid would go on to request status quo ante bellum and use Wilsonian rhetoric to ask for 
the whole of Thrace back and the removal of Greeks from Smyrna. Wilson, Lloyd-George and 
Clemenceau ail  agreed that the statement was ridiculous and that laying aU  responsibility on the 
CUP  had been a cowardly ploy. Wilson, who had "never seen anything so stupid", thought that 
the Turkish delegation "had exhibited a complete misunderstanding of the West"  (MacMillan, 
2002: p.  437).  Ferid was sent home humiliated. 
When ail the other treaties were squared away, negotiations over Turkey once again fell 
inta the nineteenth century pattern, evoking duplicity and competition in an increasingly tenuous 
European  alliance.  Not  much  had  changed  besides  Russia's  absence.  The  Big  Four  were 
posturing to do what had not been possible throughout the nineteenth century: ali-out subjugation 
of Turkey by an  international coalition. By the end of the summer of 1919, circumstances had 
made it so that the troublesome Italians and the out-of-place Americans were no  longer a factor 
in decision-making, leaving Greece, France and the UK as  the sole deciders of Turkey's fate. 
There was also a little-known grey-eyed general stirring up nationalist rebellion in  the Turkish 
interior... 
Teeth and Nails 
Long  before  the  Allies  discussed  Turkish  partition  10  Lloyd-George's  study,  a  very 
different but equally important conversation took place in the Sultan's chambers back in Istanbul. 
Mustafa Kemal's position was clear right from  December 1918. "Il faut que votre majesté [...] 
constitue un gouvernement fort, capable de traité d'égal avec l'ennemi. Il  faut mettre fin, une fois 
pour toute,  à  la psychose de défaite  qui  règne  dans  les  milieux  gouvernementaux"  (Garnier, 
1973:  p.  189).  The man who would  later name himself Atatürk  has been compared to  Julius 
Caesar, Luther, Henry VIII, Cromwell, Napoleon, Bismarck, Mussolini and De Gaulle.
5 Born in 
1881, he had fought with his mother over his education at age nine. She wanted him to attend a 
5  In  1934, President Kemal would push through a law that required of Turks ta  have a last name as  per Western 
practice. He chose Atatürk, literally 'fatherturk'. 84 
madrassa,  he wanted  secular schooling.  He  never  looked  back.  He excelled  at  mathematics, 
political  studies and  in  the military disciplines.  He spoke French fluently.  He quite intuitively 
followed  the same path that was creating the modern Turkish bureaucratie and refOlmist class: 
secular  primary  and  secondary  education,  the  military  academy  in  his  native  Salonika,  and 
officer school  in  Istanbul,  a hub  of dissent  in  the  Hamidian  era,  during which the  outspoken 
Kemal had sorne potentially dangerous extracurricular activities, including pamphleteering. 
He often  spent  long  nights  with  his  close  entourage drinking  raki  and  arguing  about 
politics  and  current events,  habits  that  he  would  maintain  throughout  his  life.  He rose  rather 
quickly, making captain by the age of 24, but his opinions often got in the way of his career. At 
the end of 1904, he was briefly imprisoned for treason for organizing Vatan, a secret association 
that had evolved from a student ~tudy group with under his direction. Vatan was not dissimilar to 
the early eup. Kemal might have remained in his cell had it not been for a sympathetic superior 
officer coming to his aid. Too good an officer to be dismissed outright, Kemal was shipped off to 
Damascus. Defiant to  the last,  he would start over in  Syria.  When the eup took over in  1908, 
Kemal managed to  secure a series of important staff positions, but again, was sometimes passed 
over because ofhis arrogant tendency to demand promotion, but mostly because of  the animosity 
he displayed towards Enver Pasha, perhaps the most powerful of the triumvir at the head of the 
eup.  Kemal's  chief complaint  was  Enver's  unflinching  loyalty  to  Germany.  As  a  divisional 
commander, Kemal became a hero to his people during the Great War, repelling Allied forces at 
Gallipoli and  Anafarta.  He had  earned the symbolic title of Ghazi,  'the victorious'. The Ghazi 
had  been stalled however, forced to sit on his hands since he had arrived in Istanbul at the end of 
the war. Mobility was made impossible to  him under Allied martial law and he had been trying 
to find a way to  the Turkish interior in order to assess the situation there. He got his wish when 
the  Sultan  agreed  to  make him  the  army's  Inspector General,  a  post that  came with  imperial 
traveling papers. Two days later, the Greeks landed at Smyrna. The day after that, Kemal set out 
for  Samsun,  deep  inside Anatolia.  His  arrivaI  there on  May 19  is  a Turkish national  holiday 
(Garnier, 1973: 192-196; MacMillan, 2002: 433;  Ternon, 2005: 378-379). 
Two weeks prior, Kemal had been summoned by the Sultan on the day the Big Four met 
in Lloyd-George's flat.  Mehmed wanted assurances that his new Inspector would play along with 
the only discernable means of  political survival to  the beleaguered patriarch: compliance with the 
Allies.  A wise officer, Kemal reassured his liege but very discretely ordered troops to  Ankara. 85 
He had long decided to resist any attempted occupation. He never admitted as much publicly, but 
he had probably already decided to  depose Mehmed as  well. The future general had youthfully 
hoped  to  overthrow Abdul Hamid with all  the Ottoman soldiers in  Syria when he was posted 
there,  but had  realized  even  then  that it  was  wishful  thinking.  Much had  changed  since then 
however, and conditions would become even more conducive to a putsch in the days to come. 
There  had  been  expressed  reservations  arnongst  the  Greek  Orthodox  communities  of 
Western Turkey about Italian occupation.  Though there was legitimate discord in Smyrna, it had 
been trumped up by Venizelos to  support his claims and  Greek action. Yet in sending Hellenic 
soldiers to  Smyrna, the Allies set in motion events that would lead to their undoing in Anatolia. 
The hatred between Greeks  and  Turks was  at  a peak,  and  consequently,  the Hellenic landing 
bestowed  the utmost urgency and  élan to  Turkish nationalism,  crystallizing soldiers, peasants, 
Islamists, Westemists in their hatred for the Greeks, which ran deeper than for any other group. 
This hatred would grant Kemal reprieve from the heterogeneity of  the various reformist branches 
that had so plagued the CUP during its decade in power. It would also permit him to  capitalize 
on popular  frustrations  with  the  Sultanate  (Anderson,  1966:  p.  364;  Berkes,  1964:  p.  436). 
Mehmed himself would oblige towards the latter end as  well. Kemal, who had been organizing a 
guerrilla around  Smyrna, waited  until  news of Ferid's initial  failure  at  Paris hit  on June  18  to 
convince the officers at his side of the need for a provisional governrnent. Though the consensus 
was  that  the  Allies  had  to  be  resisted,  Kemal  went  the  extra step,  asserting  that  a  military 
response alone would  not achieve full  success because the Sultan and  the Istanbul  parliament 
were as good as foreign agents. 
The opposing elements of traditional  Ottoman patriarchy and Turkish westem-inspired 
modemization,  which  had  been  so  often  in  conflict  in  the  past,  were  engaged  in  their  final 
confrontation.  By the  end  of June,  Kemal  had  once  again been  charged  with  treason by the 
Sublime Porte and summoned to  Istanbul. He resigned his commission but his officers remained 
loyal to him. He refused the Sultan's summons. On his way to the Armenian city of Erzerum, he 
improvised a now-famous speech in the town of Tokat.  "If we have no  weapons, we shall fight 
with our teeth and our nails." He would lead by example, but he was not fighting for the same 
reasons  as  the  great  majority  of his  partisans,  who  were  still  attached  to  the  concept  of a 
suHanate,  and  who  in fact  wanted  a constitutional monarchy modeled on the United Kingdom 
(Jevakhoff,  1989:  p.  339).  But the more the patriarch blundered,  the more he  drove Turks to 86 
Kemal, the man most responsible for Turkey becoming a Republic. 
A battle for legitimacy ensued between nationalists and the Sultan.  On July 23,  Kemal 
called  for  the fonnation of a new parliament on the grounds that the Istanbul  government had 
betrayed the Turkish people. To the Minister of the Interior he wrote "Vous êtes des lâches et des 
criminels  d'empêcher  le  peuple  de  soumettre  ses  demandes.  Vous  conspirez  avec  des  pays 
étrangers contre la nation." An ultimatum went out to the Sultan shortly thereafter: 
La nation  a  complètement  perdu  confiance dans  votre  cabinet  et  vous-même.  Elle ne 
garde  confiance  que dans  son  souverain  à  qui  seule  elle  doit  soumettre  rapports  et 
pétitions. Votre cabinet s'interpose entre la nation et le souverain. Si  vous persistez dans 
votre obstination une heure de plus,  la  nation se considérera libre d'entreprendre toute 
action qu'elle jugera utile et rompra toutes relations entre votre cabinet illégal et la nation 
entière. Ceci est notre dernier avertissement (Garnier, 1973: p. 216). 
Mehmed issued a caU to general elections for the new parliament in Istanbul, but simultaneously 
communicated  to  the  Foreign  Office  that  this  was  merely  a  ruse  to  placate  the  nationalists. 
Churchill  took  advantage of the  opportunity to  corner  the  Sultan  into  a  secret treaty  behind 
France's  back  in  September,  in  which  Mehmed  placed  the  whole  of Turkey  under  British 
mandate and placed the spiritual authority of the caliphate at London's service. 
The Sultan would also succumb to demands to fire Damad Ferid on October 2.  Too little 
too late. The most unpopular Ferid had already signed as  the Sultan's representative at Sèvres, 
after which time the Kemalist anny had cut telegraph lines and interrupted postal service in and 
out of Istanbul, and seized control of tax collection and coffers.  More and more, Kemal would 
undertake  refonns  with  the  same  strategic  cunning  that  made  him  a  brilliant  soldier,  never 
advancing beyond his means, strangling his adversaries, and leaving but one way out:  his way. 
The father  of modem Turkey had  never believed  in  the  possibility of a  hannonious marriage 
between Islamic/Ottoman and European political philosophies. Like, G6kalp, he  acknowledged 
that culture and civilization were indivisible:  "[Modernization] would have to  assume a radical 
character, to  affect aU  the aspects of Turkish society and to  sweep away most, if not aU,  of its 
traditional  beliefs  and  institutions.[ ...]  If we  are  going  to  be  westernized,  let  us  go  to  the 
fundamentals  of the  West"  (Bozdaglioglu,  2003:  p.  46).  Atatürk  wished  to  liberate  Turkish 
culture and government from  the obscurantist and superstitious elements of Islam that were so 
deeply entrenched in the sultanate that they could never be removed through refonn alone, as the 
experience  of the  late  nineteenth  century  had  demonstrated.  The strategist  was  not about  to 87 
alienate the conservatives in his camp, however, until he knew he had them cornered.
6 
Better the Devil You Know 
December 1919 was a pivotaI month for the Kemalists.  Their leader had set up  a new 
capital in Ankara, far from the intrigues, influences and occupations which made Istanbul such a 
political1y  dangerous  place,  and  beyond  the  reach o! any foreign  anny.  The Grand National 
Assembly (GNA), a legislative body meant to  replace the Ottoman parliament, was established 
though  less  than forty of the  over two hundred ministers invited to  Ankara actually presented 
themselves. Nevertheless, every action by the Allies at  this point reinforced Kemal's rebellion, 
thus  far  allowing  him  to  make a  nearly seamless  transition  from  an  occupational  resistance 
movement to  a provisional government. The gauntlet was thrown to  the British led Allied forces 
by Kemal on January 28, 1920 with the 'National Pact', which stated the nationalist's goals. The 
gist of the document boiled down to  exactly the same thing as Wilson's twelfth point: the Allied 
powers can do  what they will with the Arab portions of the fonner empire, but Turkish regions, 
including Istanbul, must remain intact and sovereign. According to the Pact's sixth article: 
It is  a  fundamental  condition  of our  life  and  continued  existence  that  we,  like  every 
country,  should enjoy complete independence and  liberty in  the matter of assuring the 
means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should 
be rendered possible and that  it  should be possible to  conduct affairs  in  the fonn of a 
more up-to-date regular administration.  For this  reason we are  opposed to  restrictions, 
inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial and other matters. 
This clause was invoked to  demand the total  abrogation of capitulations, and would be 
summoned by Kemal's supporters as  a rebuttal to  the tenns set by the Big Four and Greece at 
Sèvres (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927: p.  141). In March 1920, the British nailed shut the doors 
of  the Ottoman parliament. It was an omen. No session would ever deliberate in Istanbul again. 
Ministers deemed nationalists were either deported or interned at Malta (Garnier, 1973: pp. 222­
226).  The Sultan's reputation as  a British marionette grew,  adding validity to  Kemalist claims 
that  Istanbul  did  not represent  Turkish interests,  to  which  the  riposte  was  that  the  Ankaran 
government had no  authority to  negotiate at the international level.  As a result, during the first 
half of 1920, the Ghazi's mission was still one of resistance rather than revolution. But that didn't 
6 One of Kemal's first  acts  as  a rebel had been to  arm most of the  extreme-right religious organizations around 
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stop him from acting as  though he were a head of state. On April 23,  1920, Kemal was elected 
president  by  the  GNA.  In  a  speech  the  following  day,  he  appeased  anxious  clericals  and 
moderates who had  cold feet;  he  was still  playing the transition cardo  "As soon as  the  Sultan­
Caliph is delivered from ail pressure and coercion he will take his place within the frame of the 
legislative principles which will  be determined by the Assembly."  Between the lines,  one can 
still read  his  famous slogan:  "sovereignty belongs to  the people" (Berkes, 1964: p.  444).  As of 
July, his soldiers, rather exhausted by Greek advances along the coast, had decided to withdraw 
to the interior. In August, the Sultan agreed to the terms laid out by the treaty of Sèvres. Turkish 
nationalism was  in  trouble.  To the north, another new and  explicitly revolutionary government 
was also vying for legitimacy within the international society, and it too needed friends. 
Atatürk  had  made  tentative  openings  to  the  Boisheviks  three  days  after  becoming 
president and had proposed that the 'Reds' and the Republicans cooperate to settle borders in the 
Caucasus. Negotiations took on a strangely familiar hue.  Bolshevik Foreign Minister Chicherin 
calied  for  'self-determination'  in  the  Caucasian  states  of Georgia,  Azerbaijan  and  Armenia. 
Kemal understood the implied message that these states were only free to  choose Sovietization, 
so  he  agreed  to  settle  borders  bilaterally,  absorbing a  loss  in  exchange for  stability (Ternon, 
2005:  p.  388).  Lord Curzon, Balfour's successor, would officially ask for an American mandate 
over  Almenia  on  behalf of the  British  government  the  following  day  at  the  San  Remo 
conference.  He was unaware of talks between Ankara and  Moscow.  Britain's worst nightmare 
was  coming true.  There were nineteen million Muslims in  the former Russian Empire and  the 
Allies, most of aIl  the British, were mortified by a possible union between the forces of Near to 
Far  Eastern nationalism, Islam and Boishevism, which in the worst case scenario, would enrapt 
half the earth's  population  and  spell  the  end  of Christianity,  capitalism  and  personal  freedom 
worldwide.  This  was  perhaps  mere  alarmism,  however.  The common  enemy  that  was  Great 
Britain may have a created a marriage of convenience between these various elements, but the 
more  fundamental  divergences  of  Communist  and  Islamic  and/or  nationalist  political 
philosophies  could  not  be  so  easily  or  permanently  overcome  (Toynbee,  1925:  pp.  76-77). 
Furthermore, though the Russian revolution was seen in a positive light, not only because of the 
removal  of the troublesome Romanoff dynasty, but also because of the Reds' condemnation of 
Western  imperialism  with  regards  to  Ottoman  partition,  Bolshevism  remained  a  poorly 
understood curiosity in Turkey (Berkes, 1964: pp. 436-437). 89 
In the span of a lifetime, Turks would go  from feudalism to  a republic through their own 
versions of  the renaissance, reformation, scientific revolution, separation of church and state and 
industrialization, but the stars never aligned in a way that would permit Communism to take root 
there.  The spiritual  aspect  is  perhaps  the  most obvious  reason  why.  Though Turks  might be 
convinced  to  abandon  an  Islamic  state in  favour  of a  secular  one  with  Islam  as  the  official 
national religion, the 'godlessness' of Bolshevism was a bridge too  far to  cross. Furthellnore, at 
the  lime,  Turkey  was  mostly  agrarian.  The  brutal  conditions  that  industrial  capitalism  had 
imposed upon the proletariat tlu'oughout  Europe did exist in  Turkey, but on much too  small a 
scale to  spread Marxist ideology.
7  Moreover the Anatolian peasant was not nearly as oppressed 
by  his  landlord  in  comparison  to  his  Russian  counterparts,  and  landowners  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire had neither been nearly as powerful nor as  loathed as  in Russia. To boot, with Armenian 
and Greek 'displacements', even more land  became available to  native Turks whom had  never 
lacked in that regard anyways. Finally, though Turkey was what we would now call a 'peripheral' 
economy, a label that cornes with its  own set of reasons to  rebel  against capitalist imperialism, 
Kemal  saw  Arab  cultural  domination,  and  not  European  economic  subjugation,  as  the  main 
problem plaguing his nation. In total opposition to their northem neighbours, Turkish nationalists 
across the spectrum actually wanted to  stimulate the development of a capitalist class, the need 
for which had been compounded by the mass exodus of Greek and Jewish merchants (Georgeon, 
1986:  pp.  136-138;  Berkes,  1964:  pp.  425-426).  Pan-Islamism  and  the  various  Pan-Turkist 
movements had alallned both old and  new Russian governments given the number of Muslims 
and  ethnically or linguistically Turkic peoples within its frontiers.  As a result, these movements 
also prevented Turkish refollnists from aligning with Russia. But they had come to  be regarded 
as lofty and superfluous ambitions from better days, to  be dropped in favour of saving what was 
essential during the eleventh hour.  With them out of the way, cooperation between Ankara and 
Moscow was possible. That would be very bad news for Yerevan. 
Even after the death of the Almenian mandate in the US  Senate in June, 1920 by a vote 
of fifty-two  to  twenty-four,  the idea was  revived  by Article 89  of the  treaty of Sèvres, which 
reallocated the task to  the British. This clause amounted to  little more than a face-saving gesture 
on the part of a Supreme Allied Council that had once again made promises it could not or would 
7  A Turkish Conununist party did  briefly exist  in  1920, but  its  leader was  drowned, cast off on a ship  that  was 
scuttled  off the  coast of Trebizond along with sixteen Soviet agents January 24,  1921.  Moscow tumed  the  other 
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not keep.  No matter the intentions, the argument wouId  be mooted the following year.  For the 
time being, fronts around Smyma and Cilicia were stabilized momentarily in August with a little 
clandestine help from the embittered and withdrawing Italian forces, who had been 'surrendering' 
their arms and equipment to whatever band of nationalist Turks they crossed in defiance to  the 
British. A more conventional Russian aide arriving in August in the form of 400 kilos of gold 
also helped. 
By this  time,  the  Sultan had  lost the few  supporters  he had  left by accepting Sèvres, 
driving  even  more  Turks  to  join ranks  with  Kemal.  The Kemalists  were  reinvigorated.  By 
September  23  1920,  the  GNA  gave  Kemal  permission to  invade Armenia.  France had  been 
soundly beaten in their Cilician campaign in early 1920 and had no more stomach for casualties. 
Minister of Finance Jules Cambon, a man of considerable experience in the Near-East and who 
had lived in Turkey for seven years, strongly doubted the Allies' ability to  impose and administer 
peace  there,  and  had  long  advocated  on  behalf of economic  rather  than  military  means  of 
manipulating  the  Porte.  He was  now  raising the  alarm.  Should  the  nationalists  win,  France's 
considerable  holdings  in  the  region  might  literally  go  up  in  smoke for  no  more reason  than 
defending a treaty in which London had connived them out of their just deserves (Lloyd-George, 
1972b: pp. 822-826). Sèvres was losing its last semblances of  legitimacy. 
Sensing that it stood to  gain nothing, France refused to  ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. The 
Italian government lined up behind the French, calling for a renegotiation of terms. The Istanbul 
government  was  anything but in  control  of the  Turkish  territory.  Greece  had  advanced  way 
beyond Smyma and in doing so, beyond any justifiable excuse for occupying Turkish soil. Their 
signature would add little weight to  the document. By the end of 1920, it had become clear that 
the treaty could only be enforced as it would never be accepted by Turks. The document had had 
the  reverse  effect,  granting  the  Ankara  govemment  its  ultimate  legitimacy  and  momentum. 
Politically at least, the Sultan had signed his own death warrant and the British had spelled the 
end  of any possible foreign  mandate in Turkey.  Still,  it took a few  months longer for  this  to 
become clear. If he had not ascertained it already from the Italian fiasco, Kemal had realized by 
November, 1920 that he was by no means dealing with a united Allied front. 
Tabula Rasa 
The  year  1921  would  prove  a  turning  point  for  Kemal  and  Turkey.  The  Armenian 
campaign had paid off.  Turkish Nationalists pushed north and Bolsheviks south, wiping out the 91 
last  remaining  White  Russian  forces  on  the  way.  Though  mmor  skirmishes  did  break  out, 
Turkey's  Transcaucasian  borders,  which  remain  geographically  unchanged  to  this  day,  were 
settled in negotiations. Peace was sealed between the Soviets and Ankara with a friendship treaty 
on March 16, 1921. At Lausanne, the French and the British would be powerless when presented 
with this fait accompli.  Kemal and  Lenin exchanged ambassadors. Positive acknowledgements 
of the  nationalist  governrnent  accrued,  but  the  British  remained  stubborn.  Lloyd-George had 
campaigned hard to  win Smyrna for his friend Venizelos. The Greek landing had been handled 
poorly, blood was needlessly spiit,  and  Hellenic governance had been clumsy. Still, in June of 
1920, when the more organized forces of Kemal began their attack on Smyrna, it was the British 
PM who  approved  Greek movement  inland,  an  act  that  was  divisive  even  within  the  British 
governrnent. By the time Sèvres was signed, Greek soldiers were 400 kilometres east of Smyrna 
(MacMillan, 2002: pp. 448-449). 
Athens would pay dearly for its hubris.  On October 25,  1920, King Alexander died of 
complications arising from a monkey bite. The following month, Venizelos lost dramatically in 
the  elections.  His  party  was  in  minority  and  he  didn't  even  win  in  his  own  riding,  and  he 
narrowly survived an assassination attempt by two Greek marines. King Constantine returned in 
December and purged his armed forces of Venizelists, which resuited in the irreplaceable loss of 
many competent officers. By the time the Armenian frontier was closed, the Greek army was in 
disauay.  Still  they  pressed  forward  and  Lloyd-George  continued  his  now  more  implicit 
encouragement despite the increasingly disapproving clamour of his own cabinet. The London 
Conference, held in February 1921, brought undeniable recognition by the European diplomatie 
community of the Ankara  governrnent,  which had  been allowed  to  send  two  delegates.  This 
precursor to Lausanne accomplished little else. 
The Turks demanded a total renegotiation of Sèvres and the Greeks refused to budge. The 
following Greek offensive in the spring of 1921  was a disaster. The Allies, now realizing the size 
of  the hornet's nest they had rattled by allowing a Greek invasion, were looking for ways to back 
out.  They argued that the return of Constantine nullified  the allied  offer to  Smyrna
8  (Ternon, 
2005:  p.  395).  The Greeks  orchestrated  two  more  offensives  in  1921,  but they  were  out  of 
international support, out of momentum and about to  be routed. By spring, 1922, London, Paris 
8  Though they had offered it to Constantine in  1914 and had later told Venizelos that the offer no longer stood with 
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and Rome had declined ta aid Athens with guns and money, but offered ta broker a deal which 
Atatürk turned down because Greece refused  ta  evacuate. The Turkish army would help  them 
along.  Atatürk reached  Smyrna on September 10,  1922 and  watched as  the Greek parts of the 
city burned  to  the  ground.  He called  it  "[a]  regrettable  incident"  (MacMillan,  2002:  p.  451). 
Later,  when  overseeing  the  evacuation  of Hellenic  soldiers  from  the  neighbouring  town  of 
Konak, he would prevent Turkish youths from  trampling a Greek flag.  It  was after all, he said, 
the beloved symbol of a proud nation, regardless of the enmity one might feel  for it.  The nation 
was sacred (Garnier, 1973: pp. 270-271). 
The secret  wartime  agreements  had  stunted  peacetime  negotiations  before  they  even 
started, and the onus lay squarely on British and French shoulders since the Romanoffs were out 
of the picture. The outcome may have been better for all  had  the Big Four and Greece stuck ta 
Point  XII,  or  at  least,  not  strayed  so  far  from  it.  Giving  the  Dodecanese  to  Italy  was  not 
unreasonable,  taking  Thrace  away  and  splitting  it  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece  may  have 
worked  at the limit, but the second  Italians and  particularly Greeks landed on Anatolian soil,  a 
great many Turks began to  believe that their homeland  was  about to  be drawn and  quartered. 
After aU,  what was there to  assure them of the contrary?  There was  a good  deal  of timorous 
precedent  in  the  Balkans,  not  to  mention  that  the  most  important  city in  the  country was  in 
European  hands  and  that  the  Sultan  and  his  parliament  were their  hostages.  Conversely,  the 
nineteenth century experience also bound the peacemakers' imaginations with respect to Turkey. 
The Young Turk's movement had  not existed  long enough to  wash away the tamished 
image left by Abdul Hamid, and had in fact added a few  blemishes of its own. The majority of 
high-ranking diplomats involved could not initially envision a Turkish nation-state capable of 
thriving on its own, or simply did not want to  for reasons of their own impelial ambitions. The 
British Prime Minister, the person who would ultimately yield the most influence in the matter, 
would be at the head of both groups. His unflinching loyalty to Venizelos also blinded him to the 
fact that he was repeatedly backing a losing horse, one that had deliberately misled him as  to  the 
extent of his  ambitions, no  less.  Smyma may have been inhabited by mostly Greeks, but like 
Salonika or Istanbul, which also had very large Hellenic communities, they were economic hubs 
of the utmost importance to the Ottoman economy, and their removal would prove a huge 10ss to 
Turkish revenue. Greeks there had  also lived in the Ottoman Empire for centuries and  were for 
aH  intents and purposes naturalized. 93 
The same treaty a hundred years prior might not have ruffled so  many feathers, but the 
age of empires was almost over. The political mores that went with it were on their way out, and 
nationalism, once a dirty word amongst statesmen, was now ending its transition from the realm 
of cosmopolitan ideals to  the more politically legitimate and practiced principles of international 
society. The rules of the game had  changed more than superficially, but the evolution had  less 
effect on those that held the reins of power than on those that sought them. This lag created the 
most  strain  of all  on  the  negotiations  centered  on Turkey because of its  desire  to  join the 
increasingly global  international society dominated by a European core that was  doing almost 
everything in its power to prevent that outcome. While the Big Three spoke of 'open covenants 
arrived  at  openly',  openness  was  only practiced  when  it  was  somehow  beneficial  for  more 
underhanded reasons.  There had been several instances of use of the press to  inflame opinions 
and render decisions irreversible or inoperable. The real bargaining was, for better or for worse, 
almost always far  removed from public scrutiny. France and  the United Kingdom continued to 
act on the same impulses legitimated by the same set of values that were so rapidly becoming 
outmoded. The Big Four and Greece's treatment of the Turks was what created the necessity for 
resistance in the latter's minds. 
The two year period between the signing of  the 'porcelain treaty9, and the first sit-down at 
Lausanne had  removed  many befuddlements.  By the  time the invitation went out in  October, 
1922, the French had  already withdrawn in exchange for economic concessions and  arrived  at 
their own peace with Ankara a year prior which had traced the southern border with Syria. There 
was  only  one  Russian  govemment  left,  and  it  had  destroyed  all  possibilities  of Caucasian 
mandates in tandem with the Kemalists, establishing the northern border. The Americans didn't 
even  send  a  mission  to  Lausanne,  only  observers.  Haly  was  there,  represented  by  Benito 
Mussolini,  but  it  had  abandoned  its  promised  rewards.  Venizelos  actually presided  over  the 
hearings, but both he and Greece had fallen victim to  their own pride, to Turkish resolve and to 
the bite of a rabid monkey. Even worse, Lloyd-George had resigned, brought down in part by the 
failure  of the  last Turkish  treaty.  The only three major issues  left  on  the table  were  foreign 
occupation, international administration and  the capitulations, induding the Debt Commission. 
Istanbul and Ankara were both summoned this time. The invitation extended to the Porte was a 
"diplomatie fiction" however (Ternon, 2005: p.  406). Kemal simply had the Sultanate abolished. 
9 At Sèvres, the treaty was signed in a porcelain factory 94 
His  instructions  to  Ismet Pasha,  one  of his  best  generals,  closest  confidants  and  now  chief 
negotiator were simple: no compromises in Turkey. With the Greek almy's collapse, the British 
forces  at  Istanbul  and  the  Straits  were  totally  exposed  and  nearly  sUITounded.  The already­
beleaguered  European  alliance was now even  further  strained  by disagreements  over French 
occupation  of the  Ruhr valley.  The Allies'soldiers were  tired  and  their resources  exhausted. 
There was to be, therefore, no bargaining on the three cardinal points: Turkey's frontier in Thrace 
would be restored to the 1913  borders, the capitulations had to be abolished and ail allied troops 
had to vacate Turkish soil, meaning no international administration of Istanbul or of the Straits. 
British intransigence remained intact. The UK would neither let go of Mosul province nor of the 
Straits. The Soviets protested the second claim. 
Even more heated were the economic arguments. European states wanted guarantees for 
their considerable investments in Turkey, whose new government understood the mechanics of 
economic servitude better than any Sultan ever had. Curzon remained at the head of the Foreign 
Office after Lloyd-George's coalition goverrunent fell. He tried to use the capitulations to coerce 
the Turks, but Ismet wasn't hearing it (he suffered from 'selective deafness', often ignoring offers 
he did not like). Curzon was enraged by his pertinacity. "You remind me of  nothing so much as a 
music box. Vou play the same old tune day after day until we are heartily sick of it- sovereignty, 
sovereignty, sovereignty" (Macmillan, 2002: p. 453). After two weeks worth of negotiations, the 
British walked out as part of a dramatic ultimatum designed to  soften the Turks. It failed. In fact, 
the press in Ankara was crying that Ismet had been too soft and  that he should have asked for 
Iraq and Syria as weil. 
The British delegation returned on April 23  of the following year, and  it was they who 
had  softened. The Ankara government's position had only grown stronger. The Turks had never 
intended  on committing economic suicide and  were ready to  secure foreign holdings by legal 
means so long as it was done on their own terms. Once that was agreed upon, advances could be 
made.  The capitulations as  a whole were abolished. Since no  one could enforce Sèvres, it was 
dropped outright. Turkey got Eastern Thrace back and the Straits would remain under its control, 
though there would be a limit on tOlmage for warships, which was probably to  their advantage 
anyway.  The western limit was not settled and  the Turks agreed  to  let the League of Nations 
decide its fate.  The League awarded Mosul to  Iraq in  1925. The Ottoman debt was relegated to 
the domain of  private law and bond payments were established on a case-by-case basis, often at 95 
favourable  tenus,  much  to  the  envy of the  Weimar Republic.  Of all  the  Great  War's  losing 
parties, the Turks were the only ones to  impose their own tenns of peace. Even weapons seized 
by the  Allies at  the end of the war were given back. They had  reclaimed  aH  that was Turkish 
before the war and even received reparations from both Greece and France. 
The  treaty  was  signed  on  July  24,  1923.  Le  Figaro  commented  that  "[l]e  traité  de 
Lausanne marque une date capital dans l'histoire du monde, car, pour la première fois, la Turquie 
est traitée comme une puissance occidentale" (from Georgeon,  1986:  p.  314).  In  London,  The 
Times was muchmore sceptical. 
The treaty will seem a humiliating confession of surrender by the Western Powers.  [...  ] 
Un1ess the Turks so comp1ete1y alter their habits as  to  bring the administration of the law 
into sorne sort of hannony with that to  which Western Europeans are accustomed, it will 
be impossible for foreign traders to  pursue their calling in security (from Gong,  1984b: 
pp. 118-119). 
Either way,  one  thing  was  for  certain:  the  Turks  were  not  given  their  place  in  international 
society, they took it by force. 
Hats Offto the New Republic 
Force would  also  be the detennining factor  internally in  the final  and  irreversible step 
away from  Ottoman  governance.  The more  actual  ground  Kemal  gained  against  Greece,  the 
more he gained gt'ound in the political realm and in the hearts and minds of  Turks. The officer in 
him knew that timing was everything. As early as  April, 1920, Kemal had asked the assembly to 
draft  a  new  constitution.  At  the  time,  he  had  had  to  concede  the  temporary  nature  of his 
government. But he was laying the groundwork laid for something bigger. The first article of the 
draft constitution read  "[s]overeignty belongs unconditionally to  the nation. The government is 
based on  the principle of the people's direct rule over their own destiny." Kemal's influence is 
clear. Most did not realize the article's implications. General Kiazim Karabekir, the man who had 
refused the Sultan's order to  arrest Atatürk at the very beginning in Erzerum, would later oppose 
Kemal over his commander's  republican aims on the grounds that 
[t]he  majority  of the  persons  making  up  the  group  supporting  this  Constitution  are 
aspiring to  lead  the destiny of the country to  a revolution.  Only a small fraction of the 
people would support the idea of a new regime. Supporting the new Constitution can only 
be a matter of the private opinion of certain members of the Assembly (Berkes, 1964: pp. 
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Kemal  delayed  all  engagement in  the  confrontation  that  was  looming over this  most 
polarizing issue until he was in a better position to deal with it, and the Greeks were his greatest 
ally towards that end. As long as they posed a threat, friction along the rag-tag Assembly's many 
ideologic'al fault lines was minimal though ever-present. By 1922, a heated confrontation seemed 
imminent, but this time, the British inadvertently came to Kemal's rescue by inviting the Sultan's 
govenunent  to  Lausanne,  infuriating  everyone  in  the  GNA.  A  mere  week  after  the  call  to 
Lausanne had come, the bill for the abolition if the Sultanate was ready.  Tt was prepared within a 
few hours of Atatürk asking for it and passed later that day on November 1,  1922, riding in on 
the coattails of  anti-European sentiment. 
The reaction to the ,British faux-pas had been incredibly swift, The Sultan left aboard the 
HMS Malaya on the 17th and  Lausanne again diverted attention from internai matters. With the 
treaty settled, the ideological rifts within the GNA began to reappear when it came time to settle 
who  would rule, and even of what type govemment would be put in power, as  the question had 
indeed been left open by the  Constitution of 1921.  When the Sultan was  deposed, the uneasy 
agreement reached in the Assembly was  to  elect a new Caliph, Abdul-Medjid, installed on' the 
day  after Mehmed VI  fled.  Both conservative Sheriatists and  Kemalist Republicans had hopes 
and  anxieties regarding the new Caliphate. On the one hand, a weak spiritual leader removed of 
all  temporal  authority  was  a  stepping  stone  to  a  secular  Turkish  republic.  Inversely,  to  the 
Islamic conservatives, the new Caliph, who by the very definition of his post was imbued with 
political powers, embodied a last chance to create a totally Islamic state devoid of the impurities 
of  Hanafite doctrine. 
Years later, Kemal would write that "[fjollowing the abolition of  the Sultanate, 1 accepted 
the abolition of the Caliphate as it was nothing but the same personal sovereignty under another 
name"  (Berkes,  1964:  p.  454).  Furthermore,  in  the aftermath Ottoman collapse,  the Caliphate 
was in fact a source of unwanted foreign influence, and Republicans wished to  sever links with 
the  Islamic world  precisely for  that reason.  Kemal  would put the  issue  to  the Khilafatists  in 
September  of 1923  before  they  had  time  to  organize  a  proper  opposition.  After  a  ten  day 
filibuster,  Minister  Sheref,  the  most  venerable  to  sit  in  the  Assembly  and  the  last  official 
historian  of  the  House  of  Osman  would  proclaim  "One  hundred  years  of  the  Turkish 
transformation is giving birth to  a child. Are we afraid to  spell his name? Let us face it:  this  is 
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shouting and  rambunctiousness, depending on whose version you read, but the bill spelling the 
demise of the Caliph and  establishing Turkey as  the first  and  as  of yet  only secular Republic 
went through on  October  19,  1923.  It  would  take  until  March  of the  following  year  for  the 
theocratic office to  be legally abolished, but the blow to  conservative Islamic leftovers from the 
Ottoman days was  decisive and  fatal.  Under the  new  system,  the President ran  the executive 
branch and the Assembly ran the legislative. As it happened, Kemal was both president and head 
of the Assembly. He was also the supreme commander of  the Turkish anned forces, as appointed 
by the Assembly in  1920. Though he did  not control nearly as  large an area,  by 1924, Atatürk 
had far more control than any Sultan had since the glory days of  the fifteenth century. 
Though  his  motivations  were  far  different,  Kemal  would  use  his  power  no  less 
autocratically than a Sultan and over the next decade or so, he would continue to pick off the old 
Ottoman political and cultural bastions one by one as ifthey were stragglers in a retreating anny. 
A good soldier cuts his eriemy's lines of supply and communication. Governments and cultures, 
like soldiers and  annies,  can be isolated  and  starved into  surrender.  He depoliticized  his own 
all11Y, fearing a possible alliance between it and opposition parties. He banned religious parties, a 
sanction eventually extended to  aIl  opposition parties in  1930 and which would remain in effect 
until 1946, eight years after his death. The percentage of  religious leaders in the Grand Assembly 
refiects the success of Kemal's policies. They held  17% of seats in  1920,  Il  % in  1923, 4% in 
1927, 3% in 1931, 2% percent in 1939 and a mere 1% in  1943 (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: p.  51). 
Religious education was not rendered illegal right away, but secular primary education 
.was placed entirely under the Ministry of Education and made free for both boys and girls until 
the  age of 12, which drastically reduced enrolment inmadrassas. Opening new religious schools 
was forbidden outright. By the time of Kemal's death in  1938, the literacy rate had  gone up by 
nearly twenty percentage points (Jevakhoff, 1989: 363). When Latin script was made the official 
script  of the  Turkish  Republic  in  1928,  Arabic  could  no  longer be taught  in  any  institution 
without  state pennission, and  it  became illegal  to  speak  or write it in  government buildings. 
Legal  bifurcations were eliminated in  public law. The Swiss civil code, the most modem at the 
time, was adopted in 1926 and the Sheriat was completely done away with. Marriage was totally 
secularized,  meaning  that  inter-faith  marriages  were  possible  at  any  courthouse,  absolutely 
uIÙ1eard of  at the time and still almost guaranteed to raise eyebrows in many parts of the Islamic 
world. Equal rights of divorce and of succession came with the new code and so did tax refonn. 98 
The tithe,  a pillar of Islam, was abolished and the last feudal  land holdings were redistributed 
among landless peasants. Universal suffrage came in  1931  and  women could ron for  office by 
1934,  effectively putting Turkey ahead of the European curve in  that respect.  Article 2 of the 
1924  Constitution,  which  declared  Islam  as  the  state  religion,  was  abrogated  in  1928.  As  in 
Japan, even clothing became a target of reform. The turban and the fez were banned outright, as 
were veils in all government institutions including schools as of the end of 1925. This was most 
alanning  to  certain  hard-line  conservatives  who  found  that  western  head  garbs  were 
blasphemous, since one could not show humility before God because the rims make it impossible 
to prostrate oneself fully when praying. 
In  a way,  Kemal  had  waged his  own war on  the  Ottoman Empire,  and  it had  been  a 
blitzkrieg.  He had  capitalized on every advantage,  securing his  hold on the reins  of power in 
order to bring his vision of a modem, secular Turkey to life. Sa where did this leave Turkey with 
regards to the international society of  the late 1920s? Le Figaro was justified in reporting that the 
Turks had  for  the first timè in their long history, been accepted as  members of the diplomatie 
community.  But one must remember that that community itself had  gone through sorne very 
dramatic  changes,  most  relevant to  this  case  being the  'pluralisation'  of international  society, 
which by definition  cornes  with a relaxation in  the  standard  of civilization and  a reduction  in 
both the depth of and  adherence to  the ordering principles. In the particular case of the  192ü's, 
nationalism also came to be a core tenet of international political ideology. It cannot be stressed 
enough,  however, that Turkey quite literally had to  fight  for  every inch of its  sovereignty. No 
Entente  power  had  ever  truly  envisioned  a  Turkish  state,  republic  or  otherwise,  and  the 
diplomatie history of the nineteenth century was in many ways repeated in Paris and afterwards 
right up to the treaty of Lausanne. 
Beyond  any doubt, Turkey's admittance had been incredibly begrudged, most of all  by 
the  British. European statesmen and  scholars alike seemed to  have two major gripes even with 
respect  to  the  new  republic.  The  first,  of course,  was  the  Ottomans'  very memorable  past 
disposition for bloody misrule that was not easily forgotten. The Ghazi's autocracy was not at all 
reassuring.  Raymond  Poincaré  would  say  of the  Turkish  Republicans  that  "[l]a  révolution 
accompli  par  des  Ottomans  enthousiastes  avait  eu  pour  cause  la  funeste  incurie  du  système 
hamidien;  mais  sous des  apparences d'abord libérales,  le  nouveau  gouvernement avait persisté 
dans  les mêmes habitudes d'arbitrairité et de violence"  (Garnier,  1973:  p.  115).  The Weberian 99 
charismatic leader had become the new patriarch and thus the leader of a new bureaucracy, one 
that he was fashioning after his own beliefs. While the Sultan ruled over his 'human cattle' as pel' 
his god-given duty,  Kemal was, in his own mind at least, a servant ofthe people ofTurkey. That 
didn't make Karabekir Pasha's criticism any less true, however. When a journalist asked Atatürk 
what would happen if parliament voted for a constitutional monarchy, he replied that should that 
be the case,  "we shall chase them away with a big stick"  (Jevakhoff,  1989:  p.  332). The main 
criticism of Kemal, and certainly the most widespread, was that despite his benevolence, the old 
state-subject relations had not changed (Aktar, 1985: ch. 5). 
The second major European discomfort was directly related to  the first. Turkey had been 
a  deeply  religious  country,  and  despite  the  comparative  lack  of bloodshed  in  the  Turkish 
revolution, there was a sort of cultural, even spiritual brutality to  the forced secularization of the 
Kemalists.  Throughout  his  campaign  across  the  country  to  bolster support for  the  resistance 
against Greece, Atatürk never gave any sign that any religious aspect of society would change. 
He often referred  to  God  in  his  speeches,  he went to  prayer on  Fridays,  and  he even had  the 
Ankaran parliamentary sessions opened with prayer in the early years (Ternon, 2005: p.  383). He 
100 a sneak attack on theocratic institutions. When the Caliphate was abolished, he managed to 
make Islam subservient to republican needs. A Bureau ofReligious Affairs was opened to fill  the 
void, but also to  subdue and control religiosity. Secularization was thus unnatural. Even Arnold 
Toynbee, who by his own admission admired the Ghazi, was alanned by "the general holocaust 
of ancient  social  possessions"  (Toynbee  and  Kirkwood,  1927:  p.  243).  Writing  in  1926,  the 
historian added that: 
the  transfonnation had  been  induced by the  force  of a strong personality;  it  could not 
reproduce itselfwhen that personal stimulus was removed.[ ...  ] This is the main danger of 
the present situation in Turkey. The refonns run the risk of dying out with the refonners 
by sheer inertia, unless the leaders can pass on the momentum to  others as effective and 
as enthusiastic, while more numerous than themselves (ibid: pp. 257-258). 
In other words, the big danger was that the changes just wouldn't stick. There were ample signs 
from  within that this might be the case. The magnitude of change was as great as  its speed was 
blistering,  and  a  mood  that  can  be  described  as  nihilistic  angst  settled  in.  Mehmet  Emin,  a 
professor of  philosophy, wrote in 1928: 
We are  facing  a  spiritual  chaos, As  a  result  of the  destruction  of the  institutions  of 
religion  which  came  down  from  the  past  and  which  were  found  incompatible  with 100 
national life as  weil  as  modem civilization, unrest had  developed in men's souls.  Up  to 
now,  we  have  associated  Islam  with  [...]  the  legal  actions  of the  state.[...]  The 
sociologica1 consequences of the struggle for national liberation and the power created by 
it have finally demolished ail  fetters.  But, now we are faced with the question of religion 
minus those institutions and with the question of religion as a religious consciousness and 
as a religious experience. [...] Can Islam, reshaped to fit the requirements of secular life, 
fit this need? (Hayat, March 1, 1928, taken from Berkes, 1964: p. 492). Conclusion
 
It  is  clear  that  the  emergence  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey,  which  implies  both 
secularization  and  acceptance  into  the  diplomatie  community,  was  the  result  of historically 
specifie circumstances  after a very slow and long progression of Western-inspired reforrns.  It 
was  both  inevitable,  the  result  of many  past  actions  finally  coalescing,  and  a  total  fluke, 
impossible without a great number of variables all  lining up  favourably for  Kemalists against 
overwhelming odds. 
Turkish-European  convergence  more  or  less  happened  in  mne  steps:  trade;  systemic 
political interaction brought on by geographical proximity; minimal convergence defined by an 
initial adoption of  the most basic principles of  European international institutions by the Ottoman 
Empire;  European  technological  domination  leading  to  an  imposition  of Western  customs 
entrenched  by juridical measures  within the Porte;  initial  voluntary internalization of Western 
culture in the hopes of modernizing the Empire coupled with a moderate increase in  interaction 
between  Ottomans  and  Europeans;  a  cosmopolitan  convergence,  meaning  the  creation  of a 
European-minded intellectual-administrative class in the empire; bifurcation of the Ottoman state 
characterized  by the emergence of a  dual  set of institutions,  one based  in  traditional  Islamic 
culture,  the other in  western  secularism;  a period of international  chaos  which overthrew  the 
traditional understanding of great power management, created  an  international  power vacuum 
and  delegitimized the Sultan, allowing the Westernized element of Ottoman society to  take over 
Turkey and claim its place as a nation-state within the new pluralist international society; finally, 
consolidation  of the  new  Turkish  Republic  both  intemally  through  the  state's  creation  and 
imposition of a new, self-perpetuating secular culture, and internationally, first through military 
victory, then through compliance with accepted international practice. 
The first  politically ordered  interplay between Europeans  and  the  Ottoman  Empire,  a 
states-society  in  its  own  right,  revolved  around  trade.  Regardless  of whom  they  favoured, 
capitula were little more than business arrangements designed to facilitate commerce, supporting 
the ES  view that trade acts as the 'ice-breaker' of international relations. Necessity and curiosity 
spontaneously  create trade  routes,  whichonce established,  become  lucrative  and  thus  attract 
interstate govemmental involvement to secure roads, raise levees, and so on.  In the this case, the 
cultural exchanges that may have otherwise flourished from  East-West trade, as  they had in so 102 
many past occasions, were kept to  a minimum by the exclusive nature of the religious principles 
wlùch  governed external relations on both sides.  Trade did  lead to  formaI  contact between the 
Sultan and  European governments through their envoys however, and given the proximity and 
power of the Islamic empire, it was only a matter of time before political necessities of a more 
engaging nature would arise.  As they did, the Ottomans were drawn into  a distinctly European 
balancing act.  When the Sultans first participated in  the balance of power, they did  so  purely 
intuitively. 
FosteringProtestants ta  weaken the Pope amounted  to  no  more than 'the enemy of my 
enemy is  my friend',  which is  not quite as  subtle nor intricate as  balancing in the institutional 
sense of the term. But the die had been cast and time would do  the rest. The eighteenth century 
would  usher  in  a  very  moderate  increase  in  the  number  and  depth  of interactions,  but  the 
foundations  for  permanent diplomatic relations were established.  While European  technology 
and  administration  improved  thanks  to  the increased  competition  that  accompanied  a  weaker 
Vatican,  the  theocratic  monolith  that  reigned  in  Istanbul  made significant innovations  nearly 
impossible  within  the  Umma.  European  domination  increasingly  led  to  an  economically 
extractive relationship that would be institutionalized by capitula.  Another recurring pattern of 
relations  that  emerges from  that  century,  brought on by the  increased  competition of a  more 
pluralist Europe and  aggravated by the ascension of Russia to  the rank of world power, is  the 
kaleidoscopic  deal-making  and  breaking  between  competing  European  states  and  the  Porte. 
Geography put the Turks at the center of everyone's ambitions, and the fact  that the 'sick man' 
was coming undone made him that much more of a tantalizing target. Even in the more solidarist 
epoch of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire represented the primary and irremediable 
source of strife amongst occidental governments. It didn't help that the Osmanli patriarchs would 
playon rivalries to get their way. These three patterns of international relations would define the 
nineteenth century and perdure into the twentieth. 
External weakness, whether economic or military in nature, was the one and only impetus 
for reformative and revolutionary change. Even the more ideologically-motivated Kemalists had 
ta capitalize on the outrage provoked by a Greek invasion to seize power and transform the state. 
As a result ofbeing reactive rather than goal oriented, earlier reforms were not weIl planned and 
lacked foresight regarding their effects. Efforts were further hindered by two main factors. First, 
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willing to make changes had to  face the entire theocratic and conservative institutions built-in to 
his  administration.  From the mightiest  Sey-ul  Islam  to  the lowliest mullah,  any given reform 
axed in Western thought would have had half the Ottoman government working against it from 
square one. The second obstacle was external. Ottoman instability was a source of consternation 
for  aIl  five  of the  most  powerful  European  empires  throughout  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
central powers would have been caught in the middle of any confrontation between Russia and 
Britain, whose main concern was control of the Straits (and France balanced between Russia and 
the UK to  protect its own interests). They would either seek to  stabilize the Porte through legal 
reforms or use diplomatie or economic pressure to secure their goals in the Empire. 
Though European motivations were not always  entirely self-serving,  Ottoman reforms 
that were the result of external coercion were problematic more often than not. The Concert of 
Europe may have been more organized and/or less competitive elsewhere as  in China, but there 
was neither much coordination nor cooperation on their part with regards to the Ottoman Empire. 
Russia, France, the VI( and others would all pursue their own agendas. The reforms that resulted 
from their compelling thus went in too  many different directions at once, effectively making it 
impossible  to  achieve  lasting  or  meaningful  advances,  another  similarity  to  present-day 
international aid and development. The gravitational pull of the most powerful European empires 
and  the  internaI  Islamic  orthodoxy's  resistance  would  have  each  made  politico-economic 
advancement an arduous endeavour on their own, but combined, they made it nearly impossible. 
Reforms were not creating enough change in the short tenn, and big changes never came because 
the haphazard little reforrns were not adding up in the medium to long terrns. 
One thing the Ottomans did  not realize for  a long time was that it  was not possible to 
itemize  western  military  superiority  or  industrial  capacity  from  the  rest  of Europe's  social 
technologies:  culture  is  a  package  deal.  Weaponry,  banking,  industrialization  and  the 
Renaissance were all linked by a unique historical evolution that resulted in the singular socio­
economic construct known as  Europe.  But at the end of the nineteenth century, the Porte still 
maintained so many feudal elements in its social organization that it could scarcely compete with 
the efficiency of the West. It is ironie that the military academies that were erected to  strengthen 
the  empire are  what brought it down in  the end.  The introduction of Western culture spread 
through Ottoman institutions like tumours. Though the foreign elements may have been benign 
enough at first, the effect on traditional culture became irreversible when the state's vital organs 104 
were infected. The higher education facilities created the new leaders of the bureaucracy and of 
the  anned  forces,  putting these partisans of modernity exactly where they were  most  able  to 
create  change.  In  1908,  the  Young Turks' parliament became the  first  governmental  body to 
openly discuss the possible effects of reform and to consider their various options. It is perhaps a 
little sad that they ended up as casualties of war. Their government was by no means perfect, but 
it  was  headed  in  an  interesting if not  unique  direction,  and  given  enough time,  it  may have 
produced  a  truly  authentic  form  of  government,  blending  eastern  and  western  political 
philosophies. They may have created something a little more Turkish or they may have reverted 
to Orthodoxy like their neighbours to  the East. If things were different, they just wouldn't be the 
same, as the saying goes. 
At the end of the war, the Ottoman government was at  its lowest point ever with respect 
to  the European standard of civilization despite the fact  that they had made sorne progress in  a 
decade of parliamentary government.  European  antipathies  for  the Sublime Porte ran  so deep 
that,  as  soon as he was subdued after the Great War, the Sultan was doomed to  remain a western 
puppet  despite  changes  in  the  ordering  principles  of the  international  society  that  favoured 
nationalist  causes.  Turkey became a member of the  international  society first  because of the 
latter's shift towards the pluralist end of the spectrum and second, because it resisted attempts by 
Europeans to  subjugate it. It took two hundred years of snail-paced reforms which nevertheless 
led  to  the creation of an  'en1ightened' administrative-intellectual class, the disappearance of the 
Habsburg  Empire,  the  transformation  of Russia  into  the  Soviet  Union,  the  bankruptcy  and 
military exhaustion of England, France and  Germany, the power vacuum that resulted from  ail 
this,  an  Allied-sponsored  Greek  invasion,  a killer monkey, a  180 degree shift in  international 
political principles and  a very determined and  charismatic Turkish general taking command of 
the army and the enlightened administrative-intellectual class within it to oust the Sultan to make 
Turkey a member of  the international society. 
1 
But to  be clear, Turkey became a member of a pluralist international society which was 
(and still is) European in  origin, but not part of the European international society itself. Europe 
still represented 'the inner ring' or 'the core', and many 'uncivilized' areas of the world remained 
1 Turkey's  is  not  the  only case  in  which military force  against  the  international  society was  a decisive factor  in 
membership  to  il.  Despite Peter the  Great's  creation of modern  institutions at  the  begiruling  of the  seventeenth 
century, it was  his military expansion into Scandinavia and  the Baltic which brought him into Europe's diplomatie 
conununity. Japan's naval vic tory over Russia in 1905 marked the former's entry as weIl. 105 
in the outer ring.  But the Treaty of Paris had  created a semi-periphery of international society 
which  had  been  growing  since  1856.  Its  numbers  were  initially  increased  by American  ex­
colonial, Balkan and Asian states. After World War l, cultural factors came to  play less of a part 
than  economic  and  material  ones,  and  as  a  result,  the  new  states  emerging  from  imperial 
carcasses  were  also  relegated  to  the  semi  periphery  for  lack  of means.  Turkey joined  this 
enlarged semi-periphery of international society. 
Turkish Lessons for the English School 
A common observation about the ES  is that it is unwieldy. It may weIl be inaccessible for 
the novice political scientist.  Its ontological complexity makes it hard to  apply thoroughly, not 
to  mention the vague and  often lacking amount of theory addressing the linkages between the 
different 'layers' of international relations. Nevertheless, given an adequate amount of contextual 
research  which  can  be  multidisciplinary,  drawing  from  the  full  spectrum  of  economic, 
sociological and  cultural studies, the ES  allows for an incredible amount of subtlety, depth and 
breadth.  For one thing, the line drawn between domestic and international politics is  still there, 
though  it  is  much  more  porous.  The  scholar  is  thus  liberated  from  the  shackles  of purely 
systemic-Ievel analyses. In fact, the ES  demands consideration of aIl  three 'images', that is of the 
individual, of the state and of the system, which again brings us back to  the lacking degree of 
clarity with regards to interactions between the three. 
As the creator, preserver, transmitter and evolver of  political thought, the individual is the 
fundamental  unit of analysis  in  the ES.  The individual operates within the state,  and  the state 
within the system. The international system has two international horizontal levels. There is the 
international society (or societies), complete with practices, customs and norms based in its own 
set of values.  Its  principle components are states.  Cosmopolitan society, on the other hand, is a 
purely inter-human horizontal international phenomenon. You and 1 are its basic units. The first 
main  complication with  this model  is  that Cosmopolitan Society is  simultaneously associated 
with  Kantian-type  aspirations  towards  a  single  world-state  and  with  anti  status  quo 
revolutionism.  LogicaIly,  this  does  not  follow.  It  presupposes  that  revolutionist  ideas  will 
increase interstate solidarity in  the system as  a whole when that has never been the case. Of the 
three  international  revolutions  identified  by Wight,  those  being  the  Reformation,  the  French 
Revolution and the Russian Revolution, not one brought the world closer together. The first two 
never aimed to  and the third would have had to  overtake the rest of the planet through violent 106 
uprising to achieve total global convergence. During the age of empires, the idea that nationalism 
was  a  legitimate  principle  by  which  to  organize  the  international  system  spread  through 
Cosmopolitan circles before it was accepted in diplomatic ones. But nationalism is an inherently 
divisive idea and practice. Even human rights, the cosmopolitan ideal of  our times, cannot escape 
the criticism that imposing one's values on others is a violent act.  Cosmopolitan society is a very 
useful concept that may be better off if it was simply detached from any allusions to  a Kantian 
world-state. 
The second major problem rests in  the ill-established connections between Cosmopolitan 
society, state leaders and the values of the dominant international society. International societies' 
values  are  created  and  maintained  by  state-leaders,  academics  and  various  diplomatic 
professionals. Yet as  individuals, these people belong to  Cosmopolitan Society as  weil. So how 
does  that  work  exactly?  Are  ideas  unidirectional,  only  'trickling  up'  from  cosinopolitan  to 
international society? Do cosmopolitan ideas only flow outward from the center to  the periphery 
and  beyond  in  international  society?  In  this  scenario,  the  answer  is  a  qualified  yes  on  both 
counts,  though this observation is  certainly case-specific.  General patterns would only emerge 
after  a  lengthy,  thorough  and  narrow1y  focused  comparative study.  Until  then,  we  may only 
speculate. The westernized Ottoman class created and perpetuated by western education can only 
be described  as  Cosmopolitan.  If there  were  such  a  thing  as  a  standard  of civilization  for 
individuals, these men  (and after Atatürk, women) would have met it.  As this study may have 
unintentionally pointed out, the ES  has much in  cornmon with Immanuel Wallerstein's take on 
World  Systems Theory. To Wallerstein, the economic centre of the international system stays 
dominant  in  part  because it  creates  a  directing  class  fashioned  in  its  own  image  throughout 
peripheral states, then co-opts that elite to  run the peripheral state in a way that is subservient or 
at  least  complementary  to  the  central  states'  interest.  These  are  very  broad  strokes,  and  the 
Turkish case does not fit exactly into this model, but the parallels are c1ear. 
"Change Is Eternal. Nothing Ever Changes." 
"Both clichés are 'true'"  (Wallerstein,  1974:  p.  1).  The observation applies  exceedingly 
weil to  the Turks. Kemalist reforms didn't die out from 1ack of inertia. The changes did stick and 
sa  did  the Treaty of Lausanne,  the most long-lived of the post-war agreements.  On the day it 
became a republic, the 'father' of  modem Turkey proc1aimed: 
Our object now is  to  strengthen the ties  that  bind us  to  other nations. There may be a 107 
great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to 
achieve progress, she must be a part of this one civilization.  [...] The Ottoman Empire 
began to  decline the day when, proud of her successes against the West, she cut ties that 
bound her to  the European nations. We will not repeat this mistake (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: 
p.51). 
Turkey won its place in the new, bigger but less cohesive international society, among the 
'civilized' states. To keep it, Kemal knew that he had to eliminate the possibility  of an Orthodox 
conservative backlas. In the 1930's, the Kemalists set out to  create a new Turkish identity. The 
state would create the nation. History was rewritten, the Turkish language was purged ofPersian 
and  Arabic words.
2  The Six Arrows was the name given to  the statist manifesto created by the 
Ghazi in  1931. The 'arrows' are metaphors for  the directions in which he wanted his nation to 
progress  and  they  are  republicanism,  secularism,  populism,  nationalism,  statism  and  the 
revolutionary spirit.  These principles were incorporated  into  the constitution in  1937 and  they 
would  outlive  their  progenitor,  but  as  with  the  secular  states  of Europe,  so  would  religious 
paradoxes within the government. The Bureau of Religious Affairs still organizes and  sponsors 
the Hadj  for eligible citizens. Turkey is  still caught between two worlds. It sided with the West 
during the  Cold  War.  The American missiles  there  were  pivotaI  bargaining chips  during  the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. It sided with the West again during the Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan, but 
still, its membership applications to  the European Union have been denied. Kemalist autocracy 
has  long been dead  and  the democratic republic remains secular.  Marginalization of the  more 
religiously  inclined  segments of the  population has  gone  a  long  way towards  re-establishing 
Islamic  rhetoric  at  the  heart  of opposition  parties'  platforms.  But  so  does  every  European 
rejection. 
A popular slogan throughout the  1990's was  "Turkey will never be Iran."  The Islamic 
Welfare Party nevertheless resurrected the dyad juxtaposing Islam versus the West and attempted 
to restore ties with Libya and Iran during its very short tenure as part of a coalition government 
in  1996,  after the EU turned Turkey down,  a decision based on cultural determinants and  the 
treatment of Turkey' s Kurdish minority. The latter obstacle had been overcome by 2005, but at 
that time, the EU would raise economic objections. Howcurious that Greece somehow met these 
economic  requirements  when  Turkey  did  not.  Change  is  constant.  Nothing  ever  changes. 
2  Ifthere was no synonym of  Turkish origin, a European, usually French term would be used. Bibliography
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